Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Peppergreen2 sentences2001Therefore, in a case in which a defendant is entitled to an instruction on temporary possession for disposal, we conclude the trial court should instruct pursuant to the original version of CALJIC No. 12.06 based upon Mijares . ' ([ Hurtado, ] supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 814 , 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 853 ; see also People v. Pepper [ supra, ] 41 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1036-1038 , 48 Cal. Rptr.2d 877 , ruling the momentary possession defense does not apply to a violation of section 12021 except when the firearm is possesed momentarily in self-defense, in defense of others, or as a result of legal necessity.) 2001Therefore, in a case in which a defendant is entitled to an instruction on temporary possession for disposal, we conclude the trial court should instruct pursuant to the original version of CALJIC No. 12.06 based upon Mijares . ' ([ Hurtado, ] supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 814 , 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 853 ; see also People v. Pepper [ supra, ] 41 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1036-1038 , 48 Cal. Rptr.2d 877 , ruling the momentary possession defense does not apply to a violation of section 12021 except when the firearm is possesed momentarily in self-defense, in defense of others, or as a result of legal necessity.) | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hurtadogreen2 sentences2001Accordingly, the trial court did not err by failing to give sua sponte the momentary possession instruction derived from Mijares . " ( Id. at p. 1312, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 627 .) Frazier also placed reliance on People v. Hurtado, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th 805 , 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 853 ( Hurtado ), which case similarly rejected the rationale and holding of Cole in construing an arguably analogous unlawful possession statute. 2001Accordingly, the trial court did not err by failing to give sua sponte the momentary possession instruction derived from Mijares . " ( Id. at p. 1312, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 627 .) Frazier also placed reliance on People v. Hurtado, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th 805 , 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 853 ( Hurtado ), which case similarly rejected the rationale and holding of Cole in construing an arguably analogous unlawful possession statute. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Fraziergreen2 sentences2001Accordingly, the trial court did not err by failing to give sua sponte the momentary possession instruction derived from Mijares . " ( Id. at p. 1312, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d 627 .) Frazier also placed reliance on People v. Hurtado, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th 805 , 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 853 ( Hurtado ), which case similarly rejected the rationale and holding of Cole in construing an arguably analogous unlawful possession statute. 2001Therefore, in a case in which a defendant is entitled to an instruction on temporary possession for disposal, we conclude the trial court should instruct pursuant to the original version of CALJIC No. 12.06 based upon Mijares . ' ([ Hurtado, ] supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 814 , 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 853 ; see also People v. Pepper [ supra, ] 41 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1036-1038 , 48 Cal. Rptr.2d 877 , ruling the momentary possession defense does not apply to a violation of section 12021 except when the firearm is possesed momentarily in self-defense, in defense of others, or as a result of legal necessity.) | 1 | 2 |
People v. Sullivangreen2 sentences2013In People v. Sullivan (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1446, 1453 , the defendant was found guilty of manufacturing and possessing methamphetamine for sale, placing him outside the realm of a momentary possession defense. 2001As noted, the statutes (past and present) at issue in the cases we have reviewed all make unlawful the possession of enumerated controlled substances "without regard to the [possessor's] specific intent in possessing the substance." ( Sullivan, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1452 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 284 [but see ante, fn. 4, p. 5, 264 Cal.Rptr. 284 ].) As aptly explained in People v. Spry, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at page 1369 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 , "When a defendant relies on the Mijares defense, he or she essentially admits the commission of the offense of simple possession of narcotics: The defendant | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Marquez
green
1 sentence2025But “[a] trial court must instruct the jury, even without a request, on all general principles of law that are ‘ “closely and openly connected to the facts and that are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.” ’ ” (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 246 .) “The duty to instruct sua sponte” includes “defenses that are raised by the evidence.” (People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 581 .) “The court may, however, ‘properly refuse an instruction . . . if it is not supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Burney, at p. 246.) “[T]he court need not give the requested instruction whe | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Mijares
green
1 sentence2025But “[a] trial court must instruct the jury, even without a request, on all general principles of law that are ‘ “closely and openly connected to the facts and that are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.” ’ ” (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 246 .) “The duty to instruct sua sponte” includes “defenses that are raised by the evidence.” (People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 581 .) “The court may, however, ‘properly refuse an instruction . . . if it is not supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Burney, at p. 246.) “[T]he court need not give the requested instruction whe | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Martin
green
1 sentence2025While Kestner’s statements suggested he only briefly handled the firearm, there was no evidence he possessed it “ ‘for the purpose of abandonment, disposal, or destruction.’ ” (People v. Martin, supra, 25 Cal.4th at 8 p. 1190.) Instead, he simply moved the firearm from one area of the house to another so D.F. could “grab some cigarettes.” Kestner placed the firearm in a common area over which he continued to have access. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Burney
green
1 sentence2025But “[a] trial court must instruct the jury, even without a request, on all general principles of law that are ‘ “closely and openly connected to the facts and that are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.” ’ ” (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 246 .) “The duty to instruct sua sponte” includes “defenses that are raised by the evidence.” (People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 581 .) “The court may, however, ‘properly refuse an instruction . . . if it is not supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Burney, at p. 246.) “[T]he court need not give the requested instruction whe | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Barnett
green
1 sentence2025But “[a] trial court must instruct the jury, even without a request, on all general principles of law that are ‘ “closely and openly connected to the facts and that are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.” ’ ” (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 246 .) “The duty to instruct sua sponte” includes “defenses that are raised by the evidence.” (People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 553, 581 .) “The court may, however, ‘properly refuse an instruction . . . if it is not supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (Burney, at p. 246.) “[T]he court need not give the requested instruction whe | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Maury
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th 620, 667 ; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 424 .) Armas did not invoke the momentary possession defense at trial, and there was no substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude he possessed child pornography only very briefly for the purpose of getting rid of it. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Molano
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th 620, 667 ; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 424 .) Armas did not invoke the momentary possession defense at trial, and there was no substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude he possessed child pornography only very briefly for the purpose of getting rid of it. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Cole
green
2 sentences2001To the extent People v. Cole, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 1439 , 249 Cal.Rptr. 601 , and People v. Spry, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th 1345 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 , [10] are inconsistent *609 with the views expressed herein, they are disapproved. 2001To the extent People v. Cole, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d 1439 , 249 Cal.Rptr. 601 , and People v. Spry, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th 1345 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 , [10] are inconsistent *609 with the views expressed herein, they are disapproved. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Spry
green
2 sentences2001As noted, the statutes (past and present) at issue in the cases we have reviewed all make unlawful the possession of enumerated controlled substances "without regard to the [possessor's] specific intent in possessing the substance." ( Sullivan, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1452 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 284 [but see ante, fn. 4, p. 5, 264 Cal.Rptr. 284 ].) As aptly explained in People v. Spry, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at page 1369 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 , "When a defendant relies on the Mijares defense, he or she essentially admits the commission of the offense of simple possession of narcotics: The defendant 2001As noted, the statutes (past and present) at issue in the cases we have reviewed all make unlawful the possession of enumerated controlled substances "without regard to the [possessor's] specific intent in possessing the substance." ( Sullivan, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1452 , 264 Cal.Rptr. 284 [but see ante, fn. 4, p. 5, 264 Cal.Rptr. 284 ].) As aptly explained in People v. Spry, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at page 1369 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 , "When a defendant relies on the Mijares defense, he or she essentially admits the commission of the offense of simple possession of narcotics: The defendant | 1 | 2001–2001 |