Landgate rule in California

2002(Landgate, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1021 .) Applying the Landgate analysis to this case, there is no substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the City’s action was taken for any motive other than carrying out a substantial government interest.

2002(Landgate, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1021 .) Applying the Landgate analysis to this case, there is no substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the City’s action was taken for any motive other than carrying out a substantial government interest.

2013(See Shaw, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 264 [and authority cited there]; see also Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 629, 651 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 ].) We have no doubt that the trial court applied the proper analysis in this case by following Penn Central. ( Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. 528 .) *190 Moreover, even assuming Landgate remains good law, its complete holding is that a delay in the development process caused by an agency’s mistaken though plausible assertion of jurisdiction is a “normal delay” that, by itself, does not constitute a temporary taking,

2013(See Shaw, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 264 [and authority cited there]; see also Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 629, 651 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 ].) We have no doubt that the trial court applied the proper analysis in this case by following Penn Central. ( Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. 528 .) *190 Moreover, even assuming Landgate remains good law, its complete holding is that a delay in the development process caused by an agency’s mistaken though plausible assertion of jurisdiction is a “normal delay” that, by itself, does not constitute a temporary taking,

2013(See Loewenstein v. City of Lafayette (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 718, 731, 733 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 79 ] [erroneous denial of application for lot line adjustment not a temporary taking absent evidence that action “was taken for any motive other than carrying out a substantial government interest”].) Indeed, since Lingle was decided, several courts have questioned whether the Landgate rule remains viable.

2013(See Loewenstein v. City of Lafayette (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 718, 731, 733 [ 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 79 ] [erroneous denial of application for lot line adjustment not a temporary taking absent evidence that action “was taken for any motive other than carrying out a substantial government interest”].) Indeed, since Lingle was decided, several courts have questioned whether the Landgate rule remains viable.

2013(Landgate, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1010, 1020-1021, 1024, 1029; see Ali v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 254 [temporary taking occurred when delay in the regulatory process attributable to an agency position was “so unreasonable from a legal standpoint as to be arbitrary.”].) In this case, the trial court considered the Landgate rule in the context of its application of the third Penn Central factor, which focuses on the character of the governmental conduct.

2013(Landgate, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1010, 1020-1021, 1024, 1029; see Ali v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 254 [temporary taking occurred when delay in the regulatory process attributable to an agency position was “so unreasonable from a legal standpoint as to be arbitrary.”].) In this case, the trial court considered the Landgate rule in the context of its application of the third Penn Central factor, which focuses on the character of the governmental conduct.

2013(See Shaw, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 264 [and authority cited there]; see also Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 629, 651 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 ].) We have no doubt that the trial court applied the proper analysis in this case by following Penn Central. ( Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. 528 .) *190 Moreover, even assuming Landgate remains good law, its complete holding is that a delay in the development process caused by an agency’s mistaken though plausible assertion of jurisdiction is a “normal delay” that, by itself, does not constitute a temporary taking,

2013(See Shaw, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 264 [and authority cited there]; see also Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 629, 651 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 ].) We have no doubt that the trial court applied the proper analysis in this case by following Penn Central. ( Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. 528 .) *190 Moreover, even assuming Landgate remains good law, its complete holding is that a delay in the development process caused by an agency’s mistaken though plausible assertion of jurisdiction is a “normal delay” that, by itself, does not constitute a temporary taking,

2013(See Shaw, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 264 [and authority cited there]; see also Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 629, 651 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 ].) We have no doubt that the trial court applied the proper analysis in this case by following Penn Central. ( Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. 528 .) *190 Moreover, even assuming Landgate remains good law, its complete holding is that a delay in the development process caused by an agency’s mistaken though plausible assertion of jurisdiction is a “normal delay” that, by itself, does not constitute a temporary taking,

2013(See Shaw, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 264 [and authority cited there]; see also Los Altos El Granada Investors v. City of Capitola (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 629, 651 [ 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 434 ].) We have no doubt that the trial court applied the proper analysis in this case by following Penn Central. ( Lingle, supra, 544 U.S. 528 .) *190 Moreover, even assuming Landgate remains good law, its complete holding is that a delay in the development process caused by an agency’s mistaken though plausible assertion of jurisdiction is a “normal delay” that, by itself, does not constitute a temporary taking,