noncapital case error in California

2024(People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 50 ; see People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 (Breverman), disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 .) Generally, and as relevant here, the failure to instruct on lesser included offenses in a noncapital case is an error of state law and is therefore “not subject to reversal unless an examination of the entire record establishes 19 a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome.” (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 165 ; see People v. Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 260.) We may “consider, amo

2024(People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 50 ; see People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 (Breverman), disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 .) Generally, and as relevant here, the failure to instruct on lesser included offenses in a noncapital case is an error of state law and is therefore “not subject to reversal unless an examination of the entire record establishes 19 a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome.” (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 165 ; see People v. Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 260.) We may “consider, amo

2024(People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 50 ; see People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 (Breverman), disapproved of on other grounds by People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237 .) Generally, and as relevant here, the failure to instruct on lesser included offenses in a noncapital case is an error of state law and is therefore “not subject to reversal unless an examination of the entire record establishes 19 a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome.” (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 165 ; see People v. Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 260.) We may “consider, amo

2019Building on the premise that Judges Davidian and Currier failed to exercise discretion (which we have already rejected), defendant next argues that anything short of an order appointing advisory counsel would have been an abuse of discretion given the complexity of the case and lengthy sentence defendant would face if convicted. 28 Assuming arguendo that a trial court may abuse its discretion in denying advisory counsel in a noncapital case (compare People v. Garcia (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1430 [questioning whether a pro per defendant in a noncapital case may challenge a trial court’s deci

2019Building on the premise that Judges Davidian and Currier failed to exercise discretion (which we have already rejected), defendant next argues that anything short of an order appointing advisory counsel would have been an abuse of discretion given the complexity of the case and lengthy sentence defendant would face if convicted. 28 Assuming arguendo that a trial court may abuse its discretion in denying advisory counsel in a noncapital case (compare People v. Garcia (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1430 [questioning whether a pro per defendant in a noncapital case may challenge a trial court’s deci

2000We think, therefore, that the harmless-error inquiry must be essentially the same: Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?” (Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 18 [ 119 S.Ct. at p. 1838 ].) 7 In People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142 , we concluded the failure to instruct sua sponte on a lesser included offense in a noncapital case is an error of California law and accordingly subject only to state standards of reversibility.

2000We think, therefore, that the harmless-error inquiry must be essentially the same: Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error?” (Neder, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 18 [ 119 S.Ct. at p. 1838 ].) 7 In People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th 142 , we concluded the failure to instruct sua sponte on a lesser included offense in a noncapital case is an error of California law and accordingly subject only to state standards of reversibility.

2000(Id. at p. 165; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Analysis We have previously quoted the pertinent language of section 10802.

2000(Id. at p. 165; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) Analysis We have previously quoted the pertinent language of section 10802.

1985But while in a noncapital case a claim of erroneous admission of evidence will not be reviewed in the absence of a timely and proper objection (e.g., People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 547-548 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 732 , 579 P.2d 1048 ]), we have long followed a different rule in capital cases.

1985But while in a noncapital case a claim of erroneous admission of evidence will not be reviewed in the absence of a timely and proper objection (e.g., People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 547-548 [ 146 Cal.Rptr. 732 , 579 P.2d 1048 ]), we have long followed a different rule in capital cases.

1985On an appeal from a judgment imposing the penalty of death, a technical insufficiency in the form of an objection will be disregarded and the entire record will be examined to determine if a miscarriage of justice resulted. ( People v. Bob (1946) 29 Cal.2d 321, 328 [ 175 P.2d 12 ].) The Bob rule is even more relevant today, in light of the recognition by the United States Supreme Court of the fact that death is "`profoundly different from all other penalties'" ( Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 110 [ 71 L.Ed. 1 , 8, 102 S.Ct. 869 ]) and its repeated holdings that a capital defendant is

1985On an appeal from a judgment imposing the penalty of death, a technical insufficiency in the form of an objection will be disregarded and the entire record will be examined to determine if a miscarriage of justice resulted. ( People v. Bob (1946) 29 Cal.2d 321, 328 [ 175 P.2d 12 ].) The Bob rule is even more relevant today, in light of the recognition by the United States Supreme Court of the fact that death is "`profoundly different from all other penalties'" ( Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 110 [ 71 L.Ed. 1 , 8, 102 S.Ct. 869 ]) and its repeated holdings that a capital defendant is

1985On an appeal from a judgment imposing the penalty of death, a technical insufficiency in the form of an objection will be disregarded and the entire record will be examined to determine if a miscarriage of justice resulted. ( People v. Bob (1946) 29 Cal.2d 321, 328 [ 175 P.2d 12 ].) The Bob rule is even more relevant today, in light of the recognition by the United States Supreme Court of the fact that death is "`profoundly different from all other penalties'" ( Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 110 [ 71 L.Ed. 1 , 8, 102 S.Ct. 869 ]) and its repeated holdings that a capital defendant is

1985On an appeal from a judgment imposing the penalty of death, a technical insufficiency in the form of an objection will be disregarded and the entire record will be examined to determine if a miscarriage of justice resulted. ( People v. Bob (1946) 29 Cal.2d 321, 328 [ 175 P.2d 12 ].) The Bob rule is even more relevant today, in light of the recognition by the United States Supreme Court of the fact that death is "`profoundly different from all other penalties'" ( Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 110 [ 71 L.Ed. 1 , 8, 102 S.Ct. 869 ]) and its repeated holdings that a capital defendant is