McGill rule in California

2023A public injunction is sought by an aggrieved person in an action filed “on his or her own behalf, not ‘on behalf of the general public,’ ” even though the “ ‘the primary purpose and effect of’ ” the relief is “ ‘to prohibit and enjoin conduct that is injurious to the general public.’ ” (McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 959 ; see also id. at pp. 959–960 [stating that a request for a public injunction “does not constitute the ‘pursu[it]’ of ‘representative claims or relief on behalf of others’ ” within meaning of a ballot proposition].) A public injunction is a unitary remedy that cannot be divid

2023A public injunction is sought by an aggrieved person in an action filed “on his or her own behalf, not ‘on behalf of the general public,’ ” even though the “ ‘the primary purpose and effect of’ ” the relief is “ ‘to prohibit and enjoin conduct that is injurious to the general public.’ ” (McGill, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 959 ; see also id. at pp. 959–960 [stating that a request for a public injunction “does not constitute the ‘pursu[it]’ of ‘representative claims or relief on behalf of others’ ” within meaning of a ballot proposition].) A public injunction is a unitary remedy that cannot be divid

2022But this challenge is not “specific to the delegation clause.” (Aanderud, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 895 .) Moreover, courts routinely hold that the resolution of a McGill rule challenge is a gateway issue subject to delegation under a clause like the one here.

2022(See Aanderud, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 897 [concluding “it is the arbitrator who will consider ... whether the [class waiver] provision purports to waive the [plaintiffs] right to seek public injunctive relief in all fora and, if so, what impact this has on the enforceability of the arbitration provision as a whole”]; Wilson v. Wells Fargo & Co. (S.D.Cal., May 10, 2021, No. 20-CV- 2307-DMS-WVG) 2021 WL 1853587 , at *4 [“Where, as here, the parties have delegated arbitrability to the arbitrator, the application of McGill is a question for the arbitrator, not the Court, to decide.’ ”]; Ramir

2023Unfair and fraudulent practices are alternate grounds for relief.” (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370 ; see also Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1143 [UCL covers “ ‘ “ ‘ “anything that can properly be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law” ’ ” ’ ”].) The factual basis of McGill’s claim is that FPI, by virtue of its role in calculating and recommending the late fee set forth in paragraph 5 of the lease is directly responsible for this “unfair business practice” or, at a minimum, an aider and abettor of Woodsto

2022(See Aanderud, supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 892 [provision stating “the parties ‘agree to arbitrate all disputes... arising out of or relating to... the interpretation, validity, or enforceability of this Agreement, including the determination of the scope or applicability of [the arbitration] section ” constitutes “clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended to arbitrate arbitrability’].) 35 Additionally, the arbitration provision’s “reference to the JAMS Rules further evidences the parties’ clear and unmistakable intent to submit issues of arbitrability to the arbitrator.” (Aand