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6 California opinions name it 3 courts 1992–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Lincoln v. Barringergreen2 sentences2008(City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 178 ].) The next sentence of Moody’s brief claims that ALJ Hoover “shared” Moody’s concerns, and that assertion is followed by citations and quotations from the prehearing conferences. 2008(City of Lincoln v. Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239 [ 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 178 ].) The next sentence of Moody’s brief claims that ALJ Hoover “shared” Moody’s concerns, and that assertion is followed by citations and quotations from the prehearing conferences. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Marshallgreen2 sentences2000A defendant lacks standing to complain of the violation of a third party's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. ( People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 343 , 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635 , 895 P.2d 877 ; People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 501 , 268 Cal.Rptr. 126 , 788 P.2d 640 , disapproved on another point in People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 933, fn. 4 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 269 , 790 P.2d 676 .) Defendant does have standing, however, to assert that his own due process right to a fair trial was violated as a consequence of the asserted violation of Moody's Fifth Amendment righ 2000A defendant lacks standing to complain of the violation of a third party's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. ( People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 343 , 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635 , 895 P.2d 877 ; People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 501 , 268 Cal.Rptr. 126 , 788 P.2d 640 , disapproved on another point in People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 933, fn. 4 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 269 , 790 P.2d 676 .) Defendant does have standing, however, to assert that his own due process right to a fair trial was violated as a consequence of the asserted violation of Moody's Fifth Amendment righ | 1 | 1 |
People v. Badgettgreen2 sentences2000A defendant lacks standing to complain of the violation of a third party's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. ( People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 343 , 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635 , 895 P.2d 877 ; People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 501 , 268 Cal.Rptr. 126 , 788 P.2d 640 , disapproved on another point in People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 933, fn. 4 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 269 , 790 P.2d 676 .) Defendant does have standing, however, to assert that his own due process right to a fair trial was violated as a consequence of the asserted violation of Moody's Fifth Amendment righ 2000A defendant lacks standing to complain of the violation of a third party's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. ( People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 343 , 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635 , 895 P.2d 877 ; People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 501 , 268 Cal.Rptr. 126 , 788 P.2d 640 , disapproved on another point in People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 933, fn. 4 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 269 , 790 P.2d 676 .) Defendant does have standing, however, to assert that his own due process right to a fair trial was violated as a consequence of the asserted violation of Moody's Fifth Amendment righ | 1 | 1 |
People v. Douglasgreen2 sentences2000A defendant lacks standing to complain of the violation of a third party's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. ( People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 343 , 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635 , 895 P.2d 877 ; People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 501 , 268 Cal.Rptr. 126 , 788 P.2d 640 , disapproved on another point in People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 933, fn. 4 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 269 , 790 P.2d 676 .) Defendant does have standing, however, to assert that his own due process right to a fair trial was violated as a consequence of the asserted violation of Moody's Fifth Amendment righ 2000A defendant lacks standing to complain of the violation of a third party's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. ( People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 343 , 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635 , 895 P.2d 877 ; People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 501 , 268 Cal.Rptr. 126 , 788 P.2d 640 , disapproved on another point in People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 933, fn. 4 , 269 Cal.Rptr. 269 , 790 P.2d 676 .) Defendant does have standing, however, to assert that his own due process right to a fair trial was violated as a consequence of the asserted violation of Moody's Fifth Amendment righ | 1 | 1 |
Ochoa v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ 1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018"Generally, an appellant forfeits the right to attack error by expressly or impliedly agreeing at trial to the procedure objected to on appeal." ( *368 Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc . (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270 , 1309, 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 112 .) Having agreed to seek a declaratory ruling, the Joneses cannot complain on appeal that they received one. *641 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. 2018"Generally, an appellant forfeits the right to attack error by expressly or impliedly agreeing at trial to the procedure objected to on appeal." ( *368 Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc . (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270 , 1309, 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 112 .) Having agreed to seek a declaratory ruling, the Joneses cannot complain on appeal that they received one. *641 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Dominguez
green
1 sentence2025(People v. Dominguez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1148 ; see also People v. Morales, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 990 [the trial court “ ‘has a duty to refrain from giving . . . instructions on principles of law that are irrelevant and that would have the effect of confusing the jury’ ”].)2 2 At oral argument, Moody’s counsel acknowledged that Moody’s defense at trial—based on his testimony that he inadvertently brushed his hand against C.M. after tripping on a shoe—was factually inconsistent with a defense based on Moody having mistaken C.M. for his wife, but contended that the two defenses were c | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Wiggins v. Royale Convalescent Hospital
green
2 sentences1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ 1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Thing v. La Chusa
green
2 sentences1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ 1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Newton v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
green
2 sentences1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ 1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Sesma v. Cueto
green
2 sentences1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ 1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Johnson v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ 1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Andalon v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ 1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Schwarz v. Regents of University of California
green
2 sentences1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ 1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Hurlbut v. Sonora Community Hospital
green
2 sentences1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ 1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Golstein v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ 1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Martinez v. County of Los Angeles
green
2 sentences1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ 1992While it appears that the contemporaneous observation requirement of Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d 644 [ 257 Cal. Rptr. 865 , 771 P.2d 814 ] would bar this claim, we decline to decide the issue, since Moody's claim has been dismissed. [5] Compare, e.g., Ochoa v. Superior Court (1985) 39 Cal.3d 159 [ 216 Cal. Rptr. 661 , 703 P.2d 1 ] (permitting recovery by parents on "bystander theory," rather than "direct victim theory," as a result of parents' observation of defendants' failure to treat deathly ill child); Schwartz v. Regents of the University of California (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 149 [ | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.