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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1959–1988 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cash v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1988(People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566, 585-586 [ 305 P.2d 1 ].) In the words of Justice Traynor, “[a]bsent some governmental requirement that information be kept confidential for the purposes of effective law enforcement, the state has no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that can throw light on issues in the case, and in particular it has no interest in convicting on the testimony of witnesses who have not been as rigorously cross-examined and as thoroughly impeached as the evidence permits.” (Id., at p. 586.) This entitlement grows out of a defendant’s right to due proce 1988(People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566, 585-586 [ 305 P.2d 1 ].) In the words of Justice Traynor, “[a]bsent some governmental requirement that information be kept confidential for the purposes of effective law enforcement, the state has no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that can throw light on issues in the case, and in particular it has no interest in convicting on the testimony of witnesses who have not been as rigorously cross-examined and as thoroughly impeached as the evidence permits.” (Id., at p. 586.) This entitlement grows out of a defendant’s right to due proce | 3 | 4 |
People v. Risergreen2 sentences1988(People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566, 585-586 [ 305 P.2d 1 ].) In the words of Justice Traynor, “[a]bsent some governmental requirement that information be kept confidential for the purposes of effective law enforcement, the state has no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that can throw light on issues in the case, and in particular it has no interest in convicting on the testimony of witnesses who have not been as rigorously cross-examined and as thoroughly impeached as the evidence permits.” (Id., at p. 586.) This entitlement grows out of a defendant’s right to due proce 1988(People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566, 585-586 [ 305 P.2d 1 ].) In the words of Justice Traynor, “[a]bsent some governmental requirement that information be kept confidential for the purposes of effective law enforcement, the state has no interest in denying the accused access to all evidence that can throw light on issues in the case, and in particular it has no interest in convicting on the testimony of witnesses who have not been as rigorously cross-examined and as thoroughly impeached as the evidence permits.” (Id., at p. 586.) This entitlement grows out of a defendant’s right to due proce | 3 | 3 |
Hill v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1988(People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 677 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 832 , 700 P.2d 446 ].) The development of discovery in criminal cases has been primarily a matter of common law evolution with little legislative action. 1 (Hill v. *1488 Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812, 816, fn. 3 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 518 P.2d 1353 , 95 A.L.R.3d 820 ]; Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 678 .) The showing a defendant must make in order to compel discovery has been part of this evolution. 1988(People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 677 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 832 , 700 P.2d 446 ].) The development of discovery in criminal cases has been primarily a matter of common law evolution with little legislative action. 1 (Hill v. *1488 Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812, 816, fn. 3 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 518 P.2d 1353 , 95 A.L.R.3d 820 ]; Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 678 .) The showing a defendant must make in order to compel discovery has been part of this evolution. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Memrogreen2 sentences1988(People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 677 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 832 , 700 P.2d 446 ].) The development of discovery in criminal cases has been primarily a matter of common law evolution with little legislative action. 1 (Hill v. *1488 Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812, 816, fn. 3 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 518 P.2d 1353 , 95 A.L.R.3d 820 ]; Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 678 .) The showing a defendant must make in order to compel discovery has been part of this evolution. 1988(People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 677 [ 214 Cal.Rptr. 832 , 700 P.2d 446 ].) The development of discovery in criminal cases has been primarily a matter of common law evolution with little legislative action. 1 (Hill v. *1488 Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812, 816, fn. 3 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 257 , 518 P.2d 1353 , 95 A.L.R.3d 820 ]; Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 678 .) The showing a defendant must make in order to compel discovery has been part of this evolution. | 1 | 1 |
Vance v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1960(Vance v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.2d 92, 93 [ 330 P.2d 773 ] ; People v. Cartier, supra.) No authority is cited and we have found none holding that a defendant who is aware, during the course of trial, of the existence of documents in the possession of the People which may be relevant and material to the defense and who takes no action to compel inspection or copying or production of them, has a right, after an unfavorable verdict, to compel their production. “ The basis for requiring pretrial production of material in the hands of the prosecution is the fundamental principle that an accused is 1960(Vance v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.2d 92, 93 [ 330 P.2d 773 ] ; People v. Cartier, supra.) No authority is cited and we have found none holding that a defendant who is aware, during the course of trial, of the existence of documents in the possession of the People which may be relevant and material to the defense and who takes no action to compel inspection or copying or production of them, has a right, after an unfavorable verdict, to compel their production. “ The basis for requiring pretrial production of material in the hands of the prosecution is the fundamental principle that an accused is | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Landman v. Miedzinski
green
2 sentences1986We noted at that time that “‘The basis for requiring pretrial production of material in the hands of the prosecution is the fundamental principle that an accused is entitled to a fair trial.’ (Cash v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 72, 75 [ 346 P.2d 407 ].) Although the California Supreme Court has not yet established a method of ascertaining whether or not discovery of a given item is necessary to accord defendant a fair trial (Louisell & Wally, Modern Cal. Discovery [(2d ed. 1972) § 14.05] at p. 885), underlying the rationale of criminal discovery is the principle first stated in People v. 1986We noted at that time that "`The basis for requiring pretrial production of material in the hands of the prosecution is the fundamental principle that an accused is entitled to a fair trial.' ( Cash v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 72, 75 [ 346 P.2d 407 ].) Although the California Supreme Court has not yet established a method of ascertaining whether or not discovery of a given item is necessary to accord defendant a fair trial (Louisell & Wally, Modern Cal. Discovery [(2d ed. 1972) § 14.05] at p. 885), underlying the rationale of criminal discovery is the principle first stated in People v. | 2 | 1979–1986 |
People v. Morse
green
2 sentences1986We noted at that time that “‘The basis for requiring pretrial production of material in the hands of the prosecution is the fundamental principle that an accused is entitled to a fair trial.’ (Cash v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 72, 75 [ 346 P.2d 407 ].) Although the California Supreme Court has not yet established a method of ascertaining whether or not discovery of a given item is necessary to accord defendant a fair trial (Louisell & Wally, Modern Cal. Discovery [(2d ed. 1972) § 14.05] at p. 885), underlying the rationale of criminal discovery is the principle first stated in People v. 1986We noted at that time that “‘The basis for requiring pretrial production of material in the hands of the prosecution is the fundamental principle that an accused is entitled to a fair trial.’ (Cash v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 72, 75 [ 346 P.2d 407 ].) Although the California Supreme Court has not yet established a method of ascertaining whether or not discovery of a given item is necessary to accord defendant a fair trial (Louisell & Wally, Modern Cal. Discovery [(2d ed. 1972) § 14.05] at p. 885), underlying the rationale of criminal discovery is the principle first stated in People v. | 2 | 1979–1986 |
Chapman v. Ohio
neutral
2 sentences1986We noted at that time that “‘The basis for requiring pretrial production of material in the hands of the prosecution is the fundamental principle that an accused is entitled to a fair trial.’ (Cash v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 72, 75 [ 346 P.2d 407 ].) Although the California Supreme Court has not yet established a method of ascertaining whether or not discovery of a given item is necessary to accord defendant a fair trial (Louisell & Wally, Modern Cal. Discovery [(2d ed. 1972) § 14.05] at p. 885), underlying the rationale of criminal discovery is the principle first stated in People v. 1986We noted at that time that "`The basis for requiring pretrial production of material in the hands of the prosecution is the fundamental principle that an accused is entitled to a fair trial.' ( Cash v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 72, 75 [ 346 P.2d 407 ].) Although the California Supreme Court has not yet established a method of ascertaining whether or not discovery of a given item is necessary to accord defendant a fair trial (Louisell & Wally, Modern Cal. Discovery [(2d ed. 1972) § 14.05] at p. 885), underlying the rationale of criminal discovery is the principle first stated in People v. | 2 | 1979–1986 |
Riser v. Warden, California State Prison
neutral
2 sentences1986We noted at that time that “‘The basis for requiring pretrial production of material in the hands of the prosecution is the fundamental principle that an accused is entitled to a fair trial.’ (Cash v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 72, 75 [ 346 P.2d 407 ].) Although the California Supreme Court has not yet established a method of ascertaining whether or not discovery of a given item is necessary to accord defendant a fair trial (Louisell & Wally, Modern Cal. Discovery [(2d ed. 1972) § 14.05] at p. 885), underlying the rationale of criminal discovery is the principle first stated in People v. 1986We noted at that time that "`The basis for requiring pretrial production of material in the hands of the prosecution is the fundamental principle that an accused is entitled to a fair trial.' ( Cash v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 72, 75 [ 346 P.2d 407 ].) Although the California Supreme Court has not yet established a method of ascertaining whether or not discovery of a given item is necessary to accord defendant a fair trial (Louisell & Wally, Modern Cal. Discovery [(2d ed. 1972) § 14.05] at p. 885), underlying the rationale of criminal discovery is the principle first stated in People v. | 2 | 1979–1986 |
Powell v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1961In Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 704 , 706 et seq. [ 312 P.2d 698 ], it was noted that an accused was denied production at early common law because he might fabricate evidence to meet the state’s case and because the prosecution did not have a reciprocal right in view of the privilege against self-incrimination. 1961In Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 704 , 706 et seq. [ 312 P.2d 698 ], it was noted that an accused was denied production at early common law because he might fabricate evidence to meet the state’s case and because the prosecution did not have a reciprocal right in view of the privilege against self-incrimination. | 2 | 1959–1961 |
Funk v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1961In Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.2d 423 [ 340 P.2d 593 ], the People were required to produce written statements of prosecution witnesses relating to the matters covered in their testimony at the preliminary hearing. “ The basis for requiring pretrial production of material in the hands of the prosecution is the fundamental principle that an accused is entitled to a fair trial. 1961In Funk v. Superior Court, 52 Cal.2d 423 [ 340 P.2d 593 ], the People were required to produce written statements of prosecution witnesses relating to the matters covered in their testimony at the preliminary hearing. “ The basis for requiring pretrial production of material in the hands of the prosecution is the fundamental principle that an accused is entitled to a fair trial. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Tupper v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1960Emphasis added.) “The value to defendant of seeing the statements made by the witnesses is that to do so might enable him to impeach their testimony at the trial.” (Tupper v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.2d 263, 265 . | 1 | 1960–1960 |