Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
6 California opinions name it 1 courts 2014–2021 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bennett v. Baughgreen2 sentences2021The Court believes apportionment improper in these circumstances.” Under Oregon law, “[w]hen a party prevails in an action that encompasses both a claim for which attorney fees are authorized and a claim for which they are not, the trial court must apportion attorney fees, except when there are issues common to both claims.” (Bennett v. Baugh (1999) 164 Or.App. 243, 247 [ 990 P.2d 917, 920 ].) Apportionment between claims is not required if the fee and non-fee claims involve common legal or factual issues, the theory being that “the party entitled to fees would have incurred roughly the same a 2021The Court believes apportionment improper in these circumstances.” Under Oregon law, “[w]hen a party prevails in an action that encompasses both a claim for which attorney fees are authorized and a claim for which they are not, the trial court must apportion attorney fees, except when there are issues common to both claims.” (Bennett v. Baugh (1999) 164 Or.App. 243, 247 [ 990 P.2d 917, 920 ].) Apportionment between claims is not required if the fee and non-fee claims involve common legal or factual issues, the theory being that “the party entitled to fees would have incurred roughly the same a | 1 | 1 |
FLIR Systems, Inc. v. Parrishgreen2 sentences2020(FLIR Systems, Inc. v. Parrish (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1279 [mere possession of trade secrets by a departing employee not enough for a UTSA violation].) Nor could a trier of fact find that, by itself, a lack of candor regarding the amount of confidential information the employees kept establishes use or acquisition by Apple. 2020(FLIR Systems, Inc. v. Parrish (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1279 [mere possession of trade secrets by a departing employee not enough for a UTSA violation].) Nor could a trier of fact find that, by itself, a lack of candor regarding the amount of confidential information the employees kept establishes use or acquisition by Apple. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Whyte v. Schlage Lock Company
green
2 sentences2015Under that doctrine, the employee may be enjoined by demonstrating the employee’s new job duties will inevitably cause the employee to rely upon knowledge of the former employer’s trade secrets.” (Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1446 .) “This doctrine is contrary to California law and policy because it creates an after-the-fact covenant not to compete restricting employee mobility.” (Id. at p. 1447.) 11 that the accusation was specious under the elements of the UTSA claim.” Subjective bad faith is “examined by whether the circumstances indicate that the plaintiff knew or 2015Under that doctrine, the employee may be enjoined by demonstrating the employee’s new job duties will inevitably cause the employee to rely upon knowledge of the former employer’s trade secrets.” (Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1446 .) “This doctrine is contrary to California law and policy because it creates an after-the-fact covenant not to compete restricting employee mobility.” (Id. at p. 1447.) 11 that the accusation was specious under the elements of the UTSA claim.” Subjective bad faith is “examined by whether the circumstances indicate that the plaintiff knew or | 2 | 2014–2015 |
Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. California Custom Shapes, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021(Gemini, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 1262 .) “Subjective bad faith under section 3426.4 means the action was commenced or continued for an improper purpose, such as harassment, delay, or to thwart competition. [Citations.] The absence of evidence alone, even after discovery, does not support a finding of subjective bad faith.” (SASCO, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 847 .) A finding of subjective bad faith under section 3426.4 must be supported by evidence that plaintiff knowingly and intentionally prosecuted a specious claim. 2021(Gemini, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 1262 .) “Subjective bad faith under section 3426.4 means the action was commenced or continued for an improper purpose, such as harassment, delay, or to thwart competition. [Citations.] The absence of evidence alone, even after discovery, does not support a finding of subjective bad faith.” (SASCO, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 847 .) A finding of subjective bad faith under section 3426.4 must be supported by evidence that plaintiff knowingly and intentionally prosecuted a specious claim. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
SASCO v. Rosendin Electric, Inc.
green
2 sentences2021(Gemini, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 1262 .) “Subjective bad faith under section 3426.4 means the action was commenced or continued for an improper purpose, such as harassment, delay, or to thwart competition. [Citations.] The absence of evidence alone, even after discovery, does not support a finding of subjective bad faith.” (SASCO, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 847 .) A finding of subjective bad faith under section 3426.4 must be supported by evidence that plaintiff knowingly and intentionally prosecuted a specious claim. 2021(Gemini, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at p. 1262 .) “Subjective bad faith under section 3426.4 means the action was commenced or continued for an improper purpose, such as harassment, delay, or to thwart competition. [Citations.] The absence of evidence alone, even after discovery, does not support a finding of subjective bad faith.” (SASCO, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 847 .) A finding of subjective bad faith under section 3426.4 must be supported by evidence that plaintiff knowingly and intentionally prosecuted a specious claim. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Digital Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc.
green
1 sentence2020LEXIS 13848 , at pp. *23-24 (applying California law).) Accordingly, CUTSA “preempts common law claims that are ‘based on the same nucleus of facts as the misappropriation of trade secrets claim for relief.’ (Digital Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc., supra, 370 F.Supp. 2d at p. 1035 .)” (K.C. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.