6 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Axson-Flynn v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2006See Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, supra; see also Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, supra. “A rule that is discriminatorily motivated and applied is not a neutral rule of general applicability.” Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, supra, 356 F.3d at 1294 . 2006See Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, supra; see also Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, supra. “A rule that is discriminatorily motivated and applied is not a neutral rule of general applicability.” Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, supra, 356 F.3d at 1294 . | 1 | 1 |
Grace United Methodist Church v. City Of Cheyennegreen2 sentences2006See Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, supra; see also Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, supra. “A rule that is discriminatorily motivated and applied is not a neutral rule of general applicability.” Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, supra, 356 F.3d at 1294 . 2006A court should “apply a fact-specific inquiry to determine whether the regulation at issue was motivated by discriminatory animus, or whether the facts support an argument that the challenged rule is applied in a discriminatory fashion that disadvantages religious groups or organizations.” Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, supra, 451 F.3d at 651 . | 1 | 1 |
Colorado Land Use Commission v. Board of County Commissionersgreen2 sentences2000See, e.g., Colorado Land Use Comm'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 199 Colo. 7 , 604 P.2d 32, 35 (1979) ("To place the ultimate determination in the courts through judicial review of this legislative action would violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers."). [1] The policy in favor of delegating governmental power only to persons who will exercise it on behalf of the people is also expressed in article V, section 35 of the Colorado Constitution and our cases interpreting that provision. 2000See, e.g., Colorado Land Use Comm'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 199 Colo. 7 , 604 P.2d 32, 35 (1979) ("To place the ultimate determination in the courts through judicial review of this legislative action would violate the constitutional principle of separation of powers."). [1] The policy in favor of delegating governmental power only to persons who will exercise it on behalf of the people is also expressed in article V, section 35 of the Colorado Constitution and our cases interpreting that provision. | 1 | 1 |
Hunter v. Ericksongreen2 sentences1993Indeed, such a reading of Hunter and Washington would be antithetical to the neutral principle itself, for the requirement of neutrality would in fact only be a requirement of nondiscrimination with respect to racial minorities — and not at all a requirement that legislation must “at-temp[t] to allocate governmental power on the basis of any general principle.” Id. 458 U.S. at 470, 102 S.Ct. at 3195 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 395 , 89 S.Ct. at 562 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 1993Indeed, such a reading of Hunter and Washington would be antithetical to the neutral principle itself, for the requirement of neutrality would in fact only be a requirement of nondiscrimination with respect to racial minorities — and not at all a requirement that legislation must “at-temp[t] to allocate governmental power on the basis of any general principle.” Id. 458 U.S. at 470, 102 S.Ct. at 3195 (quoting Hunter, 393 U.S. at 395 , 89 S.Ct. at 562 (Harlan, J., concurring)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Testa v. Katt
green
2 sentences2005Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 , 67 S.Ct. 810 , 91 L.Ed. 967 (1947). 2005Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 , 67 S.Ct. 810 , 91 L.Ed. 967 (1947). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Johnson v. Fankell
green
2 sentences1998The Court stated that “our normal presumption against pre-emption is buttressed by the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court’s dismissal of the appeal rested squarely on a neutral state rule regarding the administration of the *550 state courts,” id. (emphasis added), and the rule “does not target civil rights claims against the State,” id. at-n. 9, 117 S.Ct. at 1805 n. 9. 1998The Court stated that “our normal presumption against pre-emption is buttressed by the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court’s dismissal of the appeal rested squarely on a neutral state rule regarding the administration of the *550 state courts,” id. (emphasis added), and the rule “does not target civil rights claims against the State,” id. at-n. 9, 117 S.Ct. at 1805 n. 9. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Gordon v. Lance
green
2 sentences1993Thus, while Hunter and Washington are indeed cases which involved racial minorities, the principle articulated in those cases clearly is not one that can logically be limited to the “race” context alone. 18 This was made clear in Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 , 91 S.Ct. 1889 , 29 L.Ed.2d 273 (1971). 1993Thus, while Hunter and Washington are indeed cases which involved racial minorities, the principle articulated in those cases clearly is not one that can logically be limited to the “race” context alone. 18 This was made clear in Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 , 91 S.Ct. 1889 , 29 L.Ed.2d 273 (1971). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Stream v. Heckers
green
2 sentences1979In Stream v. Heckers, 184 Colo. 149 , 519 P.2d 336 (1974), it was held that where appellant was represented by counsel, and no prosecutor was present, the fact that the hearing examiner in a driver’s license suspension proceeding asked more questions than he would have if a prosecutor had been present, did not render the hearing defective if the hearing officer remained objective. 1979In Stream v. Heckers, 184 Colo. 149 , 519 P.2d 336 (1974), it was held that where appellant was represented by counsel, and no prosecutor was present, the fact that the hearing examiner in a driver’s license suspension proceeding asked more questions than he would have if a prosecutor had been present, did not render the hearing defective if the hearing officer remained objective. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.