Petrosian defendant in California

2024Employee Pension Plan (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497 [“Where, as here, a party has a fully matured cause of action for money, the party must seek the remedy of damages, and not pursue a declaratory relief claim.”].) The complaint alleges the Petrosian defendants, aided by the Buchalter defendants, embezzled money from the Corporation and, after the April 30, 2020 termination of the relationship, used the management services agreements to exclude Williams and take over the practice.

2022Employee Pension Plan (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497 [“Where, as here, a party has a fully matured cause of action for money, the party must seek the remedy of damages, and not pursue a declaratory relief claim.”].) The second amended complaint alleged the Petrosian defendants, aided by the Wells Fargo defendants, embezzled money from the Corporation’s accounts from 2018, when the accounts were opened, through March 31, 2020, when the parties terminated their relationship.

2021The Williams plaintiffs did not show irreparable harm “[I]f the plaintiff may be fully compensated by the payment of damages in the event he prevails, then preliminary injunctive relief should be denied.” (Tahoe Keys Property Owners’ Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1471 ; accord, Pacific Decision Sciences Corp. v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1110 [“before a court may issue a nonstatutory injunction . . . it must appear that monetary relief would not afford adequate relief”].) The Williams plaintiffs seek an order to recover $2.2 million th

2021The Williams plaintiffs did not show irreparable harm “[I]f the plaintiff may be fully compensated by the payment of damages in the event he prevails, then preliminary injunctive relief should be denied.” (Tahoe Keys Property Owners’ Assn. v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1471 ; accord, Pacific Decision Sciences Corp. v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1110 [“before a court may issue a nonstatutory injunction . . . it must appear that monetary relief would not afford adequate relief”].) The Williams plaintiffs seek an order to recover $2.2 million th

2024We assume this is a clerical error because the minute order for the March 21, 2023 OSC hearing states the claims against the Petrosian defendants were dismissed. 10 (§ 1281.4.)[11] ‘Once a court grants [a] petition to compel arbitration and stays the action at law, the action at law sits in the twilight zone of abatement with the trial court retaining merely a vestigial jurisdiction over matters submitted to arbitration’ to determine, upon conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, whether an award on the merits requires dismissal of the legal action. [Citation.] This is so, in part, because t

2024We assume this is a clerical error because the minute order for the March 21, 2023 OSC hearing states the claims against the Petrosian defendants were dismissed. 10 (§ 1281.4.)[11] ‘Once a court grants [a] petition to compel arbitration and stays the action at law, the action at law sits in the twilight zone of abatement with the trial court retaining merely a vestigial jurisdiction over matters submitted to arbitration’ to determine, upon conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, whether an award on the merits requires dismissal of the legal action. [Citation.] This is so, in part, because t

2024We assume this is a clerical error because the minute order for the March 21, 2023 OSC hearing states the claims against the Petrosian defendants were dismissed. 10 (§ 1281.4.)[11] ‘Once a court grants [a] petition to compel arbitration and stays the action at law, the action at law sits in the twilight zone of abatement with the trial court retaining merely a vestigial jurisdiction over matters submitted to arbitration’ to determine, upon conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, whether an award on the merits requires dismissal of the legal action. [Citation.] This is so, in part, because t

2024We assume this is a clerical error because the minute order for the March 21, 2023 OSC hearing states the claims against the Petrosian defendants were dismissed. 10 (§ 1281.4.)[11] ‘Once a court grants [a] petition to compel arbitration and stays the action at law, the action at law sits in the twilight zone of abatement with the trial court retaining merely a vestigial jurisdiction over matters submitted to arbitration’ to determine, upon conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, whether an award on the merits requires dismissal of the legal action. [Citation.] This is so, in part, because t

2024We assume this is a clerical error because the minute order for the March 21, 2023 OSC hearing states the claims against the Petrosian defendants were dismissed. 10 (§ 1281.4.)[11] ‘Once a court grants [a] petition to compel arbitration and stays the action at law, the action at law sits in the twilight zone of abatement with the trial court retaining merely a vestigial jurisdiction over matters submitted to arbitration’ to determine, upon conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, whether an award on the merits requires dismissal of the legal action. [Citation.] This is so, in part, because t

2024We assume this is a clerical error because the minute order for the March 21, 2023 OSC hearing states the claims against the Petrosian defendants were dismissed. 10 (§ 1281.4.)[11] ‘Once a court grants [a] petition to compel arbitration and stays the action at law, the action at law sits in the twilight zone of abatement with the trial court retaining merely a vestigial jurisdiction over matters submitted to arbitration’ to determine, upon conclusion of the arbitration proceedings, whether an award on the merits requires dismissal of the legal action. [Citation.] This is so, in part, because t

2024We take no position on what action the trial court should take if the arbitrator dismisses the arbitration for failure to pay the arbitration fees and returns the matter to the trial court. 19 The Petrosian defendants contend this appeal should be dismissed under the disentitlement doctrine because the Williams plaintiffs “engineered” appealability of the order compelling arbitration by “refusing to prosecute their claims in arbitration leading to a dismissal judgment they now appeal.” (See Gastelum v. Remax Internat., Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1016, 1023 [“An order granting a motion to comp

2024We take no position on what action the trial court should take if the arbitrator dismisses the arbitration for failure to pay the arbitration fees and returns the matter to the trial court. 19 The Petrosian defendants contend this appeal should be dismissed under the disentitlement doctrine because the Williams plaintiffs “engineered” appealability of the order compelling arbitration by “refusing to prosecute their claims in arbitration leading to a dismissal judgment they now appeal.” (See Gastelum v. Remax Internat., Inc. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1016, 1023 [“An order granting a motion to comp

2024DISCUSSION A. Governing Law and Standard of Review Once a trial court has compelled claims to contractual arbitration, the court has “very limited authority with respect to [the] pending arbitration.” (SWAB Financial, LLC v. E*Trade Securities, LLC (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1200 (SWAB); accord, Optimal Markets, Inc. v. Salant (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 912, 924 [“Appellate courts have . . . routinely rejected parties’ efforts to have courts overstep their limited jurisdiction in cases that are stayed pending binding contractual arbitration.”].) As the Supreme Court explained in Gaines v. Fideli

2024It is the job of the arbitrator, not the court, to resolve all questions needed to determine the controversy. [Citations.] The arbitrator, and not the court, decides questions of procedure and discovery.” (Titan/Value, at pp. 487-488, fn. omitted; accord, Optimal Markets, Inc. v. Salant, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at pp. 923-924.) Accordingly, when a plaintiff “fail[s] to timely prosecute the arbitration,” a defendant’s “only avenue for redress” is in the arbitration proceeding.

2024(Roldan v. Callahan & Blaine (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 87, 96 [“[I]f the court determines that any plaintiff is unable to [pay for the arbitration], it must issue an order specifying that [the defendant] has the option of either paying that plaintiff’s share of the arbitration cost or waiving its right to arbitrate that plaintiff's case and allowing the case to proceed in court.”].)17 17 Other appellate courts have agreed with Roldan that a trial court has jurisdiction to lift the stay under section 1281.4 to allow a party to an arbitration agreement to request a waiver or reallocation of arbitra

2022Fourth cause of action for negligence “‘The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: the “defendant had a duty to use due care, that he [or she] breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.”’” (Day v. Lupo Vine Street, L.P. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 62, 69 ; accord, Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 477 .) As discussed, the Wells Fargo defendants argued in their demurrer that under section 1451 they had no duty of reasonable care toward the Williams plaintiffs to monitor withdrawals by the Petrosian defendants on the Corpo

2022Conversely, banks have “the duty to dishonor checks lacking required signatures.” (Kurtz-Ahlers, at p. 956.) However, the contractual relationship between a bank and its depositor “does not involve any implied duty ‘to supervise account activity’ [citation] or ‘to inquire into the purpose for which the funds are being used . . . .’” (Chazen, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 537 ; see Kurtz-Ahlers, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 956-959 [bank owed depositor no duty to investigate suspicious checks cashed by bookkeeper who deceived the depositor into issuing tax payment checks that the bookkeeper depos

2022As alleged, however, the Petrosian defendants’ cash withdrawals were not in an authorized form or manner because Williams only authorized the Petrosian defendants to “sign 11 checks to pay bills,” and “nothing else.”8 Thus, the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer based on the absence of a duty on the part of the Wells Fargo defendants. “‘The relationship between a bank and its depositor is founded on contract,’ [citation] which is ordinarily memorialized by a signature card that the depositor signs upon opening the account.” (Chazen v. Centennial Bank (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 532, 537 (C

2022Conversely, banks have “the duty to dishonor checks lacking required signatures.” (Kurtz-Ahlers, at p. 956.) However, the contractual relationship between a bank and its depositor “does not involve any implied duty ‘to supervise account activity’ [citation] or ‘to inquire into the purpose for which the funds are being used . . . .’” (Chazen, supra, 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 537 ; see Kurtz-Ahlers, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at pp. 956-959 [bank owed depositor no duty to investigate suspicious checks cashed by bookkeeper who deceived the depositor into issuing tax payment checks that the bookkeeper depos

2022The second amended complaint only alleges the Petrosian defendants “managed” the Corporation’s clinics and finances, and Williams told Tonoyan the Petrosian defendants “will be working for him.” 14 that depositors are better equipped than depository banks to identify fraudulent activity (id. at p. 961; see Desert Bermuda Properties v. Union Bank (1968) 265 Cal. App.2d 146, 151-152 [“when the Legislature adopted what is now Financial Code, section [1451], it relieved banks from any general duty to police fiduciary accounts (a duty which a bank could not reasonably be expected to carry out effec

2022The second amended complaint only alleges the Petrosian defendants “managed” the Corporation’s clinics and finances, and Williams told Tonoyan the Petrosian defendants “will be working for him.” 14 that depositors are better equipped than depository banks to identify fraudulent activity (id. at p. 961; see Desert Bermuda Properties v. Union Bank (1968) 265 Cal. App.2d 146, 151-152 [“when the Legislature adopted what is now Financial Code, section [1451], it relieved banks from any general duty to police fiduciary accounts (a duty which a bank could not reasonably be expected to carry out effec

2022When the defendant converted the property, he/she intended to deprive the owner of its use.’” (People v. Fenderson (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 625, 636 ; accord, People v. Selivanov (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 726, 764 .) The second amended complaint alleged Tonoyan entered into a conspiracy with the Petrosian defendants to embezzle 18 $11.5 million from the Corporation’s accounts by providing the Petrosian defendants with blank checks and a facsimile signature stamp, approving large cash withdrawals that he knew to be unauthorized, and “us[ing] his authority to override the computer as to allow the trans

2021We disagree. “[E]very sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in this state shall be accompanied by the manufacturer’s and the retail seller’s implied warranty that the goods are merchantable. (§ 1792.) The warranty arises by operation of law.” (Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1330 ; see also American Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1295 (American Suzuki).) Merchantability means that the goods are “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.” (§ 1791.1, subd. (a)(2).) Such fitness is shown if the product “is ‘in s

2021We disagree. “[E]very sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in this state shall be accompanied by the manufacturer’s and the retail seller’s implied warranty that the goods are merchantable. (§ 1792.) The warranty arises by operation of law.” (Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1330 ; see also American Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1295 (American Suzuki).) Merchantability means that the goods are “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.” (§ 1791.1, subd. (a)(2).) Such fitness is shown if the product “is ‘in s

2021We disagree. “[E]very sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in this state shall be accompanied by the manufacturer’s and the retail seller’s implied warranty that the goods are merchantable. (§ 1792.) The warranty arises by operation of law.” (Mega RV Corp. v. HWH Corp. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1330 ; see also American Suzuki Motor Corp. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1291, 1295 (American Suzuki).) Merchantability means that the goods are “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.” (§ 1791.1, subd. (a)(2).) Such fitness is shown if the product “is ‘in s