Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1973–1999 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Gonzalezred2 sentences1998It would be unconscionable to deny relief if a petitioner conclusively established his innocence without directly refuting every minute item of the prosecution's proof, or if a petitioner utterly destroyed the theory on which the People relied without rebutting all other possible scenarios which, if they had been presented at trial, might have tended to support a verdict of guilt." ( Ibid; see also People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1246 , 275 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 800 P.2d 1159 .) Applying this standard to the present case, in assessing whether petitioner has met his burden of proving his br 1998It would be unconscionable to deny relief if a petitioner conclusively established his innocence without directly refuting every minute item of the prosecution's proof, or if a petitioner utterly destroyed the theory on which the People relied without rebutting all other possible scenarios which, if they had been presented at trial, might have tended to support a verdict of guilt." ( Ibid; see also People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1246 , 275 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 800 P.2d 1159 .) Applying this standard to the present case, in assessing whether petitioner has met his burden of proving his br | 2 | 2 |
Los Angeles Unified School District v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Boardgreen2 sentences1999Appeals Bd. (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 823, 827 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 116 ].) Finally, Bode’s suggested statutory interpretation would lead to absurd results, by transmuting a short time limit intended to protect the public from the unwarranted release of dangerous prisoners into a hypertechnical rule favoring the very prisoners from whom the statute sought to protect the public. 1999Appeals Bd. (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 823, 827 [ 198 Cal.Rptr. 116 ].) Finally, Bode’s suggested statutory interpretation would lead to absurd results, by transmuting a short time limit intended to protect the public from the unwarranted release of dangerous prisoners into a hypertechnical rule favoring the very prisoners from whom the statute sought to protect the public. | 1 | 1 |
Tiernan v. Trustees of California State University and Collegesgreen2 sentences1999As Presiding Justice Puglia observed in Arafiles, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at page 1475 : “The construction proposed by the petitioner is ‘repugnant to the general purview’ of the statute (Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 219 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 115 , 655 P.2d 317 ]) and would lead to absurd consequences. 1999As Presiding Justice Puglia observed in Arafiles, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at page 1475 : “The construction proposed by the petitioner is ‘repugnant to the general purview’ of the statute (Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 219 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 115 , 655 P.2d 317 ]) and would lead to absurd consequences. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Kaygreen2 sentences1973(See San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson (1971) 3 Cal.3d 937 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 309 , 479 P.2d 669 ]; In re Cox, supra,. 3 Cal.3d 205, 223 ; In re Kay (1970) 1 Cal.3d 930, 942-943 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 686 , 464 P.2d 142 ].) But, of course, the point is not at issue since no male toplessness has in fact been forbidden. 1973(See San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson (1971) 3 Cal.3d 937 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 309 , 479 P.2d 669 ]; In re Cox, supra,. 3 Cal.3d 205, 223 ; In re Kay (1970) 1 Cal.3d 930, 942-943 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 686 , 464 P.2d 142 ].) But, of course, the point is not at issue since no male toplessness has in fact been forbidden. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Weber
green
2 sentences1998In Hall, relying on In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703 , 114 Cal.Rptr. 429 , 523 P.2d 229 , we articulated a standard of review of claims of actual innocence: The evidence supporting such claims must be "conclusive" and "'point unerringly to innocence.'" ( Hall, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 423 , 179 Cal. *887 Rptr. 223, 637 P.2d 690 .) We rejected, however, the suggestion that this standard imposes "either the hypertechnical requirement that each bit of prosecutorial evidence be specifically refuted, or the virtually impossible burden of proving there is no conceivable basis on which the prosecution 1998In Hall, relying on In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703 , 114 Cal.Rptr. 429 , 523 P.2d 229 , we articulated a standard of review of claims of actual innocence: The evidence supporting such claims must be "conclusive" and "'point unerringly to innocence.'" ( Hall, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 423 , 179 Cal. *887 Rptr. 223, 637 P.2d 690 .) We rejected, however, the suggestion that this standard imposes "either the hypertechnical requirement that each bit of prosecutorial evidence be specifically refuted, or the virtually impossible burden of proving there is no conceivable basis on which the prosecution | 3 | 1981–1998 |
In Re Hall
green
2 sentences1998In Hall, relying on In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703 , 114 Cal.Rptr. 429 , 523 P.2d 229 , we articulated a standard of review of claims of actual innocence: The evidence supporting such claims must be "conclusive" and "'point unerringly to innocence.'" ( Hall, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 423 , 179 Cal. *887 Rptr. 223, 637 P.2d 690 .) We rejected, however, the suggestion that this standard imposes "either the hypertechnical requirement that each bit of prosecutorial evidence be specifically refuted, or the virtually impossible burden of proving there is no conceivable basis on which the prosecution 1998In Hall, relying on In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703 , 114 Cal.Rptr. 429 , 523 P.2d 229 , we articulated a standard of review of claims of actual innocence: The evidence supporting such claims must be "conclusive" and "'point unerringly to innocence.'" ( Hall, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 423 , 179 Cal. *887 Rptr. 223, 637 P.2d 690 .) We rejected, however, the suggestion that this standard imposes "either the hypertechnical requirement that each bit of prosecutorial evidence be specifically refuted, or the virtually impossible burden of proving there is no conceivable basis on which the prosecution | 2 | 1998–1998 |
In Re Arafiles
green
1 sentence1999As Presiding Justice Puglia observed in Arafiles, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at page 1475 : “The construction proposed by the petitioner is ‘repugnant to the general purview’ of the statute (Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 219 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 115 , 655 P.2d 317 ]) and would lead to absurd consequences. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Gallamore v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
green
1 sentence1993Clearly the courts in Gallamore and Garcia elected to transcend the literal language of section 5814 in favor of "achieving a fair balance between the right of the employee to prompt payment of compensation benefits, and the avoidance of imposition upon the employer or carrier of harsh and unreasonable penalties." ( Gallamore, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 828 .) These goals have prompted a number of lower courts to conclude that timely preaward payments should be excluded from the penalty assessment under section 5814. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
San Francisco Unified School District v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1973(See San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson (1971) 3 Cal.3d 937 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 309 , 479 P.2d 669 ]; In re Cox, supra,. 3 Cal.3d 205, 223 ; In re Kay (1970) 1 Cal.3d 930, 942-943 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 686 , 464 P.2d 142 ].) But, of course, the point is not at issue since no male toplessness has in fact been forbidden. 1973(See San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson (1971) 3 Cal.3d 937 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 309 , 479 P.2d 669 ]; In re Cox, supra,. 3 Cal.3d 205, 223 ; In re Kay (1970) 1 Cal.3d 930, 942-943 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 686 , 464 P.2d 142 ].) But, of course, the point is not at issue since no male toplessness has in fact been forbidden. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
In Re Cox
green
2 sentences1973(See San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson (1971) 3 Cal.3d 937 [ 92 Cal.Rptr. 309 , 479 P.2d 669 ]; In re Cox, supra,. 3 Cal.3d 205, 223 ; In re Kay (1970) 1 Cal.3d 930, 942-943 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 686 , 464 P.2d 142 ].) But, of course, the point is not at issue since no male toplessness has in fact been forbidden. 1973(See San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson (1971) 3 Cal.3d 937 [ 92 Cal. Rptr. 309 , 479 P.2d 669 ]; In re Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d 205, 223 ; In re Kay (1970) 1 Cal.3d 930, 942-943 [ 83 Cal. Rptr. 686 , 464 P.2d 142 ].) But, of course, the point is not at issue since no male toplessness has in fact been forbidden. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.