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6 California opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2000 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Budget Realty, Inc. v. Huntergreen2 sentences1985There is no competent evidence on the record supporting the conclusionary claim of overvaluation. *508 Defendant also argues, in effect, that because the “overevaluation prevention” purpose attributed to section 580b by the Supreme Court has been criticized as wholly ineffectual (Budget Realty, Inc. v. Hunter (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 511, 515-516 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 48 ]), we should not apply the Spangler exception. 1985There is no competent evidence on the record supporting the conclusionary claim of overvaluation. *508 Defendant also argues, in effect, that because the “overevaluation prevention” purpose attributed to section 580b by the Supreme Court has been criticized as wholly ineffectual (Budget Realty, Inc. v. Hunter (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 511, 515-516 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 48 ]), we should not apply the Spangler exception. | 1 | 3 |
Palm v. Schillinggreen1 sentence1999The purposes of section 580b . . . would not be furthered.’ ” (Palm v. Schilling, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d at p. 70, fn. 7 .) In sum, Spangler’s rule is limited to those situations in which a pronounced intensification of the property’s anticipated post-sale use both requires and eventually results in construction financing that dwarfs the property’s value at the time of sale. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Spangler v. Memel
green
2 sentences1989(See Spangler v. Memel, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 611 .) “[T]he determining factor is not the intended use per se; rather ‘the purchaser does not intend to continue with the same use *1004 of the property but actually intends a different use which contemplates considerable improvement of it.’ ” (Ziegler v. Barnes, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 233 , italics in original [vacant lot intended to support new residence; variation did not come within § 580b protection].) In this context, a “different use” may be a change from one form of land use to another— such as from residential to commercial use—or a 1986(Spangler v. Memel, supra, 7 Cal.3d 603, 614 .) We conclude that the transaction was a variation on the standard purchase money security transaction, and the trial court properly found that the Spangler exception to section 580b applied to the instant case. | 3 | 1985–1989 |
DeBerard Properties, Ltd. v. Lim
green
2 sentences2000(DeBerard, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 665 .) This is consistent with Budget Realty, Inc. v. Hunter (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 511 [204 Cal.Rptr. 48], in which the seller took a junior trust deed and further agreed to subordinate his lien to construction financing, which buyer never obtained. 2000(DeBerard, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 665 .) This is consistent with Budget Realty, Inc. v. Hunter (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 511 [204 Cal.Rptr. 48], in which the seller took a junior trust deed and further agreed to subordinate his lien to construction financing, which buyer never obtained. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Ziegler v. Barnes
green
1 sentence1989(See Spangler v. Memel, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 611 .) “[T]he determining factor is not the intended use per se; rather ‘the purchaser does not intend to continue with the same use *1004 of the property but actually intends a different use which contemplates considerable improvement of it.’ ” (Ziegler v. Barnes, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 233 , italics in original [vacant lot intended to support new residence; variation did not come within § 580b protection].) In this context, a “different use” may be a change from one form of land use to another— such as from residential to commercial use—or a | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Long v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence1989(See Spangler v. Memel, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 611 .) “[T]he determining factor is not the intended use per se; rather ‘the purchaser does not intend to continue with the same use *1004 of the property but actually intends a different use which contemplates considerable improvement of it.’ ” (Ziegler v. Barnes, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at p. 233 , italics in original [vacant lot intended to support new residence; variation did not come within § 580b protection].) In this context, a “different use” may be a change from one form of land use to another— such as from residential to commercial use—or a | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Brown v. Jensen
green
2 sentences1986They basically contend that the transaction was standard within the meaning of Brown v. Jensen, supra, 41 Cal.2d 193 . 1986They basically contend that the transaction was standard within the meaning of Brown v. Jensen, supra, 41 Cal.2d 193 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.