postseizure hearing in California

2013(Subds. (f) & (j).)” (Broden v. Marin Humane Society (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1216 (Broden).) The County of Butte, acting via its animal control department (hereafter collectively “the County”), seized horses on separate occasions from plaintiffs Ellen Frye and Marlene Schultz (collectively “Frye” except as context otherwise indicates) and each sought a post-seizure hearing to contest the propriety of those seizures.

2000Respondent points to Leslie's Pool Mart, Inc. v. Department of Food & Agriculture (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1524 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 373 ], involving a postseizure hearing in which the appellate court observed: “While the United States Constitution undoubtedly requires a prompt and meaningful hearing following an administrative seizure of property (see, e.g., Barry v. Barchi (1979) 443 U.S. 55, 66 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 369 , 376, 99 S.Ct. 2642 ]), we have found no federal cases holding such a hearing must be provided by the seizing agency as opposed to a court.” (Leslie’s Pool Mart, Inc. v. Department of Food

2000Respondent points to Leslie's Pool Mart, Inc. v. Department of Food & Agriculture (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1524 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 373 ], involving a postseizure hearing in which the appellate court observed: “While the United States Constitution undoubtedly requires a prompt and meaningful hearing following an administrative seizure of property (see, e.g., Barry v. Barchi (1979) 443 U.S. 55, 66 [ 61 L.Ed.2d 369 , 376, 99 S.Ct. 2642 ]), we have found no federal cases holding such a hearing must be provided by the seizing agency as opposed to a court.” (Leslie’s Pool Mart, Inc. v. Department of Food

2000As such, the hearings should be conducted as administrative proceedings, and the strict application of the rules of evidence should be relaxed to allow for the admission of hearsay evidence.” 5 “The gist of the ‘substantial evidence’ rule is: [f] ‘When a trial court’s factual determination is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination . . . .’ [Bowers v. Be

2000As such, the hearings should be conducted as administrative proceedings, and the strict application of the rules of evidence should be relaxed to allow for the admission of hearsay evidence.” 5 “The gist of the ‘substantial evidence’ rule is: [f] ‘When a trial court’s factual determination is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination . . . .’ [Bowers v. Be

1999(E.g., People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 577 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 809 P.2d 290 ]; Conway v. Pasadena Humane Society (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 163, 172 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 777 ].) The following excerpts from the report of Officer Kirsten Kane, which was received in evidence at the postseizure hearing, makes out a compelling case of exigent circumstances: “On December 31, 1995, at approximately 11:49 a.m., I was dispatched ... to check care and conditions of reptiles at 939 Tamalpais, San Rafael. . . [An employee at the Marine Animal Shelter] told me the reporting person was at the store on Dece

1999(E.g., People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 577 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 809 P.2d 290 ]; Conway v. Pasadena Humane Society (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 163, 172 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 777 ].) The following excerpts from the report of Officer Kirsten Kane, which was received in evidence at the postseizure hearing, makes out a compelling case of exigent circumstances: “On December 31, 1995, at approximately 11:49 a.m., I was dispatched ... to check care and conditions of reptiles at 939 Tamalpais, San Rafael. . . [An employee at the Marine Animal Shelter] told me the reporting person was at the store on Dece

1999(E.g., People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 577 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 809 P.2d 290 ]; Conway v. Pasadena Humane Society (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 163, 172 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 777 ].) The following excerpts from the report of Officer Kirsten Kane, which was received in evidence at the postseizure hearing, makes out a compelling case of exigent circumstances: “On December 31, 1995, at approximately 11:49 a.m., I was dispatched ... to check care and conditions of reptiles at 939 Tamalpais, San Rafael. . . [An employee at the Marine Animal Shelter] told me the reporting person was at the store on Dece

1999(E.g., People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 577 [ 280 Cal.Rptr. 631 , 809 P.2d 290 ]; Conway v. Pasadena Humane Society (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 163, 172 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 777 ].) The following excerpts from the report of Officer Kirsten Kane, which was received in evidence at the postseizure hearing, makes out a compelling case of exigent circumstances: “On December 31, 1995, at approximately 11:49 a.m., I was dispatched ... to check care and conditions of reptiles at 939 Tamalpais, San Rafael. . . [An employee at the Marine Animal Shelter] told me the reporting person was at the store on Dece

1989(Flores v. Natividad Medical Center (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1106, 1117, fn. 4 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 24 ]; see Davis v. Myre (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 616, 618 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 682 ] (superior court judgment void because municipal court possessed sole jurisdiction); 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Jurisdiction, § 10, pp. 374-376, and cases cited therein.) Nor are we persuaded that subdivision (e) of section 10751, which describes the nature of the postseizure hearing, 2 conferred subject matter *1060 jurisdiction upon the municipal court to render factual findings despite the pendency of the criminal

1989(Flores v. Natividad Medical Center (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1106, 1117, fn. 4 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 24 ]; see Davis v. Myre (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 616, 618 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 682 ] (superior court judgment void because municipal court possessed sole jurisdiction); 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Jurisdiction, § 10, pp. 374-376, and cases cited therein.) Nor are we persuaded that subdivision (e) of section 10751, which describes the nature of the postseizure hearing, 2 conferred subject matter *1060 jurisdiction upon the municipal court to render factual findings despite the pendency of the criminal

1989(Flores v. Natividad Medical Center (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1106, 1117, fn. 4 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 24 ]; see Davis v. Myre (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 616, 618 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 682 ] (superior court judgment void because municipal court possessed sole jurisdiction); 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Jurisdiction, § 10, pp. 374-376, and cases cited therein.) Nor are we persuaded that subdivision (e) of section 10751, which describes the nature of the postseizure hearing, 2 conferred subject matter *1060 jurisdiction upon the municipal court to render factual findings despite the pendency of the criminal

1989(Flores v. Natividad Medical Center (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1106, 1117, fn. 4 [ 238 Cal.Rptr. 24 ]; see Davis v. Myre (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 616, 618 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 682 ] (superior court judgment void because municipal court possessed sole jurisdiction); 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Jurisdiction, § 10, pp. 374-376, and cases cited therein.) Nor are we persuaded that subdivision (e) of section 10751, which describes the nature of the postseizure hearing, 2 conferred subject matter *1060 jurisdiction upon the municipal court to render factual findings despite the pendency of the criminal

1986Accordingly, we do not discuss the contention of the People the warrantless seizure of the tortoise and its retention by the Society was proper under the exigent circumstances described in Cleaver v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 297, 302 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 559 , 594 P.2d 984 ], and we are not concerned with the failure of the court to hold the postseizure hearing to comply with due process requirements for animal impoundments mandated by Carrera v. Bertaini (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 721, 728-729 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 14 ].

1986Accordingly, we do not discuss the contention of the People the warrantless seizure of the tortoise and its retention by the Society was proper under the exigent circumstances described in Cleaver v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 297, 302 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 559 , 594 P.2d 984 ], and we are not concerned with the failure of the court to hold the postseizure hearing to comply with due process requirements for animal impoundments mandated by Carrera v. Bertaini (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 721, 728-729 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 14 ].

1986Accordingly, we do not discuss the contention of the People the warrantless seizure of the tortoise and its retention by the Society was proper under the exigent circumstances described in Cleaver v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 297, 302 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 559 , 594 P.2d 984 ], and we are not concerned with the failure of the court to hold the postseizure hearing to comply with due process requirements for animal impoundments mandated by Carrera v. Bertaini (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 721, 728-729 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 14 ].

1986Accordingly, we do not discuss the contention of the People the warrantless seizure of the tortoise and its retention by the Society was proper under the exigent circumstances described in Cleaver v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 297, 302 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 559 , 594 P.2d 984 ], and we are not concerned with the failure of the court to hold the postseizure hearing to comply with due process requirements for animal impoundments mandated by Carrera v. Bertaini (1976) 63 Cal.App.3d 721, 728-729 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 14 ].