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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2000 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Prudhomme v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1983Collie (1981) 30 C 3d 43.” Prudhomme holds that an order requiring defense counsel to disclose to the prosecution the names and expected testimony of all witnesses the defendant intends to call at trial violates the privilege against self-incrimination because the order in its broad form fails to inquire into the possible incriminatory consequences of compliance and the required disclosure may “conceivably . . . lighten the prosecution’s burden of proving its case in chief.” (Prudhomme v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 320, 326 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 466 P.2d 673 ].) In People v. Collie (1981) 3 1983Collie (1981) 30 C 3d 43.” Prudhomme holds that an order requiring defense counsel to disclose to the prosecution the names and expected testimony of all witnesses the defendant intends to call at trial violates the privilege against self-incrimination because the order in its broad form fails to inquire into the possible incriminatory consequences of compliance and the required disclosure may “conceivably . . . lighten the prosecution’s burden of proving its case in chief.” (Prudhomme v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 320, 326 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 466 P.2d 673 ].) In People v. Collie (1981) 3 | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Doegreen2 sentences1994The fact that the records are in respondent’s possession is irrelevant to the determination of whether the creation of the records was compelled.” (465 U.S. at pp. 611-612 [79 L.Ed.2d at pp. 559-560].) Also: “If the party asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege has voluntarily compiled the document, no compulsion is present and the contents of the document are not privileged.” (Id. at p. 612, fn. 10 [ 79 L.Ed.2d at p. 560 ].) In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor was even more emphatic: “. . . the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of any 1994The fact that the records are in respondent’s possession is irrelevant to the determination of whether the creation of the records was compelled.” (465 U.S. at pp. 611-612 [79 L.Ed.2d at pp. 559-560].) Also: “If the party asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege has voluntarily compiled the document, no compulsion is present and the contents of the document are not privileged.” (Id. at p. 612, fn. 10 [ 79 L.Ed.2d at p. 560 ].) In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor was even more emphatic: “. . . the Fifth Amendment provides absolutely no protection for the contents of private papers of any | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Littlefield
green
2 sentences2000Defendants explain that under these circumstances, they are in no position to challenge the trial court’s findings regarding the alleged danger to the witnesses. 4 We upheld the constitutionality of the reciprocal discovery provisions of Proposition 115 in Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 231 , 815 P.2d 304 ], (See also In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 122 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 248 , 851 P.2d 42 ] [holding that the applicable discovery statutes authorize an order requiring defense counsel to acquire and disclose to the prosecution the address, if reasonably accessibl 2000Defendants explain that under these circumstances, they are in no position to challenge the trial court’s findings regarding the alleged danger to the witnesses. 4 We upheld the constitutionality of the reciprocal discovery provisions of Proposition 115 in Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 231 , 815 P.2d 304 ], (See also In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 122 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 248 , 851 P.2d 42 ] [holding that the applicable discovery statutes authorize an order requiring defense counsel to acquire and disclose to the prosecution the address, if reasonably accessibl | 3 | 1993–2000 |
People v. Collie
green
2 sentences1983Collie (1981) 30 C 3d 43.” Prudhomme holds that an order requiring defense counsel to disclose to the prosecution the names and expected testimony of all witnesses the defendant intends to call at trial violates the privilege against self-incrimination because the order in its broad form fails to inquire into the possible incriminatory consequences of compliance and the required disclosure may “conceivably . . . lighten the prosecution’s burden of proving its case in chief.” (Prudhomme v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 320, 326 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 466 P.2d 673 ].) In People v. Collie (1981) 3 1983Collie (1981) 30 C 3d 43.” Prudhomme holds that an order requiring defense counsel to disclose to the prosecution the names and expected testimony of all witnesses the defendant intends to call at trial violates the privilege against self-incrimination because the order in its broad form fails to inquire into the possible incriminatory consequences of compliance and the required disclosure may “conceivably . . . lighten the prosecution’s burden of proving its case in chief.” (Prudhomme v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 320, 326 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 129 , 466 P.2d 673 ].) In People v. Collie (1981) 3 | 2 | 1983–1995 |
Izazaga v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2000Defendants explain that under these circumstances, they are in no position to challenge the trial court’s findings regarding the alleged danger to the witnesses. 4 We upheld the constitutionality of the reciprocal discovery provisions of Proposition 115 in Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 231 , 815 P.2d 304 ], (See also In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 122 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 248 , 851 P.2d 42 ] [holding that the applicable discovery statutes authorize an order requiring defense counsel to acquire and disclose to the prosecution the address, if reasonably accessibl 2000Defendants explain that under these circumstances, they are in no position to challenge the trial court’s findings regarding the alleged danger to the witnesses. 4 We upheld the constitutionality of the reciprocal discovery provisions of Proposition 115 in Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356 [ 285 Cal.Rptr. 231 , 815 P.2d 304 ], (See also In re Littlefield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 122 [ 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 248 , 851 P.2d 42 ] [holding that the applicable discovery statutes authorize an order requiring defense counsel to acquire and disclose to the prosecution the address, if reasonably accessibl | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Jones v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1976It approves its earlier decision in Jones v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 56 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 879 , 372 P.2d 919 , 96 A.L.R.2d 1213 ], and states: “A reasonable demand for factual information which, as in Jones , pertains to a particular defense or defenses, and seeks only that information which defendant intends to introduce at trial, may present no substantial hazards of self-incrimination and therefore justify the trial judge in determining that under the facts and circumstances in the case before him it clearly appears that disclosure cannot possibly tend to incriminate defendant.” ( 2 Ca 1976It approves its earlier decision in Jones v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 56 [ 22 Cal.Rptr. 879 , 372 P.2d 919 , 96 A.L.R.2d 1213 ], and states: “A reasonable demand for factual information which, as in Jones , pertains to a particular defense or defenses, and seeks only that information which defendant intends to introduce at trial, may present no substantial hazards of self-incrimination and therefore justify the trial judge in determining that under the facts and circumstances in the case before him it clearly appears that disclosure cannot possibly tend to incriminate defendant.” ( 2 Ca | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.