Kyne exception in California

1979The Kyne exception is viewed as a narrow one permitting intermediate review only where “the fact of a statutory violation cannot seriously be argued” (Boire v. Miami Herald Publishing Co. (5th Cir. 1965) 343 F.2d 17, 21 , quoted in United Farm Workers v. Superior Court, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d 268, 274 ), or where the agency transgression is “ ' “the type of gross transgression for which we invoke the label ‘jurisdictional’ or ‘clear errors of law’ . . . ." ' " (Cadiz v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 365, 382 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 213 ].) The cases granting or denying intermedia

1979Independent of and prior to Belridge, this court recognized the Kyne exception in United Farm Workers v. Superior Court, supra, 72 Cal.App.3d 268 .

1996In Nishikawa Farms, Inc. v. Mahony, supra, 66 Cal.App.3d 781 , the employer sought trial court writ relief to set aside a representation election, contending the court had jurisdiction because the ALRB acted in excess of its authority in scheduling, conducting, and certifying the election without a petition supported by a majority of the persons employed in the bargaining unit.

1979The Kyne exception in some respects is analogous to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies “in cases in which the Court has granted relief on the ground that the agency has acted in violation of its statute, the action has been so extreme as to be characterized as ‘lawless’ or ‘a clear departure from [a] statutory mandate.’ ” (5 Mezines et al. (1978) Administrative Law, § 49.02(3), p. 49-26.) For two cases where there was a violation of a clear statutory requirement (although Kyne was not discussed but its principle applied) see the preinduction review cases of Breen v. Selec

1979The Kyne exception in some respects is analogous to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies “in cases in which the Court has granted relief on the ground that the agency has acted in violation of its statute, the action has been so extreme as to be characterized as ‘lawless’ or ‘a clear departure from [a] statutory mandate.’ ” (5 Mezines et al. (1978) Administrative Law, § 49.02(3), p. 49-26.) For two cases where there was a violation of a clear statutory requirement (although Kyne was not discussed but its principle applied) see the preinduction review cases of Breen v. Selec

1979In order for Kyne to apply, the action of the Board must be patently without legality (Eastern Greyhound Lines v. Fusco (6th Cir. 1962) 310 F.2d 632 , 635) and the Board must have disregarded a specific and unambiguous statutory directive (Squillacote v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters (7th Cir. 1977) 561 F.2d 31 (a case in which a union unsuccessfully tried to use the Kyne exception)).

1979In order for Kyne to apply, the action of the Board must be patently without legality (Eastern Greyhound Lines v. Fusco (6th Cir. 1962) 310 F.2d 632 , 635) and the Board must have disregarded a specific and unambiguous statutory directive (Squillacote v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters (7th Cir. 1977) 561 F.2d 31 (a case in which a union unsuccessfully tried to use the Kyne exception)).

1979Quoting from Boire v. Miami Herald Publishing Co. (5th Cir.1965) 343 F.2d 17, 21 (cert. den., 382 U.S. 824 [ 15 L.Ed.2d 70 , 86 S.Ct. 56 ]), it was said: "`[I]t seems clear that, in light of the congressional purpose behind limited review of certification proceedings, representation matters are enjoinable only where the fact of a statutory violation cannot seriously be argued and where the deviation resulted in a deprivation of a "right" guaranteed by the Act.' [Citations.]" (At p. 274.) (See also Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co. (5th Cir.1971) 444 F.2d 1064, 1068-1069 [ 18 A.L.R.

1979Quoting from Boire v. Miami Herald Publishing Co. (5th Cir. 1965) 343 F.2d 17, 21 (cert, den., 382 U.S. 824 [ 15 L.Ed.2d 70 , 86 S.Ct. 56 ]), it was said: “ ‘[I]t seems clear that, in light of the congressional purpose behind limited review of certification proceedings, representation matters are enjoinable only where the fact of a statutory violation cannot seriously be argued and where the deviation resulted in a deprivation of a “right” guaranteed by the Act.’ [Citations.]” (At p. 274.) (See also Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co. (5th Cir. 1971) 444 F.2d 1064, 1068-1069 [ 18 A.L.R.

1979Quoting from Boire v. Miami Herald Publishing Co. (5th Cir.1965) 343 F.2d 17, 21 (cert. den., 382 U.S. 824 [ 15 L.Ed.2d 70 , 86 S.Ct. 56 ]), it was said: "`[I]t seems clear that, in light of the congressional purpose behind limited review of certification proceedings, representation matters are enjoinable only where the fact of a statutory violation cannot seriously be argued and where the deviation resulted in a deprivation of a "right" guaranteed by the Act.' [Citations.]" (At p. 274.) (See also Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co. (5th Cir.1971) 444 F.2d 1064, 1068-1069 [ 18 A.L.R.

1979Quoting from Boire v. Miami Herald Publishing Co. (5th Cir. 1965) 343 F.2d 17, 21 (cert, den., 382 U.S. 824 [ 15 L.Ed.2d 70 , 86 S.Ct. 56 ]), it was said: “ ‘[I]t seems clear that, in light of the congressional purpose behind limited review of certification proceedings, representation matters are enjoinable only where the fact of a statutory violation cannot seriously be argued and where the deviation resulted in a deprivation of a “right” guaranteed by the Act.’ [Citations.]” (At p. 274.) (See also Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co. (5th Cir. 1971) 444 F.2d 1064, 1068-1069 [ 18 A.L.R.

1979In order for Kyne to apply, the action of the Board must be patently without legality (Eastern Greyhound Lines v. Fusco (6th Cir. 1962) 310 F.2d 632 , 635) and the Board must have disregarded a specific and unambiguous statutory directive (Squillacote v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters (7th Cir. 1977) 561 F.2d 31 (a case in which a union unsuccessfully tried to use the Kyne exception)).

1979In order for Kyne to apply, the action of the Board must be patently without legality (Eastern Greyhound Lines v. Fusco (6th Cir. 1962) 310 F.2d 632 , 635) and the Board must have disregarded a specific and unambiguous statutory directive (Squillacote v. Int’l Broth. of Teamsters (7th Cir. 1977) 561 F.2d 31 (a case in which a union unsuccessfully tried to use the Kyne exception)).

1979Quoting from Boire v. Miami Herald Publishing Co. (5th Cir.1965) 343 F.2d 17, 21 (cert. den., 382 U.S. 824 [ 15 L.Ed.2d 70 , 86 S.Ct. 56 ]), it was said: "`[I]t seems clear that, in light of the congressional purpose behind limited review of certification proceedings, representation matters are enjoinable only where the fact of a statutory violation cannot seriously be argued and where the deviation resulted in a deprivation of a "right" guaranteed by the Act.' [Citations.]" (At p. 274.) (See also Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co. (5th Cir.1971) 444 F.2d 1064, 1068-1069 [ 18 A.L.R.

1979Quoting from Boire v. Miami Herald Publishing Co. (5th Cir. 1965) 343 F.2d 17, 21 (cert, den., 382 U.S. 824 [ 15 L.Ed.2d 70 , 86 S.Ct. 56 ]), it was said: “ ‘[I]t seems clear that, in light of the congressional purpose behind limited review of certification proceedings, representation matters are enjoinable only where the fact of a statutory violation cannot seriously be argued and where the deviation resulted in a deprivation of a “right” guaranteed by the Act.’ [Citations.]” (At p. 274.) (See also Templeton v. Dixie Color Printing Co. (5th Cir. 1971) 444 F.2d 1064, 1068-1069 [ 18 A.L.R.

1977Real parties are correct in asserting that a further exception has been recognized by some courts, i.e., when the constitutional rights of the complaining party have been violated. ( Fay v. Douds (2d Cir.1949) 172 F.2d 720 .) That exception is also limited.

1977Real parties are correct in asserting that a further exception has been recognized by some courts, i.e., when the constitutional rights of the complaining party have been violated. ( Fay v. Douds (2d Cir.1949) 172 F.2d 720 .) That exception is also limited.

1977In McCulloch v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. (D.C.Cir. 1968) 403 F.2d 916, 917 [ 131 App.D.C. 190 ], cert. den. 393 U.S. 1016 [ 21 L.Ed.2d 560 , 89 S.Ct. 618 ], the court stated: “As we said in Local 130, Internat’l Union of Elec., Radio & Machine Workers v. McCulloch, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 196, 201 , 345 F.2d 90, 95 (1965): ... to say that there are possible infirmities in an action taken by the Board by reason of an erroneous or arbitrary exertion of its authority in respect of the facts before it is not to conclude that there is jurisdiction in the District Court to intervene by injunction.

1977In McCulloch v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. (D.C.Cir. 1968) 403 F.2d 916, 917 [ 131 App.D.C. 190 ], cert. den. 393 U.S. 1016 [ 21 L.Ed.2d 560 , 89 S.Ct. 618 ], the court stated: “As we said in Local 130, Internat’l Union of Elec., Radio & Machine Workers v. McCulloch, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 196, 201 , 345 F.2d 90, 95 (1965): ... to say that there are possible infirmities in an action taken by the Board by reason of an erroneous or arbitrary exertion of its authority in respect of the facts before it is not to conclude that there is jurisdiction in the District Court to intervene by injunction.