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6 California opinions name it 1 courts 1933–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
General Motors Corp. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2016(McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 943 ; General Motors Corp., supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 587-588.) “When a lawsuit is first initiated after the applicable period of limitations has expired and the plaintiff is entitled to claim the benefit of a delayed discovery rule (that is, when for one reason or another the plaintiff is granted an extended period within which to file suit), the relevant inquiry is what the plaintiff knew or, through the exercise of due diligence, reasonably could have discovered at an earlier date. . . . [¶] But where . . . a lawsuit is initiated within the 2016(McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 943 ; General Motors Corp., supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 587-588.) “When a lawsuit is first initiated after the applicable period of limitations has expired and the plaintiff is entitled to claim the benefit of a delayed discovery rule (that is, when for one reason or another the plaintiff is granted an extended period within which to file suit), the relevant inquiry is what the plaintiff knew or, through the exercise of due diligence, reasonably could have discovered at an earlier date. . . . [¶] But where . . . a lawsuit is initiated within the | 1 | 3 |
Fuller v. Tuckergreen2 sentences2007“In keeping with th[e] liberal interpretation of section 474, it is now well established that even though the plaintiff knows of the existence of the defendant sued by a fictitious name, and even though the plaintiff knows the defendant’s actual identity (that is, his name), the plaintiff is ‘ignorant’ within the meaning of the statute if he lacks knowledge of that person’s connection with the case or with his injuries.” (General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 593-594.) As *943 put by another court: “The phrase ‘ignorant of the name of a defendant’ is broadly inte 2007“In keeping with th[e] liberal interpretation of section 474, it is now well established that even though the plaintiff knows of the existence of the defendant sued by a fictitious name, and even though the plaintiff knows the defendant’s actual identity (that is, his name), the plaintiff is ‘ignorant’ within the meaning of the statute if he lacks knowledge of that person’s connection with the case or with his injuries.” (General Motors Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 593-594.) As *943 put by another court: “The phrase ‘ignorant of the name of a defendant’ is broadly inte | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
KRUPSKI v. COSTA CROCIERE S. P. A
green
2 sentences2016(Id. at p. 541 [ 177 L.Ed.2d at p. 53 ].) Unlike section 474, the inquiry under Rule 15(c) is not on what the plaintiff knew. 2016(Id. at p. 541 [ 177 L.Ed.2d at p. 53 ].) Unlike section 474, the inquiry under Rule 15(c) is not on what the plaintiff knew. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
McOwen v. Grossman
green
2 sentences2016(McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 943 ; General Motors Corp., supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 587-588.) “When a lawsuit is first initiated after the applicable period of limitations has expired and the plaintiff is entitled to claim the benefit of a delayed discovery rule (that is, when for one reason or another the plaintiff is granted an extended period within which to file suit), the relevant inquiry is what the plaintiff knew or, through the exercise of due diligence, reasonably could have discovered at an earlier date. . . . [¶] But where . . . a lawsuit is initiated within the 2016(McOwen v. Grossman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 937, 943 ; General Motors Corp., supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 587-588.) “When a lawsuit is first initiated after the applicable period of limitations has expired and the plaintiff is entitled to claim the benefit of a delayed discovery rule (that is, when for one reason or another the plaintiff is granted an extended period within which to file suit), the relevant inquiry is what the plaintiff knew or, through the exercise of due diligence, reasonably could have discovered at an earlier date. . . . [¶] But where . . . a lawsuit is initiated within the | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Jacob Tome Institute v. Crothers
green
2 sentences1941The same principle applies to the unlawful use of a way over another’s land; even though no harm has been done to the land, a reasonable rent for such a way may be recovered as damages.’ (See, also, Tome Institute v. Crothers, 87 Md. 569 [ 40 Atl. 261, 267 ], and 38 Cyc. 1129.)” 38 Cyc. 1129, above cited, reads in part: “The measure of damages for an appropriation of the use of the land by a continuing trespass is the worth of the use of the property, ...” See also United States v. Bernard, 202 Federal, 728, [C. 1941The same principle applies to the unlawful use of a way over another’s land; even though no harm has been done to the land, a reasonable rent for such a way may be recovered as damages.’ (See, also, Tome Institute v. Crothers, 87 Md. 569 [ 40 Atl. 261, 267 ], and 38 Cyc. 1129.)” 38 Cyc. 1129, above cited, reads in part: “The measure of damages for an appropriation of the use of the land by a continuing trespass is the worth of the use of the property, ...” See also United States v. Bernard, 202 Federal, 728, [C. | 2 | 1933–1941 |
Lindberg v. Linder
green
2 sentences1941The detriment caused by the wrongful occupation of real property ... is deemed to be the value of the use of the property for the time of such occupation. ...” In Lindberg v. Linder, 133 Cal. App. 213 [ 23 Pac. (2d) 842 ], in regard to the measure of damages for a continuing trespass, the court said, at page 218: “That a reasonable rental value affords a proper measure of damages in a case of trespass appears in Salmond on Torts, Seventh edition, 1928, page 246: ‘ When a trespass consists in some beneficial use wrongfully made of the plaintiff’s land even if it causes no damage, the plaintiff 1941The detriment caused by the wrongful occupation of real property ... is deemed to be the value of the use of the property for the time of such occupation. ...” In Lindberg v. Linder, 133 Cal. App. 213 [ 23 Pac. (2d) 842 ], in regard to the measure of damages for a continuing trespass, the court said, at page 218: “That a reasonable rental value affords a proper measure of damages in a case of trespass appears in Salmond on Torts, Seventh edition, 1928, page 246: ‘ When a trespass consists in some beneficial use wrongfully made of the plaintiff’s land even if it causes no damage, the plaintiff | 1 | 1941–1941 |