evidence are relevant factors in Texas

2024“A trial court abuses its discretion when it rules arbitrarily, unreasonably, without regard to guiding legal principles, or without supporting evidence.” Lopez v. Rocky Creek Partners, LLC, 623 S.W.3d 510 , 517 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.) (citing Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998)); see also Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991) (explaining legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are relevant factors in determining whether a trial court abused its discretion).

2024See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998); see also Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991) (explaining that legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are relevant factors in determining whether trial court abused its discretion). 8 We note that the trial court awarded Appellee its requested attorney’s fees ($37,090.75) on the record but that its judgment reflects that it awarded $31,964.75. 15 A prevailing party may recover reasonable attorney’s fees for a breach-of- contract claim.

2022See Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied); see also Burkett v. Burkett, No. 13-18-00385-CV, 2019 WL 3331635 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Jul. 25, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

2022See Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, 11 pet. denied); see also Cox v. Walden, No. 13-20-00283-CV, 2022 WL 120014 , at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Jan. 13, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).

2022In re Rogers, 370 S.W.3d 443, 445 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, orig. proceeding).

2015In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion, “legal and factual sufficiency challenges to the evidence are relevant factors.” Rogers, 370 S.W.3d at 445 ; see also City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 830 (Tex. 2005) (holding that evidence is legally insufficient if, “[c]rediting all favorable evidence that reasonable [factfinders] could believe and disregarding all contrary evidence except that which they could not ignore,” there is no evidence to support the judgment); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (holding that under a factual-sufficiency standard of revie

2018Pickens v. Pickens, 62 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied); Dunn v. Dunn, 177 S.W.3d 393, 396 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).

2012See Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied) (citing In re D.M., 191 S.W.3d 381, 393 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied); Dunn v. Dunn, 177 S.W.3d 393, 396 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied)).

2024“A trial court abuses its discretion when it rules arbitrarily, unreasonably, without regard to guiding legal principles, or without supporting evidence.” Lopez v. Rocky Creek Partners, LLC, 623 S.W.3d 510 , 517 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.) (citing Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998)); see also Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991) (explaining legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are relevant factors in determining whether a trial court abused its discretion).

2024See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998); see also Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991) (explaining that legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are relevant factors in determining whether trial court abused its discretion). 8 We note that the trial court awarded Appellee its requested attorney’s fees ($37,090.75) on the record but that its judgment reflects that it awarded $31,964.75. 15 A prevailing party may recover reasonable attorney’s fees for a breach-of- contract claim.

2023Id. (citing Niskar v. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2004, no pet.)).

2023Id. (citing Niskar v. Niskar, 136 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2004, no pet.)).

2013Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009), aff’d, 339 S.W.3d at 74.

2012Iliff v. Iliff , 339 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Tex. App.--Austin 2009), aff'd , 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011).

2012See Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied) (citing In re D.M., 191 S.W.3d 381, 393 (Tex.App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied); Dunn v. Dunn, 177 S.W.3d 393, 396 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied)).

2012See Zeifman v. Michels , 212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.--Austin 2006, pet. denied) (citing In re D.M. , 191 S.W.3d 381, 393 (Tex. App.--Austin 2006, pet. denied); Dunn v. Dunn , 177 S.W.3d 393, 396 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied)).

2019Id.

2018Lesikar v. Moon, 237 S.W.3d 361, 375 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (citing Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991)); see Carlin v. Carlin, 92 S.W.3d 902, 905 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, no pet.).

2023Z.P.H., 2014 WL 670203 , at *2 (quoting In re J.T.W., No. 02-12-00430-CV, 2013 WL 3488153 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 11, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.)); see In re C.J.H., 79 S.W.3d 698, 702 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (holding that legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are relevant factors in assessing whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in a juvenile delinquency case).

2019Id. (cleaned up) (quoting In re J.T.W., No. 02-12-00430-CV, 2013 WL 3488153 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 11, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.)); see In re C.J.H., 79 S.W.3d 698, 702 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (holding that legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court 8 abused its discretion in a juvenile delinquency case).

2018Pickens v. Pickens, 62 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied); Dunn v. Dunn, 177 S.W.3d 393, 396 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).

2016Pickens, 62 S.W.3d at 214 .

2025“Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, ‘legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion, but are not independent grounds of error.’” In re M.O., No. 06-19- 00004-CV, 2019 WL 2518470 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 19, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re Marriage of McCoy, 567 S.W.3d 426, 428 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.)).

2019Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, “legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion, but are not independent grounds of error.” Matter of the Marriage of McCoy, 567 S.W.3d 426, 428 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (citing In re P.M.G., 405 S.W.3d 406, 410 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2013, no pet.)).

2018Lesikar v. Moon, 237 S.W.3d 361, 375 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (citing Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991)); see Carlin v. Carlin, 92 S.W.3d 902, 905 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, no pet.).

2018Lesikar v. Moon, 237 S.W.3d 361, 375 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (citing Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991)); see Carlin v. Carlin, 92 S.W.3d 902, 905 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, no pet.).

2013Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009), aff’d, 339 S.W.3d at 74.

2012Iliff v. Iliff , 339 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Tex. App.--Austin 2009), aff'd , 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011).

2024Miller v. Kennedy & Minshew, P.C., 142 S.W.3d 325, 339 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).

2024“When a claimant wishes to obtain attorney’s fees from the opposing party, the claimant must prove that the requested fees are both reasonable and necessary.” Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 489 (Tex. 2019).

2022In re Marriage of McCoy, 488 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).

2019Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, “legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion, but are not independent grounds of error.” Matter of the Marriage of McCoy, 567 S.W.3d 426, 428 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, no pet.) (citing In re P.M.G., 405 S.W.3d 406, 410 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2013, no pet.)).

2019In our analysis, we determine “whether the trial court had sufficient evidence on which to exercise its discretion, and, if so, whether it erred in the exercise of that discretion.” Id. (citing P.M.G., 405 S.W.3d at 410 ).

2015In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion, “legal and factual sufficiency challenges to the evidence are relevant factors.” Rogers, 370 S.W.3d at 445 ; see also City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 830 (Tex. 2005) (holding that evidence is legally insufficient if, “[c]rediting all favorable evidence that reasonable [factfinders] could believe and disregarding all contrary evidence except that which they could not ignore,” there is no evidence to support the judgment); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (holding that under a factual-sufficiency standard of revie

2015In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion, “legal and factual sufficiency challenges to the evidence are relevant factors.” Rogers, 370 S.W.3d at 445 ; see also City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 830 (Tex. 2005) (holding that evidence is legally insufficient if, “[c]rediting all favorable evidence that reasonable [factfinders] could believe and disregarding all contrary evidence except that which they could not ignore,” there is no evidence to support the judgment); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (holding that under a factual-sufficiency standard of revie

2011The OAG asks in its sole issue, ―Did the evidence show as a matter of law that [Father] owes more than $0 in arrears?‖ But in its discussion of its sole issue, the OAG ultimately complains that ―the trial court abused its discretion in finding that [Father] owed $0 in arrears on the grounds that it could not correctly determine the arrearage without [Mother] providing the exact amount of social security benefits paid to the child due to [Father’s] disability.‖ The confirmation of child support arrearages is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.1 Under the abuse of discretion standard, legal and

2011The OAG asks in its sole issue, ―Did the evidence show as a matter of law that [Father] owes more than $0 in arrears?‖ But in its discussion of its sole issue, the OAG ultimately complains that ―the trial court abused its discretion in finding that [Father] owed $0 in arrears on the grounds that it could not correctly determine the arrearage without [Mother] providing the exact amount of social security benefits paid to the child due to [Father’s] disability.‖ The confirmation of child support arrearages is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.1 Under the abuse of discretion standard, legal and

2011The OAG asks in its sole issue, ―Did the evidence show as a matter of law that [Father] owes more than $0 in arrears?‖ But in its discussion of its sole issue, the OAG ultimately complains that ―the trial court abused its discretion in finding that [Father] owed $0 in arrears on the grounds that it could not correctly determine the arrearage without [Mother] providing the exact amount of social security benefits paid to the child due to [Father’s] disability.‖ The confirmation of child support arrearages is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.1 Under the abuse of discretion standard, legal and