maximum extent practicable standard (California) · Go Syfert
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maximum extent practicable standard in California

6 California opinions name it 3 courts 2005–2017 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (3)

CaseFollowedCited
Building Industry Ass'n v. State Water Resources Control Boardgreen
calctapp · 2005 · cited in 3 California opinions naming this issue, 2013–2016
2 sentences

2016(See Building Industry Assn. of San Diego County v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 866, 889 (Building Industry Assn.) [explaining that ―the maximum extent practicable standard is a highly flexible concept that depends on balancing numerous factors, including the particular control‘s technical feasibility, cost, public acceptance, regulatory compliance, and effectiveness‖].) It also suggests a lack of understanding of two interrelated matters on which the Regional Board likely has expertise: the consequences of the measures included as permit conditions relative to any

2016(See Building Industry Assn. of San Diego County v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 866, 889 [ 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 128 ] (Building Industry Assn.) [explaining that “the maximum extent practicable standard is a highly flexible concept that depends on balancing numerous factors, including the particular control’s technical feasibility, cost, public acceptance, regulatory compliance, and effectiveness”].) It also suggests a lack of understanding of two interrelated matters on which the Regional Board likely has expertise: the consequences of the measures included as permit con

13
Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Board of Equalizationgreen
cal · 1998 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016
2 sentences

2016(See Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 7 [explaining that ―the binding power of an agency‘s interpretation of a statute or regulation is contextual: Its power to persuade is both circumstantial and dependent on the presence or absence of factors that support the merit of the interpretation‖].) In this case, the Regional Board informed localities that, in its view, the various permit conditions it imposed would satisfy the maximum extent practicable standard.

2016(See Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 7 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 960 P.2d 1031 ] [explaining that “the binding power of an agency’s interpretation of a statute or regulation is contextual: Its power to persuade is both circumstantial and dependent on the presence or absence of factors that support the merit of the interpretation”].) In this case, the Regional Board informed localities that, in its view, the various permit conditions it imposed would satisfy the maximum extent practicable standard.

11
Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club v. Collinsgreen
calctapp · 1994 · cited in 1 California opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006
2 sentences

2006The Cities say they disagree with BIA, but they develop no argument revealing any flaw in the opinion. “[P]arties are required *1429 to include argument and citation to authority in their briefs, and the absence of these necessary elements allows this court to treat appellant’s . . . issue as waived.” (Interinsurance Exchange v. Collins (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1448 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 126 ].) The Cities’ reliance on Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner (9th Cir. 1999) 191 F.3d 1159 , for the proposition that municipalities, unlike private companies, may not be required to strictly comply with num

2006The Cities say they disagree with BIA, but they develop no argument revealing any flaw in the opinion. “[P]arties are required *1429 to include argument and citation to authority in their briefs, and the absence of these necessary elements allows this court to treat appellant’s . . . issue as waived.” (Interinsurance Exchange v. Collins (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1448 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 126 ].) The Cities’ reliance on Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner (9th Cir. 1999) 191 F.3d 1159 , for the proposition that municipalities, unlike private companies, may not be required to strictly comply with num

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (9)

CaseCitedYears
cluster 783666 green
ca9 · 2003
2 sentences

2013In Environmental Defense Center, Inc. v. U.S.E.P.A. (9th Cir. 2003) 344 F.3d 832 (Environmental Defense Center), the Ninth Circuit considered a challenge to a ―Phase II‖ EPA rule for small municipal storm sewer systems.

2005Council, Inc. v. U.S.E.P.A., supra, 966 F.2d at p. 1308 ; Environmental Defense Center, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A. (9th Cir. 2003) 344 F.3d 832 .) Neither of these decisions addressed the issue of the scope of a regulatory agency’s authority to exceed the maximum extent practicable standard in issuing NPDES permits for municipal storm sewers. 14 Because we are not presented with a proper appellate challenge, we do not address the trial court’s factual determinations in this case concerning whether it is possible or practical for a Municipality to achieve any specific Permit requirement. 15 The Clean

32005–2013
Arkansas v. Oklahoma green
scotus · 1992
2 sentences

2013(See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, supra, 503 U.S. at p. 101 .) The EPA gives the states guidance in drafting water- quality standards and ―state authorities periodically review water quality standards and secure the EPA‘s approval of any revisions in the standards.‖ (Ibid.) 32 Finally, the maximum extent practicable standard is designed to require states to meet their Clean Water Act obligations.

2013(See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, supra, 503 U.S. at p. 101 .) The EPA gives the states guidance in drafting water- quality standards and ―state authorities periodically review water quality standards and secure the EPA‘s approval of any revisions in the standards.‖ (Ibid.) 32 Finally, the maximum extent practicable standard is designed to require states to meet their Clean Water Act obligations.

22013–2013
County of Los Angeles v. California State Water Resources Control Board green
calctapp · 2006
2 sentences

2013Finally, the Department of Finance argued the Regional Board‘s findings regarding what was necessary to implement the maximum extent practicable standard had previously been litigated in County of Los Angeles v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 985 and previously upheld by Division Five.

2013Finally, the Department of Finance argued the Regional Board‘s findings regarding what was necessary to implement the maximum extent practicable standard had previously been litigated in County of Los Angeles v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 985 and previously upheld by Division Five.

22013–2013
County of Los Angeles v. Commission on State Mandates green
calctapp · 2007
2 sentences

2013Federal Mandates and “Maximum Extent Practicable” The County contends that the trial court erred in finding that the Permit obligations were federal mandates because (1) the court in County of Los Angeles v. Commission on State Mandates, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th 898 , previously determined the mandate issue; (2) the trial court erred in finding that the Commission failed to consider the maximum extent practicable standard; and (3) the Commission‘s decision is supported by substantial evidence.

2013Federal Mandates and “Maximum Extent Practicable” The County contends that the trial court erred in finding that the Permit obligations were federal mandates because (1) the court in County of Los Angeles v. Commission on State Mandates, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th 898 , previously determined the mandate issue; (2) the trial court erred in finding that the Commission failed to consider the maximum extent practicable standard; and (3) the Commission‘s decision is supported by substantial evidence.

22013–2013
Boeken v. PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC. green
cal · 2010
2 sentences

2013(See Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 797 .) 37 As our discussion of the federal mandate issue demonstrates, the Permit, although issued by a state agency under enabling Water Code provisions, is a federal permit that implements federal law in the form of the maximum extent practicable standard.

2013(See Boeken v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 797 .) 37 As our discussion of the federal mandate issue demonstrates, the Permit, although issued by a state agency under enabling Water Code provisions, is a federal permit that implements federal law in the form of the maximum extent practicable standard.

22013–2013
Department of Finance v. Commission on State Mandates green
cal · 2016
2 sentences

2017Instead, ... the [Los Angeles] Regional Board had discretion to fashion requirements which it determined would meet the CWA's maximum extent practicable standard." ( Department of Finance , supra , 1 Cal.5th at pp. 767-768, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 44 , 378 P.3d 356 , original italics.) *859 The State contended the Commission decided the existence of a federal mandate on grounds that were too rigid.

2017Instead, ... the [Los Angeles] Regional Board had discretion to fashion requirements which it determined would meet the CWA's maximum extent practicable standard." ( Department of Finance , supra , 1 Cal.5th at pp. 767-768, 207 Cal.Rptr.3d 44 , 378 P.3d 356 , original italics.) *859 The State contended the Commission decided the existence of a federal mandate on grounds that were too rigid.

12017–2017
cluster 766202 green
ca9 · 1999
1 sentence

2006The Cities say they disagree with BIA, but they develop no argument revealing any flaw in the opinion. “[P]arties are required *1429 to include argument and citation to authority in their briefs, and the absence of these necessary elements allows this court to treat appellant’s . . . issue as waived.” (Interinsurance Exchange v. Collins (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1448 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 126 ].) The Cities’ reliance on Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner (9th Cir. 1999) 191 F.3d 1159 , for the proposition that municipalities, unlike private companies, may not be required to strictly comply with num

12006–2006
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, Battery Council International, Respondents-Intervenors green
ca9 · 1992
1 sentence

2005Council, Inc. v. U.S.E.P.A., supra, 966 F.2d at p. 1308 ; Environmental Defense Center, Inc. v. U.S. E.P.A. (9th Cir. 2003) 344 F.3d 832 .) Neither of these decisions addressed the issue of the scope of a regulatory agency’s authority to exceed the maximum extent practicable standard in issuing NPDES permits for municipal storm sewers. 14 Because we are not presented with a proper appellate challenge, we do not address the trial court’s factual determinations in this case concerning whether it is possible or practical for a Municipality to achieve any specific Permit requirement. 15 The Clean

12005–2005
cluster 759542 green
ca5 · 1998
2 sentences

2005(See Texas Oil & Gas Ass’n v. U.S. E.P.A. (5th Cir. 1998) 161 F.3d 923, 928 .) If the maximum extent practicable standard is generally “less stringent” than another Clean Water Act standard that relies on available technologies, it would be unreasonable to conclude that anything more stringent than the maximum extent practicable standard is necessarily impossible.

2005(See Texas Oil & Gas Ass’n v. U.S. E.P.A. (5th Cir. 1998) 161 F.3d 923, 928 .) If the maximum extent practicable standard is generally “less stringent” than another Clean Water Act standard that relies on available technologies, it would be unreasonable to conclude that anything more stringent than the maximum extent practicable standard is necessarily impossible.

12005–2005

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CA § Cal. Water Code § 13000 (6) CA § Cal. Water Code § 13374 (5) CFR § 40c.f.r.122.26 (5) USC § 33u.s.c.1251 (5) USC § 33u.s.c.1311 (5) USC § 33u.s.c.1342 (5) CA § Cal. Government Code § 17500 (4) CA § Cal. Government Code § 17551 (4) CA § Cal. Government Code § 17556 (4) CA § Cal. Government Code § 17559 (4) CA § Cal. Water Code § 13260 (4) USC § 33u.s.c.1370 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

CA 6 (2005–2017) MD 2 (2015–2016)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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