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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Service Employees International Union, Local 1000 v. Department of Personnel Administrationgreen2 sentences2015Union, Local 1000 v. Department of Personnel Admin. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 866, 873 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 457 ].) PegaStaff complains that PG&E’s program violates the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. 2015Union, Local 1000 v. Department of Personnel Admin. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 866, 873 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 457 ].) PegaStaff complains that PG&E’s program violates the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. | 1 | 2 |
Link v. Antioch Unified School Districtgreen2 sentences2015(Leek v. Washington Unified School Dist., supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at pp. 53-54.) In Link v. Antioch Unified School Dist. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 765, 769 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 264 ], this court required exhaustion even where all of the plaintiffs’ claims were styled as constitutional challenges, reasoning that PERB “might validly devise a method to allow plaintiffs to avoid payment for those political and ideological activities they find constitutionally objectionable.” These cases advance “the venerable jurisprudential principle to avoid constitutional questions where other grounds are available.” (Ser 2015(Leek v. Washington Unified School Dist., supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at pp. 53-54.) In Link v. Antioch Unified School Dist. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 765, 769 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 264 ], this court required exhaustion even where all of the plaintiffs’ claims were styled as constitutional challenges, reasoning that PERB “might validly devise a method to allow plaintiffs to avoid payment for those political and ideological activities they find constitutionally objectionable.” These cases advance “the venerable jurisprudential principle to avoid constitutional questions where other grounds are available.” (Ser | 1 | 2 |
People v. Lance W.green2 sentences2009It directly contradicts the well-established jurisprudential principle that, `The judiciary, from the very nature of its powers and means given it by the Constitution, must possess the right to construe the Constitution in the last resort . . . .' [Citations.] In short, in the words of Amador, supra, this `relatively simple enactment [accomplishes] . . . such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision . . . .' [Citations.]" ( Id. at pp. 354-355.) In the course of its discussion, the court in Raven contrasted the proposed change to article I, se 2009It directly contradicts the well-established jurisprudential principle that, ‘The judiciary, from the very nature of its powers and means given it by the Constitution, must possess the right to construe the Constitution in the last resort. . . .’ [Citations.] In short, in the words of Amador, supra, this ‘relatively simple enactment [accomplishes] . . . such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision . . . .’ [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 354-355.) In the course of its discussion, the court in Raven contrasted the proposed change to article I, sect | 1 | 2 |
People v. Superior Court (Romero)green2 sentences2010(Cf., e.g., People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89, 94 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 473 P.2d 993 ]; People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 509-517 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789 , 917 P.2d 628 ].) Accordingly, the familiar jurisprudential principle that statutes should be interpreted, if reasonably possible, to avoid constitutional questions (see, e.g., Miller v. Municipal Court (1943) 22 Cal.2d 818, 828 [ 142 P.2d 297 ]) supports a reading of section 1050.1 that does not condition the validity of a trial court’s determination of good cause under the statute upon the prosecutor’s motion for a co 2010(Cf., e.g., People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89, 94 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 473 P.2d 993 ]; People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 509-517 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789 , 917 P.2d 628 ].) Accordingly, the familiar jurisprudential principle that statutes should be interpreted, if reasonably possible, to avoid constitutional questions (see, e.g., Miller v. Municipal Court (1943) 22 Cal.2d 818, 828 [ 142 P.2d 297 ]) supports a reading of section 1050.1 that does not condition the validity of a trial court’s determination of good cause under the statute upon the prosecutor’s motion for a co | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tenoriogreen2 sentences2010(Cf., e.g., People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89, 94 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 473 P.2d 993 ]; People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 509-517 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789 , 917 P.2d 628 ].) Accordingly, the familiar jurisprudential principle that statutes should be interpreted, if reasonably possible, to avoid constitutional questions (see, e.g., Miller v. Municipal Court (1943) 22 Cal.2d 818, 828 [ 142 P.2d 297 ]) supports a reading of section 1050.1 that does not condition the validity of a trial court’s determination of good cause under the statute upon the prosecutor’s motion for a co 2010(Cf., e.g., People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89, 94 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 473 P.2d 993 ]; People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 509-517 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789 , 917 P.2d 628 ].) Accordingly, the familiar jurisprudential principle that statutes should be interpreted, if reasonably possible, to avoid constitutional questions (see, e.g., Miller v. Municipal Court (1943) 22 Cal.2d 818, 828 [ 142 P.2d 297 ]) supports a reading of section 1050.1 that does not condition the validity of a trial court’s determination of good cause under the statute upon the prosecutor’s motion for a co | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Mun. Court of L. A.green2 sentences2010(Cf., e.g., People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89, 94 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 473 P.2d 993 ]; People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 509-517 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789 , 917 P.2d 628 ].) Accordingly, the familiar jurisprudential principle that statutes should be interpreted, if reasonably possible, to avoid constitutional questions (see, e.g., Miller v. Municipal Court (1943) 22 Cal.2d 818, 828 [ 142 P.2d 297 ]) supports a reading of section 1050.1 that does not condition the validity of a trial court’s determination of good cause under the statute upon the prosecutor’s motion for a co 2010(Cf., e.g., People v. Tenorio (1970) 3 Cal.3d 89, 94 [ 89 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 473 P.2d 993 ]; People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 509-517 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789 , 917 P.2d 628 ].) Accordingly, the familiar jurisprudential principle that statutes should be interpreted, if reasonably possible, to avoid constitutional questions (see, e.g., Miller v. Municipal Court (1943) 22 Cal.2d 818, 828 [ 142 P.2d 297 ]) supports a reading of section 1050.1 that does not condition the validity of a trial court’s determination of good cause under the statute upon the prosecutor’s motion for a co | 1 | 1 |
Marbury v. Madisongreen2 sentences1990It directly contradicts the well-established jurisprudential principle that, “The judiciary, from the very nature of its powers and means given it by the Constitution, must possess the right to construe the Constitution in the last resort . . . .” (Nogues v. Douglass (1858) 7 Cal. 65, 69-70 ; see also Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 [ 2 L.Ed. 60, 73 ] [interpreting and applying the Constitution is “the very essence of judicial power”]; Marin Water, etc. Co. v. Railroad Com. (1916) 171 Cal. 706, 711-712 [ 154 P. 864 ].) In short, in the words of Amador, supra, this “relativ 1990It directly contradicts the well-established jurisprudential principle that, “The judiciary, from the very nature of its powers and means given it by the Constitution, must possess the right to construe the Constitution in the last resort . . . .” (Nogues v. Douglass (1858) 7 Cal. 65, 69-70 ; see also Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 [ 2 L.Ed. 60, 73 ] [interpreting and applying the Constitution is “the very essence of judicial power”]; Marin Water, etc. Co. v. Railroad Com. (1916) 171 Cal. 706, 711-712 [ 154 P. 864 ].) In short, in the words of Amador, supra, this “relativ | 1 | 1 |
Livermore v. Waitegreen2 sentences1990It directly contradicts the well-established jurisprudential principle that, “The judiciary, from the very nature of its powers and means given it by the Constitution, must possess the right to construe the Constitution in the last resort . . . .” (Nogues v. Douglass (1858) 7 Cal. 65, 69-70 ; see also Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 [ 2 L.Ed. 60, 73 ] [interpreting and applying the Constitution is “the very essence of judicial power”]; Marin Water, etc. Co. v. Railroad Com. (1916) 171 Cal. 706, 711-712 [ 154 P. 864 ].) In short, in the words of Amador, supra, this “relativ 1990It directly contradicts the well-established jurisprudential principle that, “The judiciary, from the very nature of its powers and means given it by the Constitution, must possess the right to construe the Constitution in the last resort . . . .” (Nogues v. Douglass (1858) 7 Cal. 65, 69-70 ; see also Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 [ 2 L.Ed. 60, 73 ] [interpreting and applying the Constitution is “the very essence of judicial power”]; Marin Water, etc. Co. v. Railroad Com. (1916) 171 Cal. 706, 711-712 [ 154 P. 864 ].) In short, in the words of Amador, supra, this “relativ | 1 | 1 |
Marin Water & Power Co. v. Railroad Commissiongreen2 sentences1990It directly contradicts the well-established jurisprudential principle that, “The judiciary, from the very nature of its powers and means given it by the Constitution, must possess the right to construe the Constitution in the last resort . . . .” (Nogues v. Douglass (1858) 7 Cal. 65, 69-70 ; see also Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 [ 2 L.Ed. 60, 73 ] [interpreting and applying the Constitution is “the very essence of judicial power”]; Marin Water, etc. Co. v. Railroad Com. (1916) 171 Cal. 706, 711-712 [ 154 P. 864 ].) In short, in the words of Amador, supra, this “relativ 1990It directly contradicts the well-established jurisprudential principle that, “The judiciary, from the very nature of its powers and means given it by the Constitution, must possess the right to construe the Constitution in the last resort . . . .” (Nogues v. Douglass (1858) 7 Cal. 65, 69-70 ; see also Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 [ 2 L.Ed. 60, 73 ] [interpreting and applying the Constitution is “the very essence of judicial power”]; Marin Water, etc. Co. v. Railroad Com. (1916) 171 Cal. 706, 711-712 [ 154 P. 864 ].) In short, in the words of Amador, supra, this “relativ | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Leek v. Washington Unified School District
green
1 sentence2015(Leek v. Washington Unified School Dist., supra, 124 Cal.App.3d at pp. 53-54.) In Link v. Antioch Unified School District (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 765, 768-69 , this court required exhaustion even where all of plaintiffs’ claims were styled as constitutional challenges, reasoning that PERB “might validly devise a method to allow plaintiffs to avoid payment for those political and ideological activities they find constitutionally objectionable.” These cases advance “the venerable jurisprudential principle to avoid constitutional questions where other grounds are available.” (Service Employees Inte | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Frierson
green
2 sentences2009It directly contradicts the well-established jurisprudential principle that, `The judiciary, from the very nature of its powers and means given it by the Constitution, must possess the right to construe the Constitution in the last resort . . . .' [Citations.] In short, in the words of Amador, supra, this `relatively simple enactment [accomplishes] . . . such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision . . . .' [Citations.]" ( Id. at pp. 354-355.) In the course of its discussion, the court in Raven contrasted the proposed change to article I, se 2009It directly contradicts the well-established jurisprudential principle that, ‘The judiciary, from the very nature of its powers and means given it by the Constitution, must possess the right to construe the Constitution in the last resort. . . .’ [Citations.] In short, in the words of Amador, supra, this ‘relatively simple enactment [accomplishes] . . . such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision . . . .’ [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 354-355.) In the course of its discussion, the court in Raven contrasted the proposed change to article I, sect | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Raven v. Deukmejian
green
2 sentences2009As noted, in practical effect, the new provision vests a critical portion of state judicial power in the United States Supreme Court, certainly a fundamental change in our preexisting governmental plan. " ( 52 Cal.3d at p. 355 , italics added.) In the course of its analysis, Raven explicitly distinguished the challenged provisions of article I, section 24, from the discrete restrictions on state constitutional protections that had been found not to constitute constitutional revisions in Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d 142 , and Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d 873 , thus refuting petitioners' suggestion 2009As noted, in practical effect, the new provision vests a critical portion of state judicial power in the United States Supreme Court, certainly a fundamental change in our preexisting governmental plan.” ( 52 Cal.3d at p. 355 , italics added.) In the course of its analysis, Raven explicitly distinguished the challenged provisions of article I, section 24, from the discrete restrictions on state constitutional protections that had been found not to constitute constitutional revisions in Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d 142, and Lance W., supra, 37 Cal.3d 873 , thus refuting petitioners’ suggestion th | 1 | 2009–2009 |
AMADOR VALLEY JT. UN. HIGH SCH. v. State Bd. of Equal.
green
2 sentences2009It directly contradicts the well-established jurisprudential principle that, `The judiciary, from the very nature of its powers and means given it by the Constitution, must possess the right to construe the Constitution in the last resort . . . .' [Citations.] In short, in the words of Amador, supra, this `relatively simple enactment [accomplishes] . . . such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision . . . .' [Citations.]" ( Id. at pp. 354-355.) In the course of its discussion, the court in Raven contrasted the proposed change to article I, se 2009It directly contradicts the well-established jurisprudential principle that, ‘The judiciary, from the very nature of its powers and means given it by the Constitution, must possess the right to construe the Constitution in the last resort. . . .’ [Citations.] In short, in the words of Amador, supra, this ‘relatively simple enactment [accomplishes] . . . such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision . . . .’ [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 354-355.) In the course of its discussion, the court in Raven contrasted the proposed change to article I, sect | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Legislature v. Eu
green
1 sentence2008Eu Bars This Lawsuit A. Eu Holds That Proposition 140 Did Not Revise the California Constitution Our high court analyzed whether Proposition 140 constituted a constitutional amendment or a constitutional revision in Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d 492 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Nougues v. Douglass
green
1 sentence1990It directly contradicts the well-established jurisprudential principle that, “The judiciary, from the very nature of its powers and means given it by the Constitution, must possess the right to construe the Constitution in the last resort . . . .” (Nogues v. Douglass (1858) 7 Cal. 65, 69-70 ; see also Marbury v. Madison (1803) 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 [ 2 L.Ed. 60, 73 ] [interpreting and applying the Constitution is “the very essence of judicial power”]; Marin Water, etc. Co. v. Railroad Com. (1916) 171 Cal. 706, 711-712 [ 154 P. 864 ].) In short, in the words of Amador, supra, this “relativ | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.