linchpin analysis in California

2020The key factors include the best interest of the child, wishes of the parents, the placement of siblings in the same home, whether the relative has a history of child abuse or neglect, the nature and duration of the relationship between the relative and the child, and the relative's willingness and ability to exercise proper care of the child, to provide an adequate and safe home, and to facilitate reunification with the child’s parents. (§ 361.3, subd.(a).)2 “However, the best interests of the child is the linchpin of the analysis.” (In 2 Section 361.3, subdivision (a) provides in detail that

2020(In re Robert L., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1067 .) “[W]hen a court has made a custody determination in a dependency proceeding, ‘ “ a reviewing court will not disturb that decision unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination [citations].” ’ (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 421 ; see In re Mark V. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 754 , 759 [accord]; see also Department of Parks & Recreation v. State Personnel Bd. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 813, 831 .) And we have recently warned: ‘The appropriate test for

2020The key factors include the best interest of the child, wishes of the parents, the placement of siblings in the same home, whether the relative has a history of child abuse or neglect, the nature and duration of the relationship between the relative and the child, and the relative's willingness and ability to exercise proper care of the child, to provide an adequate and safe home, and to facilitate reunification with the child’s parents. (§ 361.3, subd.(a).)2 “However, the best interests of the child is the linchpin of the analysis.” (In 2 Section 361.3, subdivision (a) provides in detail that

2020(In re Robert L., supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 1067 .) “[W]hen a court has made a custody determination in a dependency proceeding, ‘ “ a reviewing court will not disturb that decision unless the trial court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination [citations].” ’ (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 421 ; see In re Mark V. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 754 , 759 [accord]; see also Department of Parks & Recreation v. State Personnel Bd. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 813, 831 .) And we have recently warned: ‘The appropriate test for

2016(In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1068 ; In re Lauren Z. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1112 .) We review placement determinations for abuse of discretion and do not disturb a juvenile court's ruling absent a manifest showing of abuse.

2016(In re Luke L. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 670, 681 .) Nevertheless, the child's best interest is the linchpin of the analysis.

2016(R.T., supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1295–1296; § 361.3, subd. (c)(1) [“‘Preferential consideration’ means that the relative seeking placement shall be the first placement to be considered and investigated”].) 11 Although numerous factors must be taken into account in determining whether section 361.3’s relative placement preference applies, the linchpin of the analysis is 6 whether a relative placement is in the child’s best interests.

1998Burgess stated that the presence of a preexisting relationship between the parties is that ‘which defines the phrase “direct victim.” That label signifies nothing more.’ ( Burgess, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1074 .)” (Bro v. Glaser, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1415 .) Bro thus concluded that a preexisting relationship was a sine qua non of a direct victim NIED claim.

1998Burgess stated that the presence of a preexisting relationship between the parties is that ‘which defines the phrase “direct victim.” That label signifies nothing more.’ ( Burgess, supra, 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1074 .)” (Bro v. Glaser, supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1415 .) Bro thus concluded that a preexisting relationship was a sine qua non of a direct victim NIED claim.

1997(Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB (1992) 502 U.S. 527 [ 112 S.Ct. 841 , 117 L.Ed.2d 79 ].) Furthermore, Schwartz is of dubious value for the proposition cited given that it predates Pruneyard by 15 years and Pruneyard is the linchpin of the claim that there is a state constitutional right—the United States Supreme Court having rejected in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner (1972) 407 U.S. 551 [ 92 S.Ct. 2219 , 33 L.Ed.2d 131 ] the contention that there was a federal constitutional right—to engage in expressive activities on large privately owned shopping centers.

1997(Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB (1992) 502 U.S. 527 [ 112 S.Ct. 841 , 117 L.Ed.2d 79 ].) Furthermore, Schwartz is of dubious value for the proposition cited given that it predates Pruneyard by 15 years and Pruneyard is the linchpin of the claim that there is a state constitutional right—the United States Supreme Court having rejected in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner (1972) 407 U.S. 551 [ 92 S.Ct. 2219 , 33 L.Ed.2d 131 ] the contention that there was a federal constitutional right—to engage in expressive activities on large privately owned shopping centers.

1997(Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB (1992) 502 U.S. 527 [ 112 S.Ct. 841 , 117 L.Ed.2d 79 ].) Furthermore, Schwartz is of dubious value for the proposition cited given that it predates Pruneyard by 15 years and Pruneyard is the linchpin of the claim that there is a state constitutional right—the United States Supreme Court having rejected in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner (1972) 407 U.S. 551 [ 92 S.Ct. 2219 , 33 L.Ed.2d 131 ] the contention that there was a federal constitutional right—to engage in expressive activities on large privately owned shopping centers.

1997(Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB (1992) 502 U.S. 527 [ 112 S.Ct. 841 , 117 L.Ed.2d 79 ].) Furthermore, Schwartz is of dubious value for the proposition cited given that it predates Pruneyard by 15 years and Pruneyard is the linchpin of the claim that there is a state constitutional right—the United States Supreme Court having rejected in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner (1972) 407 U.S. 551 [ 92 S.Ct. 2219 , 33 L.Ed.2d 131 ] the contention that there was a federal constitutional right—to engage in expressive activities on large privately owned shopping centers.