frequently test in California

1985The present rule does not appear to serve the need for conserving judicial resources occasioned by the law explosion." ( Canal-Randolph Anaheim, Inc. v. Wilkoski (1978) 78 Cal. App.3d 477, 488, fn. 4 [ 144 Cal. Rptr. 474 ].) The trial court evidently viewed Budaeff as having softened the frequently stated rule requiring demand for the exact amount of rent due, and the court specifically rejected defendant's argument that Budaeff did not control where the statutory remedy of unlawful detainer was utilized by the landlord.

1985The present rule does not appear to serve the need for conserving judicial resources occasioned by the law explosion.” (Canal-Randolph Anaheim, Inc. v. Wilkoski (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 477, 488, fn. 4 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 474 ].) The trial court evidently viewed Budaeff as having softened the frequently stated rule requiring demand for the exact amount of rent due, and the court specifically rejected defendant’s argument that Budaeff did not control where the statutory remedy of unlawful detainer was utilized by the landlord.

1971(See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the "Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup.Ct.Rev. 191, 221.) [8] See also Ginzburg v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 463, 474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 31, 40 , 86 S.Ct. 942 ] (Brennan, J.): "No weight is ascribed to the fact that petitioners have profited from the sale of publications which we have assumed ... cannot themselves be judged obscene in the abstract; to sanction consideration of this fact might induce self-censorship, and offend the frequently stated principle that commercial activity, in itself, is no justification for narrowing the

1971(See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on the "Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup.Ct.Rev. 191, 221.) [8] See also Ginzburg v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 463, 474 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 31, 40 , 86 S.Ct. 942 ] (Brennan, J.): "No weight is ascribed to the fact that petitioners have profited from the sale of publications which we have assumed ... cannot themselves be judged obscene in the abstract; to sanction consideration of this fact might induce self-censorship, and offend the frequently stated principle that commercial activity, in itself, is no justification for narrowing the

1967(Green Trees Enterprises, Inc. v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 66 Cal.2d 782, 784 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 427 P.2d 805 ].) Contention : Mustard did not reasonably make expenditures in reliance upon Hammond's permisison to use the road.

1967(Green Trees Enterprises, Inc. v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc., 66 Cal.2d 782, 784 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 427 P.2d 805 ].) Contention : Mustard did not reasonably make expenditures in reliance upon Hammond's permisison to use the road.

1963Evidentiary use of an involuntary confession is a denial of due process of law, violating both federal and state Constitutions and requiring reversal of the conviction, even in the presence of independent corroborating evidence of guilt. {Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 [ 83 S.Ct. 917 , 9 L.Ed.2d 922 ]; Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583-584 [ 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037, 1046-1047 ]; People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 385 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ]; People v. Berve, 51 Cal.2d 286, 290 [ 332 P.2d 97 ].) A frequently stated test is whether the behavior of the state’s law enfo

1963Evidentiary use of an involuntary confession is a denial of due process of law, violating both federal and state Constitutions and requiring reversal of the conviction, even in the presence of independent corroborating evidence of guilt. {Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 [ 83 S.Ct. 917 , 9 L.Ed.2d 922 ]; Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583-584 [ 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037, 1046-1047 ]; People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 385 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ]; People v. Berve, 51 Cal.2d 286, 290 [ 332 P.2d 97 ].) A frequently stated test is whether the behavior of the state’s law enfo

1963It is our obligation to examine the uncontradicted facts in order to determine independently whether the confession was voluntary. {Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 316 [ 79 S.Ct. 1202 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1265, 1267 ]; People v. Trout, 54 Cal.2d 576, 583 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 759 , 354 P.2d 231 , 80 A.L.R.2d 1418 ].) We turn to the facts: Mrs. Wilma McAfee, an elderly widow, was the manager of an apartment house in the central portion of Sacramento.

1963It is our obligation to examine the uncontradicted facts in order to determine independently whether the confession was voluntary. {Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 316 [ 79 S.Ct. 1202 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1265, 1267 ]; People v. Trout, 54 Cal.2d 576, 583 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 759 , 354 P.2d 231 , 80 A.L.R.2d 1418 ].) We turn to the facts: Mrs. Wilma McAfee, an elderly widow, was the manager of an apartment house in the central portion of Sacramento.

1963Evidentiary use of an involuntary confession is a denial of due process of law, violating both federal and state Constitutions and requiring reversal of the conviction, even in the presence of independent corroborating evidence of guilt. {Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 [ 83 S.Ct. 917 , 9 L.Ed.2d 922 ]; Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583-584 [ 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037, 1046-1047 ]; People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 385 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ]; People v. Berve, 51 Cal.2d 286, 290 [ 332 P.2d 97 ].) A frequently stated test is whether the behavior of the state’s law enfo

1963Evidentiary use of an involuntary confession is a denial of due process of law, violating both federal and state Constitutions and requiring reversal of the conviction, even in the presence of independent corroborating evidence of guilt. {Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 [ 83 S.Ct. 917 , 9 L.Ed.2d 922 ]; Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583-584 [ 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037, 1046-1047 ]; People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 385 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ]; People v. Berve, 51 Cal.2d 286, 290 [ 332 P.2d 97 ].) A frequently stated test is whether the behavior of the state’s law enfo

1963Evidentiary use of an involuntary confession is a denial of due process of law, violating both federal and state Constitutions and requiring reversal of the conviction, even in the presence of independent corroborating evidence of guilt. {Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 [ 83 S.Ct. 917 , 9 L.Ed.2d 922 ]; Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583-584 [ 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037, 1046-1047 ]; People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 385 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ]; People v. Berve, 51 Cal.2d 286, 290 [ 332 P.2d 97 ].) A frequently stated test is whether the behavior of the state’s law enfo

1963Evidentiary use of an involuntary confession is a denial of due process of law, violating both federal and state Constitutions and requiring reversal of the conviction, even in the presence of independent corroborating evidence of guilt. {Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 [ 83 S.Ct. 917 , 9 L.Ed.2d 922 ]; Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583-584 [ 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037, 1046-1047 ]; People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 385 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ]; People v. Berve, 51 Cal.2d 286, 290 [ 332 P.2d 97 ].) A frequently stated test is whether the behavior of the state’s law enfo

1963Evidentiary use of an involuntary confession is a denial of due process of law, violating both federal and state Constitutions and requiring reversal of the conviction, even in the presence of independent corroborating evidence of guilt. {Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 [ 83 S.Ct. 917 , 9 L.Ed.2d 922 ]; Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583-584 [ 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037, 1046-1047 ]; People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 385 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ]; People v. Berve, 51 Cal.2d 286, 290 [ 332 P.2d 97 ].) A frequently stated test is whether the behavior of the state’s law enfo

1963Evidentiary use of an involuntary confession is a denial of due process of law, violating both federal and state Constitutions and requiring reversal of the conviction, even in the presence of independent corroborating evidence of guilt. {Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 [ 83 S.Ct. 917 , 9 L.Ed.2d 922 ]; Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583-584 [ 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037, 1046-1047 ]; People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 385 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ]; People v. Berve, 51 Cal.2d 286, 290 [ 332 P.2d 97 ].) A frequently stated test is whether the behavior of the state’s law enfo

1963Evidentiary use of an involuntary confession is a denial of due process of law, violating both federal and state Constitutions and requiring reversal of the conviction, even in the presence of independent corroborating evidence of guilt. {Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 [ 83 S.Ct. 917 , 9 L.Ed.2d 922 ]; Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583-584 [ 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037, 1046-1047 ]; People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 385 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ]; People v. Berve, 51 Cal.2d 286, 290 [ 332 P.2d 97 ].) A frequently stated test is whether the behavior of the state’s law enfo

1963Evidentiary use of an involuntary confession is a denial of due process of law, violating both federal and state Constitutions and requiring reversal of the conviction, even in the presence of independent corroborating evidence of guilt. {Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 [ 83 S.Ct. 917 , 9 L.Ed.2d 922 ]; Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583-584 [ 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037, 1046-1047 ]; People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 385 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ]; People v. Berve, 51 Cal.2d 286, 290 [ 332 P.2d 97 ].) A frequently stated test is whether the behavior of the state’s law enfo

1963It is our obligation to examine the uncontradicted facts in order to determine independently whether the confession was voluntary. {Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 316 [ 79 S.Ct. 1202 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1265, 1267 ]; People v. Trout, 54 Cal.2d 576, 583 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 759 , 354 P.2d 231 , 80 A.L.R.2d 1418 ].) We turn to the facts: Mrs. Wilma McAfee, an elderly widow, was the manager of an apartment house in the central portion of Sacramento.

1963It is our obligation to examine the uncontradicted facts in order to determine independently whether the confession was voluntary. {Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 316 [ 79 S.Ct. 1202 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1265, 1267 ]; People v. Trout, 54 Cal.2d 576, 583 [ 6 Cal.Rptr. 759 , 354 P.2d 231 , 80 A.L.R.2d 1418 ].) We turn to the facts: Mrs. Wilma McAfee, an elderly widow, was the manager of an apartment house in the central portion of Sacramento.

1963Evidentiary use of an involuntary confession is a denial of due process of law, violating both federal and state Constitutions and requiring reversal of the conviction, even in the presence of independent corroborating evidence of guilt. {Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 [ 83 S.Ct. 917 , 9 L.Ed.2d 922 ]; Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 583-584 [ 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037, 1046-1047 ]; People v. Parham, 60 Cal.2d 378, 385 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 497 , 384 P.2d 1001 ]; People v. Berve, 51 Cal.2d 286, 290 [ 332 P.2d 97 ].) A frequently stated test is whether the behavior of the state’s law enfo

1952As is pointed out by Mr. Justice Shaw in the opinion rendered on the application for rehearing in the Latour case, supra, page 437: ‘ ‘ The hearing of these two proceedings [petition for probate and the contest] must come at the same time, and it is this circumstance which causes the confusion about the proper method of procedure.” The frequently stated rule that the matter of the order of proof in such a case rests in the sound discretion of the trial court (Estate of Relph, supra, 192 Cal. 451, 459-460 ; see discussion in Estate of Black, 199 Cal. 257, 261 [ 248 P. 1015 ]), and the concept o

1952As is pointed out by Mr. Justice Shaw in the opinion rendered on the application for rehearing in the Latour case, supra, page 437: ‘ ‘ The hearing of these two proceedings [petition for probate and the contest] must come at the same time, and it is this circumstance which causes the confusion about the proper method of procedure.” The frequently stated rule that the matter of the order of proof in such a case rests in the sound discretion of the trial court (Estate of Relph, supra, 192 Cal. 451, 459-460 ; see discussion in Estate of Black, 199 Cal. 257, 261 [ 248 P. 1015 ]), and the concept o