Pate error in California

2019(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 .) “[O]nce a doubt has arisen as to the competence of the defendant to stand trial, the trial court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the case against the defendant without first determining his competence in a section 7 1368 hearing, and the matter cannot be waived by defendant or his counsel. [Citations.]” (Hale, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 541 , italics added.) This is known as Pate error (Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375 ) and is a due process violation where the trial court orders a competency hearing but never determin

2018In Pate itself, the high court rejected a proposal to remand for a retrospective competency hearing, citing the difficulty of determining the defendant's competence some six years after the fact. ( Pate , supra , 383 U.S. at p. 387 , 86 S.Ct. 836 .) The court did the same in Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162 , 183, 95 S.Ct. 896 , 43 L.Ed.2d 103 ( Drope ), emphasizing "the inherent difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc determination under the most favorable circumstances." For many years, these decisions were generally understood to mean automatic reversal was the only remedy for Pate error.

2009All we said there about the burden of proof is that "the People will have the burden of establishing that a retrospective competency hearing can be held. " ( Ary, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1029 , italics added.) Since Ary says nothing at all about the burden of proof on the issue of competency after a Pate violation, the Legislature's presumed acquiescence in our opinion hardly signifies a legislative position on that issue.

2009All we said there about the burden of proof is that "the People will have the burden of establishing that a retrospective competency hearing can be held. " ( Ary, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1029 , italics added.) Since Ary says nothing at all about the burden of proof on the issue of competency after a Pate violation, the Legislature's presumed acquiescence in our opinion hardly signifies a legislative position on that issue.

2018In Pate itself, the high court rejected a proposal to remand for a retrospective competency hearing, citing the difficulty of determining the defendant's competence some six years after the fact. ( Pate , supra , 383 U.S. at p. 387 , 86 S.Ct. 836 .) The court did the same in Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162 , 183, 95 S.Ct. 896 , 43 L.Ed.2d 103 ( Drope ), emphasizing "the inherent difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc determination under the most favorable circumstances." For many years, these decisions were generally understood to mean automatic reversal was the only remedy for Pate error.

2018In Pate itself, the high court rejected a proposal to remand for a retrospective competency hearing, citing the difficulty of determining the defendant's competence some six years after the fact. ( Pate , supra , 383 U.S. at p. 387 , 86 S.Ct. 836 .) The court did the same in Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162 , 183, 95 S.Ct. 896 , 43 L.Ed.2d 103 ( Drope ), emphasizing "the inherent difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc determination under the most favorable circumstances." For many years, these decisions were generally understood to mean automatic reversal was the only remedy for Pate error.

2018Feasibility in this context means the availability of sufficient evidence to reliably determine the defendant's mental competence when tried earlier." ( Id. at p. 520, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 , 246 P.3d 322 .) In Lightsey , we again declined to answer the question whether a retrospective competency hearing is ever an available remedy for Pate error, deeming the question "complex and subject to debate." ( Lightsey , supra , 54 Cal.4th at p. 704 , 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 279 P.3d 1072 .) We instead concluded that such a hearing might be an appropriate remedy for a different sort of error-namely, a tri

2018Feasibility in this context means the availability of sufficient evidence to reliably determine the defendant's mental competence when tried earlier." ( Id. at p. 520, 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 , 246 P.3d 322 .) In Lightsey , we again declined to answer the question whether a retrospective competency hearing is ever an available remedy for Pate error, deeming the question "complex and subject to debate." ( Lightsey , supra , 54 Cal.4th at p. 704 , 143 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 , 279 P.3d 1072 .) We instead concluded that such a hearing might be an appropriate remedy for a different sort of error-namely, a tri

2020(See People v. Linton (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1146 , 1182 fn. 8 [“We are not bound, of course, by decisions of the lower federal courts, even on federal questions, but they may be considered for their persuasive weight”].) When deciding whether there was substantial evidence of the defendant’s incompetence, federal appellate courts, like California courts, routinely consider evidence of the defendant’s rational trial behavior that suggests the defendant was competent.

2020As the trial court remarked, Simon’s testimony was lucid and articulate”].) The federal courts are likewise bound by Pate’s rule that “[a] criminal defendant’s due process right to a fair trial is violated by a court’s failure to hold a proper competency hearing where there is substantial evidence of a defendant’s incompetency.” (United States v. Abdulmutallab (6th Cir. 2014) 739 F.3d 891, 899 ; see 18 U.S.C. § 4241 , subd. (a) [district court must hold competency hearing “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rend

2019(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 .) “[O]nce a doubt has arisen as to the competence of the defendant to stand trial, the trial court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the case against the defendant without first determining his competence in a section 7 1368 hearing, and the matter cannot be waived by defendant or his counsel. [Citations.]” (Hale, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 541 , italics added.) This is known as Pate error (Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375 ) and is a due process violation where the trial court orders a competency hearing but never determin

2019(Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 .) “[O]nce a doubt has arisen as to the competence of the defendant to stand trial, the trial court has no jurisdiction to proceed with the case against the defendant without first determining his competence in a section 7 1368 hearing, and the matter cannot be waived by defendant or his counsel. [Citations.]” (Hale, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 541 , italics added.) This is known as Pate error (Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375 ) and is a due process violation where the trial court orders a competency hearing but never determin

2019(See People v. Rodas (2018) 6 Cal.5th 219, 238 (Rodas).) The fair import of Hale, supra, that neither the defendant nor his counsel may withdraw a previously expressed doubt is clear and forms the basis of our holding: A person charged with crime may not stand trial if he is mentally incompetent.

2018In Pate itself, the high court rejected a proposal to remand for a retrospective competency hearing, citing the difficulty of determining the defendant's competence some six years after the fact. ( Pate , supra , 383 U.S. at p. 387 , 86 S.Ct. 836 .) The court did the same in Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162 , 183, 95 S.Ct. 896 , 43 L.Ed.2d 103 ( Drope ), emphasizing "the inherent difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc determination under the most favorable circumstances." For many years, these decisions were generally understood to mean automatic reversal was the only remedy for Pate error.

2018In Pate itself, the high court rejected a proposal to remand for a retrospective competency hearing, citing the difficulty of determining the defendant's competence some six years after the fact. ( Pate , supra , 383 U.S. at p. 387 , 86 S.Ct. 836 .) The court did the same in Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162 , 183, 95 S.Ct. 896 , 43 L.Ed.2d 103 ( Drope ), emphasizing "the inherent difficulties of such a nunc pro tunc determination under the most favorable circumstances." For many years, these decisions were generally understood to mean automatic reversal was the only remedy for Pate error.

2018I am just saying that the physical material copies in the fact of knowledge identified consistency, a prototype of the nature of the assimilated nature." Although defense counsel did not at that point renew her caution that defendant appeared incompetent to stand trial, the court's duty to assess competence is a continuing one. ( People v. Sattiewhite , supra , 59 Cal.4th at p. 464 , 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 328 P.3d 1 .) 6 A psychiatrist testified for the defense at trial, but did not examine defendant or prepare any written report. 7 In Ary II , supra , 51 Cal.4th 510 , 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 , 246

2018I am just saying that the physical material copies in the fact of knowledge identified consistency, a prototype of the nature of the assimilated nature." Although defense counsel did not at that point renew her caution that defendant appeared incompetent to stand trial, the court's duty to assess competence is a continuing one. ( People v. Sattiewhite , supra , 59 Cal.4th at p. 464 , 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 328 P.3d 1 .) 6 A psychiatrist testified for the defense at trial, but did not examine defendant or prepare any written report. 7 In Ary II , supra , 51 Cal.4th 510 , 120 Cal.Rptr.3d 431 , 246

2012(People v. Ary, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 516-517.) 18 We explained the three-step procedure followed in adjudicating a Batson claim as follows: “ ‘First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” [Citation.] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the “burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion” by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, “[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial

2012(See Pate, supra, 383 U.S. at pp. 386-387; Dusky, supra, 362 U.S. at p. 403 .) We disagree.

2012(See Morris v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1969) 414 F.2d 258, 259 , citing Meador v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1964) 332 F.2d 935, 938-939 ; see also U.S. v. Taylor (4th Cir. 1971) 437 F.2d 371, 382, fn. 3 [listing cases distinguishing between direct appeals and collateral review]; but see U.S. v. Makris (5th Cir. 1973) 483 F.2d 1082, 1092, fn. 8 [observing that that court had “consistently rejected” the Ninth Circuit’s rule of automatic reversal in direct criminal appeals].) 17 As noted ante, in footnote 15, in a later appeal we accepted this ruling as law of the case and thus did not pass judgment on whether the l

2012(See Morris v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1969) 414 F.2d 258, 259 , citing Meador v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1964) 332 F.2d 935, 938-939 ; see also U.S. v. Taylor (4th Cir. 1971) 437 F.2d 371, 382, fn. 3 [listing cases distinguishing between direct appeals and collateral review]; but see U.S. v. Makris (5th Cir. 1973) 483 F.2d 1082, 1092, fn. 8 [observing that that court had “consistently rejected” the Ninth Circuit’s rule of automatic reversal in direct criminal appeals].) 17 As noted ante, in footnote 15, in a later appeal we accepted this ruling as law of the case and thus did not pass judgment on whether the l

2012(See Morris v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1969) 414 F.2d 258, 259 , citing Meador v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1964) 332 F.2d 935, 938-939 ; see also U.S. v. Taylor (4th Cir. 1971) 437 F.2d 371, 382, fn. 3 [listing cases distinguishing between direct appeals and collateral review]; but see U.S. v. Makris (5th Cir. 1973) 483 F.2d 1082, 1092, fn. 8 [observing that that court had “consistently rejected” the Ninth Circuit’s rule of automatic reversal in direct criminal appeals].) 17 As noted ante, in footnote 15, in a later appeal we accepted this ruling as law of the case and thus did not pass judgment on whether the l

2012(See Morris v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1969) 414 F.2d 258, 259 , citing Meador v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1964) 332 F.2d 935, 938-939 ; see also U.S. v. Taylor (4th Cir. 1971) 437 F.2d 371, 382, fn. 3 [listing cases distinguishing between direct appeals and collateral review]; but see U.S. v. Makris (5th Cir. 1973) 483 F.2d 1082, 1092, fn. 8 [observing that that court had “consistently rejected” the Ninth Circuit’s rule of automatic reversal in direct criminal appeals].) 17 As noted ante, in footnote 15, in a later appeal we accepted this ruling as law of the case and thus did not pass judgment on whether the l

2012(See People v. Pennington, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 521 [“That error requires reversal of judgment here.”].) In Welch , we concluded that where there is substantial evidence of incompetence and “a full competence hearing is required but the trial court fails to hold one, the judgment must be reversed.” (People v. Welch, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 738 , italics added.) At some point, however, courts parsed the language of Pate and subsequent high court decisions addressing the constitutional violation (like Drope, supra, 420 U.S. 162 ) and discerned that the problem of remanding for the limited reme

2012(See People v. Ary, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 520-521 [in the case of Pate error, “[Requiring a criminal defendant to prove at a retrospective mental competency hearing that he was incompetent when tried earlier does not ‘ “offend[] some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” ’ ”]; Tate v. State (1995) 1995 OKCR 24 [ 896 P.2d 1182, 1188 ] [inherent in the decision to conduct a retrospective competency hearing in the case of Pate error “is the conclusion that the defendant will be placed in a position comparable to the one h

2009The Moran majority concludes that, though Medina deals only with pretrial competency determinations, its holding is nevertheless "equally applicable to retrospective competency hearings" because such a hearing can only take place if the prosecution has established "that a petitioner's competence can be accurately evaluated retrospectively." ( Moran, supra, 57 F.3d at p. 697 , italics added.) This statement, which is the cornerstone of the court's analysis, seems to us little more than an ipse dixit. [19] The unexplained idea that it is sufficient for due process purposes, i.e., fundamentally f

2009The Moran majority concludes that, though Medina deals only with pretrial competency determinations, its holding is nevertheless "equally applicable to retrospective competency hearings" because such a hearing can only take place if the prosecution has established "that a petitioner's competence can be accurately evaluated retrospectively." ( Moran, supra, 57 F.3d at p. 697 , italics added.) This statement, which is the cornerstone of the court's analysis, seems to us little more than an ipse dixit. [19] The unexplained idea that it is sufficient for due process purposes, i.e., fundamentally f

2009Dec. 836 , 362 N.E.2d 307, 311 ]. [13] See, e.g., U.S. v. Robinson (4th Cir. 2005) 404 F.3d 850, 856-857 . [14] See, e.g., U.S. v. Hoskie (9th Cir. 1991) 950 F.2d 1388, 1392 ; U.S. v. Velasquez (3d Cir. 1989) 885 F.2d 1076, 1089 ; Brown v. Warden, Great Meadow Correctional Facility (2d Cir. 1982) 682 F.2d 348, 353-354 ; United States v. Hollis (3d Cir. 1977) 569 F.2d 199, 203-204 ; United States v. DiGilio (3d Cir. 1976) 538 F.2d 972 ; United States v. Makris (5th Cir. 1976) 535 F.2d 899, 902 ; United States v. Williams (M.D.Fla., June 7, 2007, No. 5:06-cr-36-Oc-10GRJ) 2007 WL 1655371 ; U.S. v

2009Dec. 836 , 362 N.E.2d 307, 311 ]. [13] See, e.g., U.S. v. Robinson (4th Cir. 2005) 404 F.3d 850, 856-857 . [14] See, e.g., U.S. v. Hoskie (9th Cir. 1991) 950 F.2d 1388, 1392 ; U.S. v. Velasquez (3d Cir. 1989) 885 F.2d 1076, 1089 ; Brown v. Warden, Great Meadow Correctional Facility (2d Cir. 1982) 682 F.2d 348, 353-354 ; United States v. Hollis (3d Cir. 1977) 569 F.2d 199, 203-204 ; United States v. DiGilio (3d Cir. 1976) 538 F.2d 972 ; United States v. Makris (5th Cir. 1976) 535 F.2d 899, 902 ; United States v. Williams (M.D.Fla., June 7, 2007, No. 5:06-cr-36-Oc-10GRJ) 2007 WL 1655371 ; U.S. v

2009(Cf. Zapata v. Estelle (5th Cir. 1979) 588 F.2d 1017, 1020 .) There is yet another way in which Medina indicates that it would be unfair to allocate the burden of proof at a retrospective hearing to the defendant. *97 The Medina court differentiated the situation before it from that in cases in which the government had violated a defendant's constitutional rights. ( Medina, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 451-452, citing Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157 [ 93 L.Ed.2d 473 , 107 S.Ct. 515 ] [burden of proof on state to show waiver of Miranda rights]; Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431 [ 81 L.Ed.2

2009(Cf. Zapata v. Estelle (5th Cir. 1979) 588 F.2d 1017, 1020 .) There is yet another way in which Medina indicates that it would be unfair to allocate the burden of proof at a retrospective hearing to the defendant. *97 The Medina court differentiated the situation before it from that in cases in which the government had violated a defendant's constitutional rights. ( Medina, supra, 505 U.S. at pp. 451-452, citing Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157 [ 93 L.Ed.2d 473 , 107 S.Ct. 515 ] [burden of proof on state to show waiver of Miranda rights]; Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431 [ 81 L.Ed.2

2009Dec. 836 , 362 N.E.2d 307, 311 ]. [13] See, e.g., U.S. v. Robinson (4th Cir. 2005) 404 F.3d 850, 856-857 . [14] See, e.g., U.S. v. Hoskie (9th Cir. 1991) 950 F.2d 1388, 1392 ; U.S. v. Velasquez (3d Cir. 1989) 885 F.2d 1076, 1089 ; Brown v. Warden, Great Meadow Correctional Facility (2d Cir. 1982) 682 F.2d 348, 353-354 ; United States v. Hollis (3d Cir. 1977) 569 F.2d 199, 203-204 ; United States v. DiGilio (3d Cir. 1976) 538 F.2d 972 ; United States v. Makris (5th Cir. 1976) 535 F.2d 899, 902 ; United States v. Williams (M.D.Fla., June 7, 2007, No. 5:06-cr-36-Oc-10GRJ) 2007 WL 1655371 ; U.S. v