local interest exception in California

2016Trespass is one 'threat[ ] to public order' that is not totally preempted by the NLRA."]; Hillhaven, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 855 , 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 11 [ Sears "expanded the local interest exception to a case involving peaceful, nonobstructive picketing on an employer's private property."].) A trespass claim may fit within the local interest exception to preemption.

2016Trespass is one 'threat[ ] to public order' that is not totally preempted by the NLRA."]; Hillhaven, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 855 , 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 11 [ Sears "expanded the local interest exception to a case involving peaceful, nonobstructive picketing on an employer's private property."].) A trespass claim may fit within the local interest exception to preemption.

2016(See Retail Prop. supra, 768 F.3d at p. 956 [" Sears ... confirmed what the Court said in Garmon ...

2016(See Retail Property, supra, 768 F.3d at p. 956 ["Sears . . . confirmed what the Court said in Garmon . . . : Trespass is one ‘threat[] to public order’ that is not totally preempted by the NLRA.”]; Hillhaven, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 855 *206 [Sears “expanded the local interest exception to a case involving peaceful, nonobstructive picketing on an employer’s private property.”].) 10 A trespass claim may fit within the local interest exception to preemption.

2025Union (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 194, 201 (Wal-Mart).) The test for the local interest exception was articulated in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters (1978) 436 U.S. 180 (Sears).

2020The Local Interest Exception The local interest exception vindicates interests “ ‘deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility.’ ” (Sears, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 195 .) Two factors relevant to the application of this exception, in a case where an employer’s policies are arguably prohibited by the NLRA, are: (1) whether there is “a significant state interest in protecting the citizen from the challenged conduct” and (2) whether “the exercise of state jurisdiction over the tort claim [for trespass] entailed little risk of interference with the regulatory jurisdiction of the Labor Board.” (Id

2020Five years after Sears, the Supreme Court in Jones restated the local interest exception test in what “amount[ed] to a substantial reformulation of the Sears requirement that state and federal controversies be identical.” (Jones, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 688 (dis. opn. of Rehnquist, J.).) Because the facts of Jones are the most closely analogous to this case and it is the most recent Supreme Court precedent, it is worth examining Jones in detail.

2016(Jones, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 676 .) We conclude the local interest exception applies in this case.

2016Council of Carpenters (1976) 17 Cal.3d 893 , 898-900, 132 Cal.Rptr. 443 , 553 P.2d 603 .) The court rejected the application of the local interest exception.

2016Council of Carpenters (1976) 17 Cal.3d 893 , 898-900, 132 Cal.Rptr. 443 , 553 P.2d 603 .) The court rejected the application of the local interest exception.

2025Union (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 194, 201 (Wal-Mart).) The test for the local interest exception was articulated in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters (1978) 436 U.S. 180 (Sears).

2020A. Legal Principles Congress intended the NLRA to serve as a comprehensive law governing labor relations; accordingly, “the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving unfair labor practices, and ‘state jurisdiction must yield’ when state action would regulate conduct governed by the NLRA. ( Garmon, [supra, 359 U.S.] at pp. 244–245.)” ( Wal-Mart, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 200–201.) Because it is for the NLRB to determine, in 8 the first instance, whether conduct is in fact governed by the NLRA, the Act’s preemptive effect may extend beyond conduct that the NLRA directly governs t

1996Thus, for example, the Court has upheld state-court jurisdiction over conduct that touches ‘interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.’ ” (Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, supra, at pp. 194-195 [56 L.Ed.2d at pp. 223-224], quoting San Diego Unions v. Garmon, supra, 359 U.S. at p. 244 [3 L.Ed.2d at pp. 782-783].) The local interest exception was founded upon the “compelling state interest ... in the maintenance of domestic peace” and ap

1996Thus, for example, the Court has upheld state-court jurisdiction over conduct that touches ‘interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act.’ ” (Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, supra, at pp. 194-195 [56 L.Ed.2d at pp. 223-224], quoting San Diego Unions v. Garmon, supra, 359 U.S. at p. 244 [3 L.Ed.2d at pp. 782-783].) The local interest exception was founded upon the “compelling state interest ... in the maintenance of domestic peace” and ap

2020(See Sears, supra, 436 U.S. at pp. 196–197; Farmer, supra, 430 U.S. at p. 300 .) But the parties have argued, citing competing precedents and legal tests ostensibly derived from them, for alternative ways of analyzing the local interest exception, so we now turn to consider these alternatives. 1.

2020(Id. at pp. 849–850.) In finding preemption, the Hillhaven court relied on common factual issues between the state-court suit The concurring and dissenting opinion accuses us of “ignor[ing] 4 Jones’s reasoning” and “the analytical path the Supreme Court has set forth for the local interest exception.” (At pp. 4, 13, post.) But there is nothing “novel” about our analyzing “competing interests.” (At p. 7, post.) The Supreme Court requires that we conduct a “balanced inquiry into such factors as the nature of the federal and state interests in regulation and the potential for interference with fe

2020A. Legal Principles Congress intended the NLRA to serve as a comprehensive law governing labor relations; accordingly, “the NLRB has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving unfair labor practices, and ‘state jurisdiction must yield’ when state action would regulate conduct governed by the NLRA. ( Garmon, [supra, 359 U.S.] at pp. 244–245.)” ( Wal-Mart, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 200–201.) Because it is for the NLRB to determine, in 8 the first instance, whether conduct is in fact governed by the NLRA, the Act’s preemptive effect may extend beyond conduct that the NLRA directly governs t

1996(Belknap, Inc. v. Hale (1983) 463 U.S. *855 491 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 798 , 103 S.Ct. 3172 ]; see Kaplan's Fruit & Produce Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 26 Cal.3d 60, 69-70 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 603 P.2d 1341 ].) Cases following Garmon have clarified that the preemption issue as to both arguably prohibited and arguably protected conduct “turns primarily on whether preemption is necessary to avoid conflicting adjudications which would interfere with the regulatory activity of the administrative board.

2020Co. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 918 (Inter- Modal), “the Supreme Court has declined to preempt a variety of state law 13 claims even though they arose in a labor law context [involving, for example,] trespass by peaceful picking . . . intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . [and] defamation . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 925; see Sears, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 198 [trespass by picketing]; Farmer, supra, 430 U.S. at pp. 299–300 [intentional infliction of emotional distress]; Linn, supra, 383 U.S. at pp. 61–62 [defamation].) The local interest exception has also been applied to a cause of action challen

2020Co. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 918 (Inter- Modal), “the Supreme Court has declined to preempt a variety of state law 13 claims even though they arose in a labor law context [involving, for example,] trespass by peaceful picking . . . intentional infliction of emotional distress . . . [and] defamation . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 925; see Sears, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 198 [trespass by picketing]; Farmer, supra, 430 U.S. at pp. 299–300 [intentional infliction of emotional distress]; Linn, supra, 383 U.S. at pp. 61–62 [defamation].) The local interest exception has also been applied to a cause of action challen

1996(Belknap, Inc. v. Hale (1983) 463 U.S. *855 491 [ 77 L.Ed.2d 798 , 103 S.Ct. 3172 ]; see Kaplan's Fruit & Produce Co. v. Superior Court (1979) 26 Cal.3d 60, 69-70 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 603 P.2d 1341 ].) Cases following Garmon have clarified that the preemption issue as to both arguably prohibited and arguably protected conduct “turns primarily on whether preemption is necessary to avoid conflicting adjudications which would interfere with the regulatory activity of the administrative board.

1996(See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, supra, 436 U.S. 180 , 197 . . . ; Farmer v. Carpenters, supra, 430 U.S. 290, 305 [ 51 L.Ed.2d 338, 353 ]; Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge (1971) 403 U.S. 274 , 285 . . . .)” (Kaplan's Fruit & Produce Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 26 Cal.3d 60, 69-70 .) In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, supra, 436 U.S. 180 , the court expanded the local interest exception to a case involving peaceful, nonobstructive picketing on an employer’s private property.