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51 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lawton v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 553 (Tex. Crim. 2001Based on these facts, we cannot say that the trial court’s admission of Aguirre’s testimony under the excited utterance hearsay exception was outside “the zone of reasonable disagreement.” See Wood v. State, 18 S.W.3d 642, 652 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (hearsay statement was properly excluded because it was separated from the event it concerned by ten to twelve hours and declarant’s behavior in the interim did not indicate any excitement or nervousness on declarant’s part); Lawton, 913 S.W.2d at 553 (hearsay statement by an eyewitness was properly admitted as an excited utterance, even though one ho | 10 | 10 |
Salazar v. Stategreen2 sentences2002See Salazar , 38 S.W.3d at 154 ("It is not dispositive that the statement is an answer to a question or that it was separated by a period of time from the startling event; these are simply factors to consider in determining whether the statement is admissible under the excited utterance hearsay exception."). 2002“It is not dispositive that the statement is an answer to a question or that it was separated by a period of time from the startling event; these are simply factors to consider in determining whether the statement is admissible under the excited utterance hearsay exception.” Salazar, 38 S.W.3d at 154 . | 8 | 13 |
McFarland v. Stategreen2 sentences2003See Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 553 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 750-51 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). 2001Based on these facts, we cannot say that the trial court’s admission of Aguirre’s testimony under the excited utterance hearsay exception was outside “the zone of reasonable disagreement.” See Wood v. State, 18 S.W.3d 642, 652 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (hearsay statement was properly excluded because it was separated from the event it concerned by ten to twelve hours and declarant’s behavior in the interim did not indicate any excitement or nervousness on declarant’s part); Lawton, 913 S.W.2d at 553 (hearsay statement by an eyewitness was properly admitted as an excited utterance, even though one ho | 4 | 4 |
Zuliani v. Stategreen2 sentences2024(Finding no abuse of discretion for statement under the excited utterance hearsay exception when “it cannot be determined for certain how much time elapsed from the shooting to the making of the statements, it is clear. . .that it was not a lengthy period of time.”) Moreover, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held “it is not dispositive that the statement . . .was separated by a period of time from the startling event; these are simply factors to consider in determining whether the statement is admissible under the excited utterance hearsay exception.” Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596 . 2020“However, it is not dispositive that the statement is an answer to a question or that it was separated by a period of time from the startling event; these are simply factors to consider in determining whether the statement is admissible under the excited utterance hearsay exception.” Id. at 596 . | 3 | 22 |
Penry v. Stategreen2 sentences2003See Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 553 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 750-51 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). 2001See Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 553 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 750-51 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 977 , 116 S.Ct. 480 , 133 L.Ed.2d 408 (1995); McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 846 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2005It is not dispositive that [a] statement is an answer to a question or that it was separated by a period of time from the startling event; these are simply factors to consider in determining whether the statement is admissible under the excited utterance hearsay exception.” Brown v. State, 96 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, no pet.). 5 The critical determination is “whether the declarant was still dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the event” or condition at the time of the statement. 2005“It is not dispositive that [a] statement is an answer to a question or that it was separated by a period of time from the startling event; these are simply factors to consider in determining whether the statement is admissible under the excited utterance hearsay exception.” Brown v. State , 96 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.). (footnote: 5) The critical determination is “whether the declarant was still dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the event” or condition at the time of the statement. | 2 | 2 |
Short v. Stategreen2 sentences2003Reed also cites Short v. State for the proposition that the trial court should have admitted Samantha's statement to her father as within the excited utterance hearsay exception. 658 S.W.2d 250, 254-55 (Tex. App.--Houston [1 st Dist.] 1983), aff'd , 671 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Crim. 2003Reed also cites Short v. State for the proposition that the trial court should have admitted Samantha’s statement to her father as within the excited utterance hearsay exception. 658 S.W.2d 250, 254-55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1 st Dist.] 1983), aff’d , 671 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Davis v. Stategreen2 sentences2025Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596 ; Davis, 268 S.W.3d at 703 . 2017“However, it is not dispositive that the statement is an answer to a question or that it was separated by a period of time from the startling event; these are simply factors to consider in determining whether the statement is admissible under the excited utterance hearsay exception.” Davis v. State, 268 S.W.3d 683, 703 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d) (citing Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 596 ). | 1 | 5 |
Ward v. Whitleygreen2 sentences2002Evid. 803(2); see McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 963 , 113 S.Ct. 2937 , 124 L.Ed.2d 686 (1993); Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd). 2002EVID. 803(2); see McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 963 , 113 S.Ct. 2937 , 124 L.Ed.2d 686 (1993); Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd). | 1 | 2 |
Cokeley v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2002Evid. 803(2); see McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 963 , 113 S.Ct. 2937 , 124 L.Ed.2d 686 (1993); Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd). 2002EVID. 803(2); see McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 963 , 113 S.Ct. 2937 , 124 L.Ed.2d 686 (1993); Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd). | 1 | 2 |
Ashley v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2002Evid. 803(2); see McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 963 , 113 S.Ct. 2937 , 124 L.Ed.2d 686 (1993); Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd). 2002EVID. 803(2); see McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 963 , 113 S.Ct. 2937 , 124 L.Ed.2d 686 (1993); Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd). | 1 | 2 |
McCarty v. Stategreen1 sentence2015McCarty v. State, 257 S.W.3d 238, 239 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Couchman v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Evid. 803(2); see McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 963 , 113 S.Ct. 2937 , 124 L.Ed.2d 686 (1993); Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd). 2002EVID. 803(2); see McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 963 , 113 S.Ct. 2937 , 124 L.Ed.2d 686 (1993); Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 159 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd). | 1 | 1 |
Wood v. Stategreen1 sentence2001Based on these facts, we cannot say that the trial court’s admission of Aguirre’s testimony under the excited utterance hearsay exception was outside “the zone of reasonable disagreement.” See Wood v. State, 18 S.W.3d 642, 652 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) (hearsay statement was properly excluded because it was separated from the event it concerned by ten to twelve hours and declarant’s behavior in the interim did not indicate any excitement or nervousness on declarant’s part); Lawton, 913 S.W.2d at 553 (hearsay statement by an eyewitness was properly admitted as an excited utterance, even though one ho | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schieble v. Dorchester County
green
2 sentences2006Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 154 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 855 , 122 S.Ct. 127 , 151 L.Ed.2d 82 (2001). 2005Id. (quoting Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 154 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 855 , 122 S.Ct. 127 , 151 L.Ed.2d 82 (2001)). | 3 | 2002–2006 |
Rollins v. Ray
green
2 sentences2006Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 154 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 855 , 122 S.Ct. 127 , 151 L.Ed.2d 82 (2001). 2005Id. (quoting Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 154 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 855 , 122 S.Ct. 127 , 151 L.Ed.2d 82 (2001)). | 3 | 2002–2006 |
Rodriguez-Gutierrez v. United States
green
2 sentences2006Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 154 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 855 , 122 S.Ct. 127 , 151 L.Ed.2d 82 (2001). 2005Id. (quoting Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 154 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 855 , 122 S.Ct. 127 , 151 L.Ed.2d 82 (2001)). | 3 | 2002–2006 |
Short v. State
green
2 sentences2003Reed also cites Short v. State for the proposition that the trial court should have admitted Samantha's statement to her father as within the excited utterance hearsay exception. 658 S.W.2d 250, 254-55 (Tex. App.--Houston [1 st Dist.] 1983), aff'd , 671 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Crim. 2003Reed also cites Short v. State for the proposition that the trial court should have admitted Samantha’s statement to her father as within the excited utterance hearsay exception. 658 S.W.2d 250, 254-55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1 st Dist.] 1983), aff’d , 671 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Tucker v. New Jersey State Prison
green
2 sentences2001See Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 553 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Penny v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 750-51 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 977 , 116 S.Ct. 480 , 133 L.Ed.2d 408 (1995); McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 963 , 113 S.Ct. 2937 , 124 L.Ed.2d 686 (1993). 2001See Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 553 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 750-51 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 977 , 116 S.Ct. 480 , 133 L.Ed.2d 408 (1995); McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 846 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Hawkins v. Oklahoma
green
2 sentences2001See Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 553 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Penny v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 750-51 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 977 , 116 S.Ct. 480 , 133 L.Ed.2d 408 (1995); McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 963 , 113 S.Ct. 2937 , 124 L.Ed.2d 686 (1993). 2001See Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 553 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 750-51 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 977 , 116 S.Ct. 480 , 133 L.Ed.2d 408 (1995); McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 846 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Kelley v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2001See Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 553 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Penny v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 750-51 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 977 , 116 S.Ct. 480 , 133 L.Ed.2d 408 (1995); McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 963 , 113 S.Ct. 2937 , 124 L.Ed.2d 686 (1993). 2001See Lawton v. State, 913 S.W.2d 542, 553 (Tex.Crim.App.1995); Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 750-51 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 977 , 116 S.Ct. 480 , 133 L.Ed.2d 408 (1995); McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 846 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Hunt v. State
green
1 sentence2018Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Commonwealth v. Almeida
green
2 sentences2015This is the sound holding in Commonwealth v Almeida, 433 Mass. 717 , 746 N.E.2d 139 (2001), where the Court held “(a)dmitting hearsay evidence of statements made while a person is sleeping, so-called ‘sleep talk,’ would run counter to one of the central principles governing the admissibility of evidence, namely, that the proffered material is reliable.” Almeida at 719 . 2015This is the sound holding in Commonwealth v Almeida, 433 Mass. 717 , 746 N.E.2d 139 (2001), where the Court held “(a)dmitting hearsay evidence of statements made while a person is sleeping, so-called ‘sleep talk,’ would run counter to one of the central principles governing the admissibility of evidence, namely, that the proffered material is reliable.” Almeida at 719 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.