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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Duckworth v. Eagangreen2 sentences1997Defendant additionally contends that even if he purported to waive his Miranda rights, the circumstance that he was not advised specifically that his statements could be used against him “in court,” in conjunction with his refusal to be tape-recorded, establishes that his waiver of Miranda rights was not knowing or voluntary, because he “believed he was speaking off the record by not having the interrogation tape recorded.” As the United States Supreme Court has observed, the prophylactic Miranda warnings are “ ‘not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to 1997Defendant additionally contends that even if he purported to waive his Miranda rights, the circumstance that he was not advised specifically that his statements could be used against him “in court,” in conjunction with his refusal to be tape-recorded, establishes that his waiver of Miranda rights was not knowing or voluntary, because he “believed he was speaking off the record by not having the interrogation tape recorded.” As the United States Supreme Court has observed, the prophylactic Miranda warnings are “ ‘not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. Clarkgreen2 sentences1990Applying the totality of the circumstances test, we find that the violation here was, at most, a prophylactic Miranda violation that is subject to the Chapman harmless error test, as applied in Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. 570 . 10 *618 IV Was the Error Prejudicial? “[S]ince Chapman, ‘we have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Rose v. Clark [, supra,] 478 U.S. 570, 576 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 469 , 106 1990Applying the totality of the circumstances test, we find that the violation here was, at most, a prophylactic Miranda violation that is subject to the Chapman harmless error test, as applied in Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. 570 . 10 *618 IV Was the Error Prejudicial? “[S]ince Chapman, ‘we have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Rose v. Clark [, supra,] 478 U.S. 570, 576 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 469 , 106 | 1 | 1 |
Satterwhite v. Texasgreen2 sentences1990Applying the totality of the circumstances test, we find that the violation here was, at most, a prophylactic Miranda violation that is subject to the Chapman harmless error test, as applied in Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. 570 . 10 *618 IV Was the Error Prejudicial? “[S]ince Chapman, ‘we have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Rose v. Clark [, supra,] 478 U.S. 570, 576 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 469 , 106 1990Applying the totality of the circumstances test, we find that the violation here was, at most, a prophylactic Miranda violation that is subject to the Chapman harmless error test, as applied in Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. 570 . 10 *618 IV Was the Error Prejudicial? “[S]ince Chapman, ‘we have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Rose v. Clark [, supra,] 478 U.S. 570, 576 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 469 , 106 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Peevy
green
2 sentences2018In Peevy , this court concluded that the balance of interests did not warrant the exclusion of a statement that had been deliberately elicited in violation of Miranda for purposes of impeaching *464 the defendant's trial testimony. ( Peevy , supra , 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1193-1194, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865 , 953 P.2d 1212 ; cf. Harris v. New York , supra , 401 U.S. at p. 224 , 91 S.Ct. 643 .) Defendant argues, however, that *381 the balance of interests here is different, because there is no danger that excluding the witnesses' statements will turn the prophylactic Miranda rule into a shield for a defen 2018In Peevy , this court concluded that the balance of interests did not warrant the exclusion of a statement that had been deliberately elicited in violation of Miranda for purposes of impeaching *464 the defendant's trial testimony. ( Peevy , supra , 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1193-1194, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865 , 953 P.2d 1212 ; cf. Harris v. New York , supra , 401 U.S. at p. 224 , 91 S.Ct. 643 .) Defendant argues, however, that *381 the balance of interests here is different, because there is no danger that excluding the witnesses' statements will turn the prophylactic Miranda rule into a shield for a defen | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Harris v. New York
green
2 sentences2018In Peevy , this court concluded that the balance of interests did not warrant the exclusion of a statement that had been deliberately elicited in violation of Miranda for purposes of impeaching *464 the defendant's trial testimony. ( Peevy , supra , 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1193-1194, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865 , 953 P.2d 1212 ; cf. Harris v. New York , supra , 401 U.S. at p. 224 , 91 S.Ct. 643 .) Defendant argues, however, that *381 the balance of interests here is different, because there is no danger that excluding the witnesses' statements will turn the prophylactic Miranda rule into a shield for a defen 2018In Peevy , this court concluded that the balance of interests did not warrant the exclusion of a statement that had been deliberately elicited in violation of Miranda for purposes of impeaching *464 the defendant's trial testimony. ( Peevy , supra , 17 Cal.4th at pp. 1193-1194, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 865 , 953 P.2d 1212 ; cf. Harris v. New York , supra , 401 U.S. at p. 224 , 91 S.Ct. 643 .) Defendant argues, however, that *381 the balance of interests here is different, because there is no danger that excluding the witnesses' statements will turn the prophylactic Miranda rule into a shield for a defen | 1 | 2018–2018 |
New York v. Quarles
green
1 sentence2015The People argued under New York v. Quarles (1984) 467 U.S. 649 (Quarles) that if there is a public safety need, it outweighs the prophylactic Miranda rule. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
California v. Prysock
green
1 sentence2014The prophylactic Miranda warnings are not required to be conveyed in any particular form or “talismanic incantation.” (California v. Prysock, supra, 453 U.S. at p. 20 . 359.) Even if the grammatically flawed sentence imperfectly conveyed the idea of the county providing an attorney for defendant in the context of the right to have an attorney during questioning, the inability of defendant to pay for one, and the idea that the county would pay for an attorney, it sufficiently conveyed the concept of appointment. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Andreasen
green
1 sentence2013(People v. Andreasen (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 70, 86 .) However, under the booking exception to the Miranda rule, the authorities need not provide Miranda warnings prior to asking routine questions related to health or safety concerns that arise during the arrest or booking process. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. Mary Alice Wolf
green
1 sentence1990Applying the totality of the circumstances test, we find that the violation here was, at most, a prophylactic Miranda violation that is subject to the Chapman harmless error test, as applied in Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. 570 . 10 *618 IV Was the Error Prejudicial? “[S]ince Chapman, ‘we have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Rose v. Clark [, supra,] 478 U.S. 570, 576 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 469 , 106 | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Milton v. Wainwright
green
1 sentence1990Applying the totality of the circumstances test, we find that the violation here was, at most, a prophylactic Miranda violation that is subject to the Chapman harmless error test, as applied in Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. 570 . 10 *618 IV Was the Error Prejudicial? “[S]ince Chapman, ‘we have repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Rose v. Clark [, supra,] 478 U.S. 570, 576 [ 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 469 , 106 | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.