no-reimbursement rule in California

2002Code, § 2640] reveals a “legislative judgment that it would be fairer to the contributing party to allow separate property reimbursement upon dissolution.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Cochran, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1061-1062 , citing In re Marriage of Walrath, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 918 .) However, “the no-reimbursement rule of See v. See [supra, 64 Cal.2d 778, 785 ] has been voided only insofar as the separate property contributions are within the category of ‘contributions to the acquisition of property’ as defined in Family Code section 2640.” (1 Kirkland et al., Cal. Family Law Practice

1979Thus we said in See, “The basic rule is that the party who uses his separate property for community purposes is entitled to *83 reimbursement from the community or separate property of the other only if there is an agreement between the parties to that effect.” ( 64 Cal.2d at p. 785 ; Weinberg v. Weinberg (1967) 67 Cal.2d 557, 570 [ 63 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 432 P.2d 709 ].) This court, however, has not previously addressed the applicability of this no-reimbursement rule to the situation in which, after separating, the party uses his separate property for payments on preexisting community obligations.

1989Thus, application of the no-reimbursement rule will discourage payment of community debts after separation, exacerbate the financial and emotional disruption which all too frequently accompanies the breakup of a marriage and, perhaps, result in impairing the credit reputations of both spouses.” (In re Marriage of Smith (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 725, 746-747 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 205 ], adopted in In re Marriage of Epstein, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 84 .) A further reason why section 4800.2 does not limit Epstein credits is that it affects only property rights.

1989Thus, application of the no-reimbursement rule will discourage payment of community debts after separation, exacerbate the financial and emotional disruption which all too frequently accompanies the breakup of a marriage and, perhaps, result in impairing the credit reputations of both spouses.” (In re Marriage of Smith (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 725, 746-747 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 205 ], adopted in In re Marriage of Epstein, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 84 .) A further reason why section 4800.2 does not limit Epstein credits is that it affects only property rights.

1978Next, the Vides court noticed a no-reimbursement rule as applied in Blackburn and Thomson , but distinguished those cases on the basis that in them the wife sought *746 reimbursement from the separate estate of the husband whereas in Vides reimbursement was sought from the community property, in fact, from the very asset on which the payments were made. ( 215 Cal. App.2d at p. 603 .) However, the rule as set forth in See ( 64 Cal.2d at p. 785 ) and repeated in Weinberg ( 67 Cal.2d at p. 570 ) and Cosgrove ( 27 Cal. App.3d at p. 431 ) applies to reimbursement from either the community property

1978Next, the Vides court noticed a no-reimbursement rule as applied in Blackburn and Thomson , but distinguished those cases on the basis that in them the wife sought reimbursement from the separate estate of the husband whereas in Vides reimbursement was sought from the community property, in fact, from the very asset on which the payments were made. ( 215 Cal.App.2d at p. 603 .) However, the rule as set forth in See ( 64 Cal.2d at p. 785 ) and repeated in Weinberg ( 67 Cal.2d at p. 570 ) and Cosgrove ( 27 Cal.App.3d at p. 431 ) applies to reimbursement from either the community property or the

1978Next, the Vides court noticed a no-reimbursement rule as applied in Blackburn and Thomson , but distinguished those cases on the basis that in them the wife sought *746 reimbursement from the separate estate of the husband whereas in Vides reimbursement was sought from the community property, in fact, from the very asset on which the payments were made. ( 215 Cal. App.2d at p. 603 .) However, the rule as set forth in See ( 64 Cal.2d at p. 785 ) and repeated in Weinberg ( 67 Cal.2d at p. 570 ) and Cosgrove ( 27 Cal. App.3d at p. 431 ) applies to reimbursement from either the community property

1978Next, the Vides court noticed a no-reimbursement rule as applied in Blackburn and Thomson , but distinguished those cases on the basis that in them the wife sought reimbursement from the separate estate of the husband whereas in Vides reimbursement was sought from the community property, in fact, from the very asset on which the payments were made. ( 215 Cal.App.2d at p. 603 .) However, the rule as set forth in See ( 64 Cal.2d at p. 785 ) and repeated in Weinberg ( 67 Cal.2d at p. 570 ) and Cosgrove ( 27 Cal.App.3d at p. 431 ) applies to reimbursement from either the community property or the

2002Code, § 2640] reveals a “legislative judgment that it would be fairer to the contributing party to allow separate property reimbursement upon dissolution.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Cochran, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1061-1062 , citing In re Marriage of Walrath, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 918 .) However, “the no-reimbursement rule of See v. See [supra, 64 Cal.2d 778, 785 ] has been voided only insofar as the separate property contributions are within the category of ‘contributions to the acquisition of property’ as defined in Family Code section 2640.” (1 Kirkland et al., Cal. Family Law Practice

1978(See See v. See, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 785 ; cf. Dunn v. Mullan, 211 Cal. 583, 589-590 [ 296 P. 604 , 77 A.L.R. 1015 ]; Ives v. Connacher, supra, 162 Cal. at p. 177 .) This presumption is, in turn, largely based no doubt upon the natural feelings of mutual affection and generosity presumably attending the marital state.