Legislature changed rule in California

2002The Guild Wineries court summarized the law in 1975 as follows: "[W]hile a recent, open market, arm's length sale of a particular type of property may be a very important factor in determining its fair market value, the sale, by itself, does not provide sufficient, reliable data to enable the assessor to make an accurate valuation of that property [citation]; it is only a starting point in appraising the property." ( 51 Cal.App.3d at p. 187 , 124 Cal.Rptr. 96 .) By its adoption of section 110(b), the Legislature changed that rule.

2002The Guild Wineries court summarized the law in 1975 as follows: “[W]hile a recent, open market, arm’s length sale of a particular type of property may be a very important factor in determining its fair market value, the sale, by itself, does not provide sufficient, reliable data to enable the assessor to make an accurate valuation of that property [citation]; it is only a starting point in appraising the property.” (Guild Wineries & Distilleries v. County of Freno, supra, 51 Cal.App.3d at p. 187 .) By its adoption of section 110(b), the Legislature changed that rule.

1999One ‘does not lose the defense of insanity because [he or she] may also have been intoxicated at the time of the offense.’ ” ( 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1841 , fn. omitted.) Earlier, People v. McCarthy (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 296 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 772 ] had explained Kelly’s (People v. Kelly (1973) 10 Cal.3d 565 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 171 , 516 P.2d 875 ]) holding more colorfully, “If an alcoholic wants to use his problem as an escape hatch, he must drink enough to develop a mental disorder that continues when he is stone sober even though the damage is not permanent in the sense it is beyond repair.” ( 110 C

1999One ‘does not lose the defense of insanity because [he or she] may also have been intoxicated at the time of the offense.’ ” ( 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1841 , fn. omitted.) Earlier, People v. McCarthy (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 296 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 772 ] had explained Kelly’s (People v. Kelly (1973) 10 Cal.3d 565 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 171 , 516 P.2d 875 ]) holding more colorfully, “If an alcoholic wants to use his problem as an escape hatch, he must drink enough to develop a mental disorder that continues when he is stone sober even though the damage is not permanent in the sense it is beyond repair.” ( 110 C

1999One ‘does not lose the defense of insanity because [he or she] may also have been intoxicated at the time of the offense.’ ” ( 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1841 , fn. omitted.) Earlier, People v. McCarthy (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 296 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 772 ] had explained Kelly’s (People v. Kelly (1973) 10 Cal.3d 565 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 171 , 516 P.2d 875 ]) holding more colorfully, “If an alcoholic wants to use his problem as an escape hatch, he must drink enough to develop a mental disorder that continues when he is stone sober even though the damage is not permanent in the sense it is beyond repair.” ( 110 C

1999One ‘does not lose the defense of insanity because [he or she] may also have been intoxicated at the time of the offense.’ ” ( 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1841 , fn. omitted.) Earlier, People v. McCarthy (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 296 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 772 ] had explained Kelly’s (People v. Kelly (1973) 10 Cal.3d 565 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 171 , 516 P.2d 875 ]) holding more colorfully, “If an alcoholic wants to use his problem as an escape hatch, he must drink enough to develop a mental disorder that continues when he is stone sober even though the damage is not permanent in the sense it is beyond repair.” ( 110 C

1999One ‘does not lose the defense of insanity because [he or she] may also have been intoxicated at the time of the offense.’ ” ( 20 Cal.App.4th at p. 1841 , fn. omitted.) Earlier, People v. McCarthy (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 296 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 772 ] had explained Kelly’s (People v. Kelly (1973) 10 Cal.3d 565 [ 111 Cal.Rptr. 171 , 516 P.2d 875 ]) holding more colorfully, “If an alcoholic wants to use his problem as an escape hatch, he must drink enough to develop a mental disorder that continues when he is stone sober even though the damage is not permanent in the sense it is beyond repair.” ( 110 C

1986It may reasonably be assumed the Legislature chose this accrual date for some of the same reasons given by the court in Gehman v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 257 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 62 ] (disapproved in Frost, supra, 26 Cal.3d 744, 759, fn. 5 ), in reaching the same conclusion.

1986It may reasonably be assumed the Legislature chose this accrual date for some of the same reasons given by the court in Gehman v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 257 [ 158 Cal.Rptr. 62 ] (disapproved in Frost, supra, 26 Cal.3d 744, 759, fn. 5 ), in reaching the same conclusion.

1975(See, People v. Francis, 71 Cal.2d 66, 75-76 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 199 , 450 P.2d 591 ]; In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740, 750 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 948 ].) This question has been answered by In re Kapperman, 11 Cal.3d 542 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 522 P.2d 657 ], wherein the court holds that the defendant is to be credited with the presentence time served as the statute is to be applied retroactively. *730 The length of presentence confinement served by defendant is not set forth.

1975(See, People v. Francis, 71 Cal.2d 66, 75-76 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 199 , 450 P.2d 591 ]; In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740, 750 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 948 ].) This question has been answered by In re Kapperman, 11 Cal.3d 542 [ 114 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 522 P.2d 657 ], wherein the court holds that the defendant is to be credited with the presentence time served as the statute is to be applied retroactively. *730 The length of presentence confinement served by defendant is not set forth.

1958(In re Runk, 181 App.Div. 461 [ 168 N.Y.S. 970 ], 224 N.Y. 570 [ 120 N.E. 875 ].) The reason for the rule in this state, as declared in Estate of Parker, supra, at page 137, quoting from Broughton v. Broughton, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 160 [43 Eng.

1958(In re Runk, 181 App.Div. 461 [ 168 N.Y.S. 970 ], 224 N.Y. 570 [ 120 N.E. 875 ].) The reason for the rule in this state, as declared in Estate of Parker, supra, at page 137, quoting from Broughton v. Broughton, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 160 [43 Eng.

1958It was stated at page 135 of the opinion in that case: “ [I] f the executor . . . being himself a practicing lawyer, elects to act as his own attorney in the performance of the legal services incident to the administration of the estate, the general rule is that he will not be entitled to an *615 allowance against the estate for his professional services, in the absence of some statutory provision entitling him thereto.” (See also Estate of Vokal, 121 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 263 P.2d 64 ] ; Estate of Lair, 70 Cal.App.2d 330 [ 161 P.2d 288 ]; Estate of Scherer, 58 Cal.App.2d 133 [ 136 P.2d 105 ].) It

1958It was stated at page 135 of the opinion in that case: “ [I] f the executor . . . being himself a practicing lawyer, elects to act as his own attorney in the performance of the legal services incident to the administration of the estate, the general rule is that he will not be entitled to an *615 allowance against the estate for his professional services, in the absence of some statutory provision entitling him thereto.” (See also Estate of Vokal, 121 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 263 P.2d 64 ] ; Estate of Lair, 70 Cal.App.2d 330 [ 161 P.2d 288 ]; Estate of Scherer, 58 Cal.App.2d 133 [ 136 P.2d 105 ].) It

1958(In re Runk, 181 App.Div. 461 [ 168 N.Y.S. 970 ], 224 N.Y. 570 [ 120 N.E. 875 ].) The reason for the rule in this state, as declared in Estate of Parker, supra, at page 137, quoting from Broughton v. Broughton, 5 De Gex, M. & G. 160 [43 Eng.

1958It was stated at page 135 of the opinion in that case: “ [I] f the executor . . . being himself a practicing lawyer, elects to act as his own attorney in the performance of the legal services incident to the administration of the estate, the general rule is that he will not be entitled to an *615 allowance against the estate for his professional services, in the absence of some statutory provision entitling him thereto.” (See also Estate of Vokal, 121 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 263 P.2d 64 ] ; Estate of Lair, 70 Cal.App.2d 330 [ 161 P.2d 288 ]; Estate of Scherer, 58 Cal.App.2d 133 [ 136 P.2d 105 ].) It

1958It was stated at page 135 of the opinion in that case: “ [I] f the executor . . . being himself a practicing lawyer, elects to act as his own attorney in the performance of the legal services incident to the administration of the estate, the general rule is that he will not be entitled to an *615 allowance against the estate for his professional services, in the absence of some statutory provision entitling him thereto.” (See also Estate of Vokal, 121 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 263 P.2d 64 ] ; Estate of Lair, 70 Cal.App.2d 330 [ 161 P.2d 288 ]; Estate of Scherer, 58 Cal.App.2d 133 [ 136 P.2d 105 ].) It

1958It was stated at page 135 of the opinion in that case: “ [I] f the executor . . . being himself a practicing lawyer, elects to act as his own attorney in the performance of the legal services incident to the administration of the estate, the general rule is that he will not be entitled to an *615 allowance against the estate for his professional services, in the absence of some statutory provision entitling him thereto.” (See also Estate of Vokal, 121 Cal.App.2d 252 [ 263 P.2d 64 ] ; Estate of Lair, 70 Cal.App.2d 330 [ 161 P.2d 288 ]; Estate of Scherer, 58 Cal.App.2d 133 [ 136 P.2d 105 ].) It