Project CBD defendant in California

2024(See ProjectCBD.com, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 619 [specific allegation that Project CBD defendants published article on their own website and “other websites 9 (but not Facebook)” controlled over “the inconsistent, more general allegation that all of the defendants published negative statements on Facebook”]; cf. Skopp, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pp. 437– 438 [absence of specific allegation about formation of agency did not negate general allegation that defendants acted “ ‘as agents for the plaintiffs’ ”]; Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858 , 884–885 [argu

2020We therefore reverse the trial court's order and remand the matter with directions to enter an order granting the Project CBD defendants' anti-SLAPP motion. 1 In a prior appeal, Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 602 (Medical Marijuana), the Project CBD defendants appealed the trial court's denial of their anti-SLAPP motion with respect to the first amended complaint.

2016(See Exhibit L to the First Amended Complaint.) “The court therefore requests that the parties respond to the following questions: “1) Is the First Amended Complaint deficient with respect to alleging the existence of any conduct on the part of the Project CBD defendants to support the causes of action for libel and false light? “2) Assuming that the First Amended Complaint fails to state a legally sufficient cause of action against the Project CBD defendants for libel or false light because the First Amended Complaint fails to identify any conduct on the part of these defendants in setting fo

2016(See Exhibit L to the First Amended Complaint.) “The court therefore requests that the parties respond to the following questions: “1) Is the First Amended Complaint deficient with respect to alleging the existence of any conduct on the part of the Project CBD defendants to support the causes of action for libel and false light? “2) Assuming that the First Amended Complaint fails to state a legally sufficient cause of action against the Project CBD defendants for libel or false light because the First Amended Complaint fails to identify any conduct on the part of these defendants in setting fo

2016A. The anti-SLAPP statute and applicable legal standards A SLAPP suit is “a meritless lawsuit ‘filed primarily to chill the defendant’s exercise of First Amendment rights.’ ” (Paul v. Friedman (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 853, 861 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 82 ], quoting Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 815, fn. 2 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 ].) California’s anti-SLAPP statute allows a defendant to move to dismiss “certain unmeritorious claims that are brought to thwart constitutionally protected speech or petitioning activity.” (Robinzine v. Vicory (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1420-1421 [ 50 Cal.

2016A. The anti-SLAPP statute and applicable legal standards A SLAPP suit is “a meritless lawsuit ‘filed primarily to chill the defendant’s exercise of First Amendment rights.’ ” (Paul v. Friedman (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 853, 861 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 82 ], quoting Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 815, fn. 2 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 ].) California’s anti-SLAPP statute allows a defendant to move to dismiss “certain unmeritorious claims that are brought to thwart constitutionally protected speech or petitioning activity.” (Robinzine v. Vicory (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1420-1421 [ 50 Cal.

2016(See Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396 [“the moving defendant bears the burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity, and the claims for relief supported by them” (italics added)].) Because the relief sought in the libel and false light counts is not based on allegations arising from any activity attributed to the Project CBD defendants, no protected activity on their part supports these claims, and we therefore do not reach the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

2016As we have explained, they made no similar allegations regarding the conduct of the Project CBD defendants, with respect to the two pleaded causes of action at issue on appeal. 15 This case presents a unique circumstance in which the failure of the plaintiff to state a legally sufficient claim against the defendant requires a determination at the first step of the anti-SLAPP motion analysis, where the defendant bears the burden of identifying “all allegations of protected activity, and the claims for relief supported by them.” (Baral supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396 .) This is because the insufficie

2016(See Exhibit L to the First Amended Complaint.) “The court therefore requests that the parties respond to the following questions: “1) Is the First Amended Complaint deficient with respect to alleging the existence of any conduct on the part of the Project CBD defendants to support the causes of action for libel and false light? “2) Assuming that the First Amended Complaint fails to state a legally sufficient cause of action against the Project CBD defendants for libel or false light because the First Amended Complaint fails to identify any conduct on the part of these defendants in setting fo

2016(See Exhibit L to the First Amended Complaint.) “The court therefore requests that the parties respond to the following questions: “1) Is the First Amended Complaint deficient with respect to alleging the existence of any conduct on the part of the Project CBD defendants to support the causes of action for libel and false light? “2) Assuming that the First Amended Complaint fails to state a legally sufficient cause of action against the Project CBD defendants for libel or false light because the First Amended Complaint fails to identify any conduct on the part of these defendants in setting fo

2016A. The anti-SLAPP statute and applicable legal standards A SLAPP suit is “a meritless lawsuit ‘filed primarily to chill the defendant’s exercise of First Amendment rights.’ ” (Paul v. Friedman (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 853, 861 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 82 ], quoting Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 815, fn. 2 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 ].) California’s anti-SLAPP statute allows a defendant to move to dismiss “certain unmeritorious claims that are brought to thwart constitutionally protected speech or petitioning activity.” (Robinzine v. Vicory (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1420-1421 [ 50 Cal.

2016A. The anti-SLAPP statute and applicable legal standards A SLAPP suit is “a meritless lawsuit ‘filed primarily to chill the defendant’s exercise of First Amendment rights.’ ” (Paul v. Friedman (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 853, 861 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 82 ], quoting Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 815, fn. 2 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 ].) California’s anti-SLAPP statute allows a defendant to move to dismiss “certain unmeritorious claims that are brought to thwart constitutionally protected speech or petitioning activity.” (Robinzine v. Vicory (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1420-1421 [ 50 Cal.

2016(See Vogel v. Felice, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1018-1019 [if the pleadings are not adequate to support a cause of action, the plaintiff has failed to cany the plaintiff’s burden in opposing an anti-SLAPP motion].) 16 Our decision not to attempt to reimagine the operative complaint is particularly appropriate given the fact that the parties disagree as to what plaintiffs intended to, and did in fact, allege in that pleading. 17 Specifically, this opinion is not intended to preclude the Project CBD defendants from demurring to the remaining counts of the first amended complaint on the groun

2016Therefore, we consider the legal standards for the claims asserted in counts 1 and 3 of the first amended complaint. 16 words constituting an alleged libel must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the complaint.' " (Vogel v. Felice (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1017, fn. 3 .) Count 3 asserts a cause of action for false light as to all of the named defendants.

2016A. The anti-SLAPP statute and applicable legal standards A SLAPP suit is “a meritless lawsuit ‘filed primarily to chill the defendant’s exercise of First Amendment rights.’ ” (Paul v. Friedman (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 853, 861 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 82 ], quoting Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 815, fn. 2 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 ].) California’s anti-SLAPP statute allows a defendant to move to dismiss “certain unmeritorious claims that are brought to thwart constitutionally protected speech or petitioning activity.” (Robinzine v. Vicory (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1420-1421 [ 50 Cal.

2016A. The anti-SLAPP statute and applicable legal standards A SLAPP suit is “a meritless lawsuit ‘filed primarily to chill the defendant’s exercise of First Amendment rights.’ ” (Paul v. Friedman (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 853, 861 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 82 ], quoting Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 809, 815, fn. 2 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 ].) California’s anti-SLAPP statute allows a defendant to move to dismiss “certain unmeritorious claims that are brought to thwart constitutionally protected speech or petitioning activity.” (Robinzine v. Vicory (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1420-1421 [ 50 Cal.

2016“Where a pleading includes a general allegation, such as an allegation of an ultimate fact, as well as specific allegations that add details or explanatory facts, it is possible that a conflict or inconsistency will exist between the more general allegation and the specific allegations.” (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1235 [ 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 709 ], italics added.) 13 “To handle these contradictions, California courts have adopted the principle that specific allegations in a complaint control over an inconsistent general allegation.” (Id. at pp. 1235-1236.) “U

2016“Where a pleading includes a general allegation, such as an allegation of an ultimate fact, as well as specific allegations that add details or explanatory facts, it is possible that a conflict or inconsistency will exist between the more general allegation and the specific allegations.” (Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1235 [ 147 Cal.Rptr.3d 709 ], italics added.) 13 “To handle these contradictions, California courts have adopted the principle that specific allegations in a complaint control over an inconsistent general allegation.” (Id. at pp. 1235-1236.) “U

2024(See ProjectCBD.com, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 619 [specific allegation that Project CBD defendants published article on their own website and “other websites 9 (but not Facebook)” controlled over “the inconsistent, more general allegation that all of the defendants published negative statements on Facebook”]; cf. Skopp, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pp. 437– 438 [absence of specific allegation about formation of agency did not negate general allegation that defendants acted “ ‘as agents for the plaintiffs’ ”]; Blickman Turkus, LP v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858 , 884–885 [argu

2020The burden thus shifted to the plaintiffs to demonstrate that "there is a probability that [they] will prevail on the claim." (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1); see Equilon Enterprises, LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 61 .) a.

2020(See Shively v. Bozanich (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1230, 1242 [each publication of a defamatory statement gives rise to a new cause of action].) One of the plaintiffs' claims for libel is that the Project CBD defendants published a statement that "claimed the existence of evidence that RSHO was contaminated with heavy metals and solvents without verifying the accuracy of the testing results from Stewart," and the other claim for libel is that the Project CBD defendants published a statement that "alleged that multiple people became ill after using RSHO due to heavy metals and other toxins based on Cra

2020(See Bartalo v. Superior Court (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 526, 533 [explaining role of fact-pleading requirement in application of the relation-back doctrine].) An amended complaint relates back to a timely filed original complaint, and thus avoids the bar of the statute of limitations, only if it rests on the same general set of facts and refers to the same " 'offending instrumentalities' " as the original complaint.

2020(See, e.g., Simmons, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th 1068 ; Jackson, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1263–1264; Contreras v. Dowling (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 394 , 411 36 [" '[a] plaintiff . . . may not seek to subvert or avoid a ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion by amending the challenged complaint . . . in response to the motion' "]; Hansen v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 171 Cal.App.4th 1537, 1547 ["A plaintiff cannot avoid [an anti-]SLAPP motion by amending the complaint"]; Sylmar Air Conditioning v. Pueblo Contracting Services, Inc. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1055 .) One of the reasons

2020"The general rule is that the words constituting an alleged libel must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the complaint." (Kahn v. Bower (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1599, 1612, fn. 5 (Kahn), citing 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, § 688, p. 140, des Granges v. Crall (1915) 27 Cal.App. 313, 315 , Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary Sch.

2020(See Exhibit 'M' attached hereto, the full content of which is incorporated herein by this reference.)" (Italics added.) It is clear from the text of these special allegations that the only "words constituting an alleged libel" (Kahn, supra, 232 Cal.App.3d at p. 1612, fn. 5 ) on which 9 The only paragraph in Paragraphs 1 through 57 in the second amended complaint that sets forth any allegations regarding the purportedly "false" statements published by the Project CBD defendants is paragraph 49, which is identical to paragraph 59 of the complaint, and states: "49.

2020Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073 (Simmons), the general rule disallowing amendment after a defendant has made a prima facie showing that the allegations of the complaint are protected by the anti-SLAPP statute should apply because here, unlike in Nguyen-Lam, the problems with the plaintiffs' pleading are not "minor 'pleading technicalit[ies].' " Instead, an amended complaint would require "yet another Special Motion to Strike under 425.16, and, contrary to the prohibitions outlined in Simmons, the vicious cycle of using litigation to chill [the Project CBD defendants'] protected speech wou

2020Co. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1073 (Simmons), the general rule disallowing amendment after a defendant has made a prima facie showing that the allegations of the complaint are protected by the anti-SLAPP statute should apply because here, unlike in Nguyen-Lam, the problems with the plaintiffs' pleading are not "minor 'pleading technicalit[ies].' " Instead, an amended complaint would require "yet another Special Motion to Strike under 425.16, and, contrary to the prohibitions outlined in Simmons, the vicious cycle of using litigation to chill [the Project CBD defendants'] protected speech wou

2020(See Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 277 [where a plaintiff's "UCL claim is derivative of [the plaintiff's] defamation cause of action, that is, it is based on the same assertedly false and defamatory press release statements, . . . that cause of action stands or falls with that underlying claim"].) We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in denying the Project CBD defendants' anti- SLAPP motion to strike the causes of action stated for false light and unfair competition. 35 3.

2020(See Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 277 [where a plaintiff's "UCL claim is derivative of [the plaintiff's] defamation cause of action, that is, it is based on the same assertedly false and defamatory press release statements, . . . that cause of action stands or falls with that underlying claim"].) We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in denying the Project CBD defendants' anti- SLAPP motion to strike the causes of action stated for false light and unfair competition. 35 3.

2020Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 596, 600 ["where an amendment is sought after the statute of limitations has run, the amended complaint will be deemed filed as of the date of the original complaint provided recovery is sought in both pleadings on the same general set of facts" (italics added)].) The plaintiffs' claims for libel relate back to the first amended complaint because even though the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently assert claims for libel or false light against the Project CBD defendants in their first amended complaint, the plaintiffs nevertheless did include in that pleading allegations of