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6 California opinions name it 1 courts 1972–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Levinegreen2 sentences1985(People v. Levine (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1058, 1070 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 756 ].) In the instant case, the trial judge conducted a second in camera hearing in his chambers pursuant to Evidence Code section 1042, subdivision (d). 1985(People v. Levine (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 1058, 1070 [ 199 Cal.Rptr. 756 ].) In the instant case, the trial judge conducted a second in camera hearing in his chambers pursuant to Evidence Code section 1042, subdivision (d). | 1 | 1 |
Taglianetti v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1984While some defense critics have been distrustful of any unilateral determination of materiality reached without participation by defense counsel, and have been critical of placing an additional burden of judicial investigation upon the trial judge, the United States Supreme Court in Taglianetti v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 316, 317-318 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 302, 305 , 89 S.Ct. 1099 ] held: “[W]e cannot hold that ‘the task is too complex, and the margin for error too great, to rely wholly on the in camera judgment of the trial court. ’ ” Pursuant to section 1042, subdivision (d) of the Evidence Code 1984While some defense critics have been distrustful of any unilateral determination of materiality reached without participation by defense counsel, and have been critical of placing an additional burden of judicial investigation upon the trial judge, the United States Supreme Court in Taglianetti v. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 316, 317-318 [ 22 L.Ed.2d 302, 305 , 89 S.Ct. 1099 ] held: “[W]e cannot hold that ‘the task is too complex, and the margin for error too great, to rely wholly on the in camera judgment of the trial court. ’ ” Pursuant to section 1042, subdivision (d) of the Evidence Code | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Yeung v. Soos
green
2 sentences2012If quiet title is the sole cause of action, the hearing is, in effect, the trial of the entire matter. . . . [I]t warrants an open-court hearing.” (Harbour Vista, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1507-1508, citation omitted.) As Division Five of this appellate district held in Yeung v. Soos (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 576 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 502 ] (Yeung): “[Section 764.010 . . . require[s] ... an evidentiary hearing in a quiet title action after default. 2012If quiet title is the sole cause of action, the hearing is, in effect, the trial of the entire matter. . . . [I]t warrants an open-court hearing.” (Harbour Vista, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1507-1508, citation omitted.) As Division Five of this appellate district held in Yeung v. Soos (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 576 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 502 ] (Yeung): “[Section 764.010 . . . require[s] ... an evidentiary hearing in a quiet title action after default. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
TJX Companies, Inc. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2011“It is wise public policy to conduct judicial proceedings in the sunshine, unless there is a very good reason not to do so.” (TJX, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 754 .) The language of section 764.010 compels us to conclude the trial court erred when it entered a default judgment against HSBC without an open-court hearing. 2011“It is wise public policy to conduct judicial proceedings in the sunshine, unless there is a very good reason not to do so.” (TJX, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 754 .) The language of section 764.010 compels us to conclude the trial court erred when it entered a default judgment against HSBC without an open-court hearing. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
McCray v. Illinois
green
1 sentence1981In McCray v. Illinois, supra, 386 U.S. 300 , the United States Supreme Court held that the United States Constitution does not require abolition of the informant privilege where an informant’s communication has been used to establish cause for an arrest or search. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
United States v. Isaac Davenport
green
1 sentence1972While as a general rule the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to compel the attendance of witnesses chosen by him (United States v. Davenport (7th Cir. 1963) 312 F.2d 303, 305 ), it does not necessarily follow that a defendant has the right to compel the prosecution to disclose the name of an informer. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.