Herrera claim in Texas

2026Applicant is raising a Herrera claim—“a ‘bare claim of innocence’ based solely on newly discovered evidence.” Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 544 (discussing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993)).

2026Applicant is raising a Herrera claim—“a ‘bare claim of innocence’ based solely on newly discovered evidence.” Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 544 (discussing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993)).

2019Applicable law on a Herrera claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence A claim of actual innocence is cognizable in a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding.2 Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 205 (Tex. Crim.

2019Applicable law on a Herrera claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence A claim of actual innocence is cognizable in a post-conviction habeas corpus proceeding.2 Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 , 205 (Tex. Crim.

2026Applicant is raising a Herrera claim—“a ‘bare claim of innocence’ based solely on newly discovered evidence.” Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 544 (discussing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993)).

2026Applicant is raising a Herrera claim—“a ‘bare claim of innocence’ based solely on newly discovered evidence.” Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 544 (discussing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993)).

2013A Herrera claim is a “substantive claim in which applicant asserts his bare claim of innocence based solely on newly discovered evidence.” Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d at 675 .

2013A Herrera claim is a “substantive claim in which applicant asserts his bare claim of innocence based solely on newly discovered evidence.” Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d at 675 .

2012Unlike a Herrera claim, which is substantive, a Schlup-type claim is procedural: it provides a “gateway through which a habe-as petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315 , 115 S.Ct. 851 .

2012Unlike a Herrera claim, which is substantive, a Schlup-type claim is procedural: it provides a “gateway through which a habe-as petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315 , 115 S.Ct. 851 .

2012See Ex parte Gonzalez, 323 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Tex.App.-Waco 2010, pet. ref’d) (holding that an evidentiary hearing on an 11.072 Herrera claim is not required if the habeas judge presided over the applicant’s trial); Ex parte Franklin, 310 S.W.3d 918, 921-23 (Tex.App.Beaumont 2010, no pet.) (requiring an evi-dentiary hearing on an 11.072 Herrera claim if the habeas judge did not preside over the applicant’s trial); Ex parte Irwin, No. 02-09-00282-CR, 2009 WL 3720176 , at *1 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Mar. 24, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (affirming trial court’s denial

2011See Ex parte Gonzalez, 323 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, pet. ref‘d) (holding that an evidentiary hearing on an 11.072 Herrera claim is not required if the habeas judge presided over the applicant‘s trial); Ex parte Franklin, 310 S.W.3d 918 , 921–23 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.) (requiring an evidentiary hearing on an 11.072 Herrera claim if the habeas judge did not preside over the applicant‘s trial); Ex parte Irwin, No. 02-09-00282-CR, 2009 WL 3720176 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 24, 2010, pet. ref‘d) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (affirming trial court‘s den

2018See Tuley, 109 S.W.3d at 392 (finding of entitlement to relief on an actual innocence claim following a guilty plea requires the applicant to prove the existence of new evidence).

2011See Ex parte Gonzalez, 323 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, pet. ref‘d) (holding that an evidentiary hearing on an 11.072 Herrera claim is not required if the habeas judge presided over the applicant‘s trial); Ex parte Franklin, 310 S.W.3d 918 , 921–23 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.) (requiring an evidentiary hearing on an 11.072 Herrera claim if the habeas judge did not preside over the applicant‘s trial); Ex parte Irwin, No. 02-09-00282-CR, 2009 WL 3720176 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 24, 2010, pet. ref‘d) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (affirming trial court‘s den

2025Ex parte Vasquez, 499 S.W.3d 602 , 609–10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d); see Ex parte Gonzalez, 323 S.W.3d 557 , 559 n.3 (Tex. App.—Waco 2010, pet. ref’d) (“The recantation of a witness raises a Herrera claim.”).

2012See Ex parte Gonzalez, 323 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Tex.App.-Waco 2010, pet. ref’d) (holding that an evidentiary hearing on an 11.072 Herrera claim is not required if the habeas judge presided over the applicant’s trial); Ex parte Franklin, 310 S.W.3d 918, 921-23 (Tex.App.Beaumont 2010, no pet.) (requiring an evi-dentiary hearing on an 11.072 Herrera claim if the habeas judge did not preside over the applicant’s trial); Ex parte Irwin, No. 02-09-00282-CR, 2009 WL 3720176 , at *1 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Mar. 24, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication) (affirming trial court’s denial

2012Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d at 678; see Ex parte Calderon, 309 S.W.3d 64, 65 (Tex.Crim.App.2010); Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 546 .

2012Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d at 678; see Ex parte Calderon, 309 S.W.3d 64, 65 (Tex.Crim.App.2010); Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 546 .

2009Indeed, neither the record nor Herrera's brief reveals to this court what Herrera's particular conduct was in this case. (3) Recently, in Urdiales v. State , No. 04-08-00546-CR, 2009 WL 1883932, at *3 (Tex. App.--San Antonio July 1, 2009, no pet. h.), the appellant, like Herrera, raised the issue of whether the racing statute was unconstitutionally vague on its face.

2009Indeed, neither the record nor Herrera’s brief reveals to this court what Herrera’s particular conduct was in this case.3 Recently, in Urdiales v. State, No. 04-08-00546-CR, 2009 WL 1883932, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 1, 2009, no pet. h.), the appellant, like Herrera, raised the issue of whether the racing statute was unconstitutionally vague on its face.

2006See Hill v. State , 90 S.W.3d 308, 312-13 (Tex. Crim.

2006See Hill v. State, 90 S.W.3d 308, 312-13 (Tex. Crim.

2024Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 462 S.W.3d 496, 504 (Tex. 2015).

2019See Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 545 ; Lawal v. State, 368 S.W.3d 876, 887 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).

2019See Brown, 205 S.W.3d at 545 ; Lawal v. State, 368 S.W.3d 876, 887 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.).

2016See Carroll v. State, 418 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (citing Martinez v. State, 74 S.W.3d 19, 22 (Tex. Crim.

2016See In re Allen, 366 S.W.3d 696, 703-09 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding). .See id. at 700, 703-04 (stating that "[a] Herrera claim is a substantive claim in which the person asserts a bare claim of innocence based solely on newly discovered evidence,” and entails a showing “by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt that supports the conviction, no reasonable juror could have found the applicant guilty in light of the new evidence,” while “a Schlup- type claim is procedural: it provides a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred c

2016See In re Allen, 366 S.W.3d 696, 703-09 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding). .See id. at 700, 703-04 (stating that "[a] Herrera claim is a substantive claim in which the person asserts a bare claim of innocence based solely on newly discovered evidence,” and entails a showing “by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the evidence of guilt that supports the conviction, no reasonable juror could have found the applicant guilty in light of the new evidence,” while “a Schlup- type claim is procedural: it provides a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred c

2016See, e.g., Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 339 ; Wallace, 106 S.W.3d at 108 ; Keeter, 74 S.W.3d at 36–37; Reyes, 849 S.W.2d at 815 . 5 To the extent Herrera’s two issues on appeal may be construed as including the complaint that his confrontation rights were violated because A.O.’s victim-impact statement was included in the PSI and the complaint that A.O. did not actually author the victim-impact statement included in the PSI, we briefly address these contentions.

2016See Carroll v. State, 418 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (citing Martinez v. State, 74 S.W.3d 19, 22 (Tex. Crim.

2016See id. at 707 . . 265 S.W.3d at 704-08 (construing Act of May 27, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 1488, § 1, 2001 Tex. Gen.

2012The court of criminal appeals recognizes two types of "actual innocence" claims: (1) a Herrera claim, "which involves a substantive claim in which applicant asserts his 2 See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim.

2012The court of criminal appeals recognizes two types of "actual innocence" claims: (1) a Herrera claim, "which involves a substantive claim in which applicant asserts his 2 See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim.