Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Third Eye Blind, Inc. v. Near North Entertainment Insurance Services, LLCgreen1 sentence2015(Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813, 817 .) Rather, when a defendant’s tortious conduct requires the plaintiff to sue a third party, or defend a suit brought by a third party, attorney fees the plaintiff incurs in this third party action ‘are recoverable as damages resulting from a tort in the same way that medical fees would be part of the damages in a personal injury action.’ (Sooy v. Peter (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1305, 1310 ; see also Brandt v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 817 .)” (Third Eye Blind, Inc. v. Near North Entertainment Insurance Services, LLC (2005) 127 Cal.Ap | 1 | 1 |
Brandt v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2015(Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813, 817 .) Rather, when a defendant’s tortious conduct requires the plaintiff to sue a third party, or defend a suit brought by a third party, attorney fees the plaintiff incurs in this third party action ‘are recoverable as damages resulting from a tort in the same way that medical fees would be part of the damages in a personal injury action.’ (Sooy v. Peter (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1305, 1310 ; see also Brandt v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 817 .)” (Third Eye Blind, Inc. v. Near North Entertainment Insurance Services, LLC (2005) 127 Cal.Ap 2015(Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813, 817 .) Rather, when a defendant’s tortious conduct requires the plaintiff to sue a third party, or defend a suit brought by a third party, attorney fees the plaintiff incurs in this third party action ‘are recoverable as damages resulting from a tort in the same way that medical fees would be part of the damages in a personal injury action.’ (Sooy v. Peter (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1305, 1310 ; see also Brandt v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 817 .)” (Third Eye Blind, Inc. v. Near North Entertainment Insurance Services, LLC (2005) 127 Cal.Ap | 1 | 1 |
People v. Guevaragreen2 sentences1983(See Hart v. Municipal Court, supra,*; People v. Guevara (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d Supp. 19, 22-23 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 19 ]; People v. Buller (1979) 101 Cal.App.3d 73, 75-76 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 657 ]; Youkhanna v. Municipal Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 612 , 615 and fn. 1 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 380 ] and Stewart v. Justice Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 607, 609-610 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 589 ].) On the other hand, it has been held that where the clerk makes docket entries under circumstances showing that the entries were prepared for the particular case before the court, such docket entries satisfy the Mills requirement. 1983(See Hart v. Municipal Court, supra,*; People v. Guevara (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d Supp. 19, 22-23 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 19 ]; People v. Buller (1979) 101 Cal.App.3d 73, 75-76 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 657 ]; Youkhanna v. Municipal Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 612 , 615 and fn. 1 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 380 ] and Stewart v. Justice Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 607, 609-610 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 589 ].) On the other hand, it has been held that where the clerk makes docket entries under circumstances showing that the entries were prepared for the particular case before the court, such docket entries satisfy the Mills requirement. | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Justice Ct. for Avenal Judicial Dist. of Kings Cty.green2 sentences1983(See Hart v. Municipal Court, supra,*; People v. Guevara (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d Supp. 19, 22-23 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 19 ]; People v. Buller (1979) 101 Cal.App.3d 73, 75-76 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 657 ]; Youkhanna v. Municipal Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 612 , 615 and fn. 1 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 380 ] and Stewart v. Justice Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 607, 609-610 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 589 ].) On the other hand, it has been held that where the clerk makes docket entries under circumstances showing that the entries were prepared for the particular case before the court, such docket entries satisfy the Mills requirement. 1983(See Hart v. Municipal Court, supra,*; People v. Guevara (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d Supp. 19, 22-23 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 19 ]; People v. Buller (1979) 101 Cal.App.3d 73, 75-76 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 657 ]; Youkhanna v. Municipal Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 612 , 615 and fn. 1 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 380 ] and Stewart v. Justice Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 607, 609-610 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 589 ].) On the other hand, it has been held that where the clerk makes docket entries under circumstances showing that the entries were prepared for the particular case before the court, such docket entries satisfy the Mills requirement. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bullergreen2 sentences1983(See Hart v. Municipal Court, supra,*; People v. Guevara (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d Supp. 19, 22-23 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 19 ]; People v. Buller (1979) 101 Cal.App.3d 73, 75-76 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 657 ]; Youkhanna v. Municipal Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 612 , 615 and fn. 1 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 380 ] and Stewart v. Justice Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 607, 609-610 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 589 ].) On the other hand, it has been held that where the clerk makes docket entries under circumstances showing that the entries were prepared for the particular case before the court, such docket entries satisfy the Mills requirement. 1983(See Hart v. Municipal Court, supra,*; People v. Guevara (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d Supp. 19, 22-23 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 19 ]; People v. Buller (1979) 101 Cal.App.3d 73, 75-76 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 657 ]; Youkhanna v. Municipal Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 612 , 615 and fn. 1 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 380 ] and Stewart v. Justice Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 607, 609-610 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 589 ].) On the other hand, it has been held that where the clerk makes docket entries under circumstances showing that the entries were prepared for the particular case before the court, such docket entries satisfy the Mills requirement. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Sapp
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 316 .) VI. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Sooy v. Peter
green
1 sentence2015(Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813, 817 .) Rather, when a defendant’s tortious conduct requires the plaintiff to sue a third party, or defend a suit brought by a third party, attorney fees the plaintiff incurs in this third party action ‘are recoverable as damages resulting from a tort in the same way that medical fees would be part of the damages in a personal injury action.’ (Sooy v. Peter (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1305, 1310 ; see also Brandt v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 817 .)” (Third Eye Blind, Inc. v. Near North Entertainment Insurance Services, LLC (2005) 127 Cal.Ap | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Serrano v. Priest
green
2 sentences2004Consistent with the burden on summary judgment, to the extent the evidence may be in conflict, only those facts favorable to McIntosh are discussed. 7 This contingency was removed in the first half of the following month. 8 “The use of the lodestar method for calculating attorney fees was established in California in Serrano III [Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 569 P.2d 1303 ] (Serrano III)]. 2004Consistent with the burden on summary judgment, to the extent the evidence may be in conflict, only those facts favorable to McIntosh are discussed. 7 This contingency was removed in the first half of the following month. 8 “The use of the lodestar method for calculating attorney fees was established in California in Serrano III [Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 315 , 569 P.2d 1303 ] (Serrano III)]. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Healing v. California Coastal Commission
green
2 sentences1999A similar issue was considered in Healing v. California Coastal Com. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1158 , 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 758 . 1999A similar issue was considered in Healing v. California Coastal Com. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1158 , 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 758 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Youkhanna v. Municipal Court
green
2 sentences1983(See Hart v. Municipal Court, supra,*; People v. Guevara (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d Supp. 19, 22-23 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 19 ]; People v. Buller (1979) 101 Cal.App.3d 73, 75-76 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 657 ]; Youkhanna v. Municipal Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 612 , 615 and fn. 1 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 380 ] and Stewart v. Justice Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 607, 609-610 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 589 ].) On the other hand, it has been held that where the clerk makes docket entries under circumstances showing that the entries were prepared for the particular case before the court, such docket entries satisfy the Mills requirement. 1983(See Hart v. Municipal Court, supra,*; People v. Guevara (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d Supp. 19, 22-23 [ 169 Cal.Rptr. 19 ]; People v. Buller (1979) 101 Cal.App.3d 73, 75-76 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 657 ]; Youkhanna v. Municipal Court (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 612 , 615 and fn. 1 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 380 ] and Stewart v. Justice Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 607, 609-610 [ 141 Cal.Rptr. 589 ].) On the other hand, it has been held that where the clerk makes docket entries under circumstances showing that the entries were prepared for the particular case before the court, such docket entries satisfy the Mills requirement. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Ballard v. Superior Court of San Diego County
red
2 sentences1978Thereafter, the court entertained Mills' motion for "sanctions." Following a hearing on the motion the court found that Tina's decision was "influenced by the conduct of the district attorney's office," which had "willfully and persistently act[ed] in such a way as to frustrate that court order," by advising Tina that "she has a choice as to whether she wants to comply or not," "thereby breaching their responsibilities under the due process clause." Then stating, "I can't allow interference with a lawful order of the court by the prosecution," so the sanction will be that Tina "will not be all 1978Thereafter, the court entertained Mills’ motion for “sanctions.” Following a hearing on the motion the court found that Tina’s decision wás “influenced by the conduct of the district attorney’s office,” which had “willfully and persistently act[ed] in such a way as to frustrate that court order,” by advising Tina that “she has a choice as to whether she wants to comply or not,” “thereby breaching their responsibilities under the due process clause.” Then stating, “I can’t allow interference with a lawful order of the court by the prosecution,” so the sanction will be that Tina “will not be all | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.