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39 California opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Morrissey v. Brewergreen2 sentences2016Neutral Hearing Officer The Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 requires that PRCS revocations "incorporate the procedural due process protections held to apply to probation revocation procedures under Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 , and People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451 , and their progeny." (Vol. 6 West's Cal. Legislative Service (Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 2(b), p. 1969.) Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. 471 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484 ], delineates basic due process requirements for the revocation of parole, which includes the right to a probable cause hearing before a neutral hearing office 2016Neutral Hearing Officer The Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 requires that PRCS revocations "incorporate the procedural due process protections held to apply to probation revocation procedures under Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 , and People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451 , and their progeny." (Vol. 6 West's Cal. Legislative Service (Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 2(b), p. 1969.) Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. 471 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484 ], delineates basic due process requirements for the revocation of parole, which includes the right to a probable cause hearing before a neutral hearing office | 9 | 13 |
Williams v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2016(See *1017 Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 485 , 92 S.Ct. at p. 2602 , 33 L.Ed.2d at p. 497 [probable cause determination should be made by someone "not directly involved in the case"]; Williams, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 647 , 178 Cal.Rptr.3d 685 [same].) It was the functional equivalent of an arraignment and a probable cause ruling in superior court. 2016(See *1017 Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 485 , 92 S.Ct. at p. 2602 , 33 L.Ed.2d at p. 497 [probable cause determination should be made by someone "not directly involved in the case"]; Williams, supra, 230 Cal.App.4th at p. 647 , 178 Cal.Rptr.3d 685 [same].) It was the functional equivalent of an arraignment and a probable cause ruling in superior court. | 6 | 7 |
Black v. Romanogreen2 sentences2014Where the minor has been declared a ward of the court under section 602, a notice may be filed by the probation officer or the prosecuting attorney alleging “a violation of a condition of probation not amounting to a crime” and must “contain a concise statement of facts sufficient to support this conclusion.” (§ 777, subd. (a)(2).) As a matter of due process, a probationer is entitled to “written notice of the claimed violations of his probation; disclosure of the evidence against him; an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; a neutral hearing bod 2012(See Black v. Romano (1985) 471 U.S. 606, 610 [ 85 L.Ed.2d 636 , 105 S.Ct. 2254 ]; People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144, 1152-1153 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 631 , 875 P.2d 736 ]; People v. Quarterman (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1294 [ 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 419 ].) Due process requires a probationer be given “written notice of the claimed violations of his probation; disclosure of the evidence against him; an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; a neutral hearing body; and a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for | 3 | 5 |
Gagnon v. Scarpellired2 sentences1989A probationer for whom revocation of probation is sought is entitled to certain procedural safeguards, including “written notice of the claimed violations of his probation; disclosure of the evidence against him; an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; a neutral hearing body; and a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation. [Citation.]” (Black v. Romano (1985) 471 U.S. 606, 612 [ 85 L.Ed.2d 636, 643 , 105 S.Ct. 2254 ], italics added, citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778, 786 1989A probationer for whom revocation of probation is sought is entitled to certain procedural safeguards, including “written notice of the claimed violations of his probation; disclosure of the evidence against him; an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; a neutral hearing body; and a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation. [Citation.]” (Black v. Romano (1985) 471 U.S. 606, 612 [ 85 L.Ed.2d 636, 643 , 105 S.Ct. 2254 ], italics added, citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778, 786 | 3 | 4 |
People v. Treloargreen2 sentences1968(Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,8 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 653, 659 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 ].) Appropriate to the circumstances relating to the second statement made by the defendant in the case at bench is the *684 language of the court in People v. Treloar, 64 Cal.2d 141 , at page 147 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 100 , 410 P.2d 620 ] : “ [T]he questioning was initiated by defendant, and the statement was volunteered in resp'onse to a neutral inquiry invited by defendant’s own remarks; . . . the conduct of the police was neither intimidating nor accusatory, nor did it appear in any way designed to elicit incriminating statement 1968(Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,8 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 653, 659 , 84 S.Ct. 1489 ].) Appropriate to the circumstances relating to the second statement made by the defendant in the case at bench is the *684 language of the court in People v. Treloar, 64 Cal.2d 141 , at page 147 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 100 , 410 P.2d 620 ] : “ [T]he questioning was initiated by defendant, and the statement was volunteered in resp'onse to a neutral inquiry invited by defendant’s own remarks; . . . the conduct of the police was neither intimidating nor accusatory, nor did it appear in any way designed to elicit incriminating statement | 3 | 4 |
People v. Arreolagreen2 sentences2012(See Black v. Romano (1985) 471 U.S. 606, 610 [ 85 L.Ed.2d 636 , 105 S.Ct. 2254 ]; People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144, 1152-1153 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 631 , 875 P.2d 736 ]; People v. Quarterman (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1294 [ 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 419 ].) Due process requires a probationer be given “written notice of the claimed violations of his probation; disclosure of the evidence against him; an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; a neutral hearing body; and a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for 2012(See Black v. Romano (1985) 471 U.S. 606, 610 [ 85 L.Ed.2d 636 , 105 S.Ct. 2254 ]; People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144, 1152-1153 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 631 , 875 P.2d 736 ]; People v. Quarterman (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1294 [ 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 419 ].) Due process requires a probationer be given “written notice of the claimed violations of his probation; disclosure of the evidence against him; an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; a neutral hearing body; and a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for | 2 | 2 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1994This court adopted Castellanos's reasoning concerning the hearsay rule and added that “[p]erhaps equally important, ‘[t]he main reasons for excluding hearsay evidence are: “(a) The statements are not made under *1703 oath; (b) the adverse party has no opportunity to cross-examine the person who made them; and (c) the jury cannot observe his demeanor while making them.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Given that statements made during a preliminary hearing are made under oath and are subject to cross-examination, we conclude defendant is afforded adequate protection from the dangers of out-of-court s 1990The court reasoned that “[b]ecause the preliminary hearing transcript testimony and other relevant court documents, albeit hearsay, are not being offered against the defendant in the traditional sense, but are merely being offered for the neutral inquiry as to the nature of the earlier offense, i.e., to explain the defendant’s conduct which comprised the crime he admitted to have suffered in the earlier proceeding, they are admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule to explain *616 his admissions. [Citation.]” (Id., at p. 1174.) Perhaps equally important, “[t]he main reasons for excluding he | 2 | 2 |
In Re Lovegreen2 sentences1974The outpatient is entitled to (1) written notice of the claimed violations of his release; (2) disclosure of evidence against him; (3) the opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (5) a neutral hearing body such as the NAEA or a hearing officer or officers selected by the NAEA; and (6) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking outpatient status. 14 In 1974The outpatient is entitled to (1) written notice of the claimed violations of his release; (2) disclosure of evidence against him; (3) the opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (4) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (5) a neutral hearing body such as the NAEA or a hearing officer or officers selected by the NAEA; and (6) a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking outpatient status. 14 In | 2 | 2 |
People v. Carluccigreen2 sentences2026(See Carlucci, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 256 .) Essentially, Chi is complaining that the administrative hearing does not follow the adversarial trial model, where the advocates introduce evidence and a judge rules on objections. 2026(See Carlucci, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 256 .) Essentially, Chi is complaining that the administrative hearing does not follow the adversarial trial model, where the advocates introduce evidence and a judge rules on objections. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Nievesgreen2 sentences2026(See Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 498 .) Assigning both tasks to a neutral hearing officer does not incentivize the officer to favor the department. 2026(See Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 498 .) Assigning both tasks to a neutral hearing officer does not incentivize the officer to favor the department. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Quartermangreen2 sentences2012(See Black v. Romano (1985) 471 U.S. 606, 610 [ 85 L.Ed.2d 636 , 105 S.Ct. 2254 ]; People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144, 1152-1153 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 631 , 875 P.2d 736 ]; People v. Quarterman (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1294 [ 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 419 ].) Due process requires a probationer be given “written notice of the claimed violations of his probation; disclosure of the evidence against him; an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; a neutral hearing body; and a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for 2012(See Black v. Romano (1985) 471 U.S. 606, 610 [ 85 L.Ed.2d 636 , 105 S.Ct. 2254 ]; People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144, 1152-1153 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 631 , 875 P.2d 736 ]; People v. Quarterman (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1294 [ 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 419 ].) Due process requires a probationer be given “written notice of the claimed violations of his probation; disclosure of the evidence against him; an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; a neutral hearing body; and a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for | 1 | 2 |
People v. Sanchezgreen2 sentences1970(Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 477-478 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 725-726 ]; People v. Mercer, 257 Cal.App.2d 244, 247-249 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 861 ]; People v. Hazel, 252 Cal.App.2d 412, 417-418 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 437 ]; see People v. Sanchez, 65 Cal.2d 814, 823-824 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 648 , 423 P.2d 800 ]; People v. Jacobson, 63 Cal.2d 319, 328 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 515 , 405 P.2d 555 ].) Accordingly, the response “I did it and I’m sorry” to this neutral inquiry was admissible because defendant was not then in custody, the investigation had not focused on him as an accused, and the inquiry was not such as to co 1970(Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 477-478 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 725-726 ]; People v. Mercer, 257 Cal.App.2d 244, 247-249 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 861 ]; People v. Hazel, 252 Cal.App.2d 412, 417-418 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 437 ]; see People v. Sanchez, 65 Cal.2d 814, 823-824 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 648 , 423 P.2d 800 ]; People v. Jacobson, 63 Cal.2d 319, 328 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 515 , 405 P.2d 555 ].) Accordingly, the response “I did it and I’m sorry” to this neutral inquiry was admissible because defendant was not then in custody, the investigation had not focused on him as an accused, and the inquiry was not such as to co | 1 | 2 |
People v. Jacobsongreen2 sentences1970(Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 477-478 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 725-726 ]; People v. Mercer, 257 Cal.App.2d 244, 247-249 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 861 ]; People v. Hazel, 252 Cal.App.2d 412, 417-418 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 437 ]; see People v. Sanchez, 65 Cal.2d 814, 823-824 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 648 , 423 P.2d 800 ]; People v. Jacobson, 63 Cal.2d 319, 328 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 515 , 405 P.2d 555 ].) Accordingly, the response “I did it and I’m sorry” to this neutral inquiry was admissible because defendant was not then in custody, the investigation had not focused on him as an accused, and the inquiry was not such as to co 1970(Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436, 477-478 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 725-726 ]; People v. Mercer, 257 Cal.App.2d 244, 247-249 [ 64 Cal.Rptr. 861 ]; People v. Hazel, 252 Cal.App.2d 412, 417-418 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 437 ]; see People v. Sanchez, 65 Cal.2d 814, 823-824 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 648 , 423 P.2d 800 ]; People v. Jacobson, 63 Cal.2d 319, 328 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 515 , 405 P.2d 555 ].) Accordingly, the response “I did it and I’m sorry” to this neutral inquiry was admissible because defendant was not then in custody, the investigation had not focused on him as an accused, and the inquiry was not such as to co | 1 | 2 |
People v. Woodgreen1 sentence2023(People v. Wood (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d Supp. 11, 15 [“‘It is error to give an instruction which correctly states a principle of law which has no application to the facts of the case’”].) There is no bracketed portion of CALCRIM No. 2100 (or any other pattern jury instruction) that references the presumption that operates against the prosecution (BAC of less than .05 percent) or the neutral presumption (BAC of from .05 to less than .08 percent). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Coxgreen2 sentences2014In doing so it ratified a principle that had been part of California law since at least 1919 (see People v. Sing, supra, 42 Cal.App. 385, 395-396 ) and that reflects the great weight of authority elsewhere (see Annot., Series of Takings Over a Period of Time as Involving Single or Separate Larcenies (1973) 53 A.L.R.3d 398 ; People v. Cox (1941) 36 N.E.2d 84, 86 [ 286 N.Y. 137, 143 ] [―The same rule applies in England . . . .‖].). 2014In doing so it ratified a principle that had been part of California law since at least 1919 (see People v. Sing, supra, 42 Cal.App. 385, 395-396 ) and that reflects the great weight of authority elsewhere (see Annot., Series of Takings Over a Period of Time as Involving Single or Separate Larcenies (1973) 53 A.L.R.3d 398 ; People v. Cox (1941) 36 N.E.2d 84, 86 [ 286 N.Y. 137, 143 ] [―The same rule applies in England . . . .‖].). | 1 | 1 |
California-Nevada Annual Conference of United Methodist Church v. St. Luke's United Methodist Churchgreen2 sentences2009Luke's United Methodist Church (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 754, 769 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 442 ].) If a neutral principle of law approach were applied here, the Episcopal Church might well lose because the 1950 deed to the disputed property is in the name of St. 2009Luke's United Methodist Church (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 754, 769 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 442 ].) If a neutral principle of law approach were applied here, the Episcopal Church might well lose because the 1950 deed to the disputed property is in the name of St. | 1 | 1 |
| In Re: Dale Chimenti, Lizabeth Chimenti, Joey Chimenti, and Stefanie Chimentigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Second Employers'liability Casesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Thompsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Miranda v. Arizonagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hazelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Mercergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Arnoldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Malloy v. Hogangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Tomitagreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Konigsberggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Vickers
green
2 sentences2016Neutral Hearing Officer The Criminal Justice Realignment Act of 2011 requires that PRCS revocations "incorporate the procedural due process protections held to apply to probation revocation procedures under Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 , and People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 451 , and their progeny." (Vol. 6 West's Cal. Legislative Service (Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 2(b), p. 1969.) Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. 471 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484 ], delineates basic due process requirements for the revocation of parole, which includes the right to a probable cause hearing before a neutral hearing office 1988The probationer is entitled to written notice of the claimed violations of his probation; disclosure of the evidence against him; an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; a neutral hearing body; and a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation. [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 611-612 [85 L.Ed.2d at pp. 642-643], citing Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471 [ 33 L.Ed.2d 484 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 ], and Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973) 411 U.S. 778 [ 36 L.Ed.2d 656 , 93 S.Ct. 1756 ].) In People v. Felix ( | 3 | 1988–2016 |
People v. Castellanos
green
2 sentences1996The Castellanos court opined no showing of unavailability was required because the preliminary hearing transcripts, “albeit hearsay, are not being offered against the defendant in the traditional sense, but are merely being offered for the neutral inquiry as to the nature of the earlier offense . . . .” (People v. Castellanos, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 1174 .) Apparently referring to the defendant’s plea of guilty in the prior case, the Castellanos court then suggested the transcripts were “admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule to explain his admissions.” (Ibid.) The Castellanos reaso 1996The Castellanos court opined no showing of unavailability was required because the preliminary hearing transcripts, "albeit hearsay, are not being offered against the defendant in the traditional sense, but are merely being offered for the neutral inquiry as to the nature of the earlier offense...." ( People v. Castellanos, supra, 219 Cal. App.3d at p. 1174 .) Apparently referring to the defendant's plea of guilty in the prior case, the Castellanos court then suggested the transcripts were "admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule to explain his admissions." ( Ibid. ) The Castellanos reaso | 2 | 1994–1996 |
People v. Goodner
green
2 sentences1996The Castellanos court opined no showing of unavailability was required because the preliminary hearing transcripts, “albeit hearsay, are not being offered against the defendant in the traditional sense, but are merely being offered for the neutral inquiry as to the nature of the earlier offense . . . .” (People v. Castellanos, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 1174 .) Apparently referring to the defendant’s plea of guilty in the prior case, the Castellanos court then suggested the transcripts were “admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule to explain his admissions.” (Ibid.) The Castellanos reaso 1996The Castellanos court opined no showing of unavailability was required because the preliminary hearing transcripts, “albeit hearsay, are not being offered against the defendant in the traditional sense, but are merely being offered for the neutral inquiry as to the nature of the earlier offense . . . .” (People v. Castellanos, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d at p. 1174 .) Apparently referring to the defendant’s plea of guilty in the prior case, the Castellanos court then suggested the transcripts were “admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule to explain his admissions.” (Ibid.) The Castellanos reaso | 2 | 1994–1996 |
People v. Cotter
green
2 sentences1967The fact that Charles supplied some of the details of his statement in response to the officer’s questions as to “what happened on [each] robbery” is irrelevant, since “the questioning was initiated by defendant, . . . the [defendant’s] statement was volunteered in response to a neutral inquiry invited by defendant’s own remarks; [and] the conduct of the police was neither intimidating nor accusatory, nor did it appear in any way designed to elicit incriminating statements . . . . ” (People v. Treloar (1966) 64 Cal.2d 141, 147 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 100 , 410 P.2d 620 ].) These circumstances negate an 1967(See People v. Sanchez, 65 Cal.2d 814 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 648 , 423 P.2d 800 ] ; People v. Pike, 239 Cal.App.2d 237 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 575 ]; People v. *249 Cotter, 63 Cal.2d 386 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 622 , 405 P.2d 862 ]; People v. Jacobson, 63 Cal.2d 319 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 515 , 405 P.2d 555 ] and People v. Charles, 66 Cal.2d 330 [ 57 Cal.Rptr. 745 , 425 P.2d 545 ].) The fact that appellant supplied some of the details which explained his first statement, in response to Keister’s neutral inquiry is of no importance because “the questioning was initiated by defendant, . . . the [defendant’s] statement was volunt | 2 | 1967–1967 |
People v. Alberto S.
green
1 sentence2014(In re Robert G. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 437, 441-443 .)” (In re Alberto S. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1459, 1464 .) The section 777 notice must identify the specific probation violation the minor is alleged to have committed. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Robert G.
green
1 sentence2014(In re Robert G. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 437, 441-443 .)” (In re Alberto S. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1459, 1464 .) The section 777 notice must identify the specific probation violation the minor is alleged to have committed. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Sing
green
2 sentences2014In doing so it ratified a principle that had been part of California law since at least 1919 (see People v. Sing, supra, 42 Cal.App. 385, 395-396 ) and that reflects the great weight of authority elsewhere (see Annot., Series of Takings Over a Period of Time as Involving Single or Separate Larcenies (1973) 53 A.L.R.3d 398 ; People v. Cox (1941) 36 N.E.2d 84, 86 [ 286 N.Y. 137, 143 ] [―The same rule applies in England . . . .‖].). 2014In doing so it ratified a principle that had been part of California law since at least 1919 (see People v. Sing, supra, 42 Cal.App. 385, 395-396 ) and that reflects the great weight of authority elsewhere (see Annot., Series of Takings Over a Period of Time as Involving Single or Separate Larcenies (1973) 53 A.L.R.3d 398 ; People v. Cox (1941) 36 N.E.2d 84, 86 [ 286 N.Y. 137, 143 ] [―The same rule applies in England . . . .‖].). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Rabe
green
1 sentence2014The leading treatise on California law describes Bailey as classifying one of these cases—and by logical extension all of them—as ―involving no general intent or overall plan,‖ which I take to mean that they stand only for the unremarkable proposition that in the absence of a single unifying impulse, each taking will support a separate charge and conviction. (2 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Property, § 13, p. 36.) 3 People v. Rabe (1927) 202 Cal. 409 . 6 It is thus apparent that Bailey contemplated a single neutral rule requiring the aggregation of theft off | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Stanson v. Mott
green
1 sentence2011Vargas I agreed with those appellate decisions “that explicitly have held that Stanson [v. Mott, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206 ] does not preclude a governmental entity from publicly expressing an opinion with regard to the merits of a proposed ballot measure, so long as it does not expend public funds to mount a campaign on the measure.” (Vargas I, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 36 .) We summarily dispose of City’s argument that plaintiffs have waived or are estopped from raising the constitutional argument because they failed to raise it in opposition to a previous attorney fees motion. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Vargas v. City of Salinas
green
1 sentence2011Vargas I agreed with those appellate decisions “that explicitly have held that Stanson [v. Mott, supra, 17 Cal.3d 206 ] does not preclude a governmental entity from publicly expressing an opinion with regard to the merits of a proposed ballot measure, so long as it does not expend public funds to mount a campaign on the measure.” (Vargas I, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 36 .) We summarily dispose of City’s argument that plaintiffs have waived or are estopped from raising the constitutional argument because they failed to raise it in opposition to a previous attorney fees motion. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.
green
2 sentences2009NOTES [1] The acronym "SLAPP" stands for "strategic lawsuit against public participation." (See Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53 , 57 & fn. 1 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 , 52 P.3d 685 ].) [2] As relevant here, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (First Amendment) provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." (See Kedroff v. St. 2009NOTES [1] The acronym "SLAPP" stands for "strategic lawsuit against public participation." (See Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53 , 57 & fn. 1 [ 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507 , 52 P.3d 685 ].) [2] As relevant here, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (First Amendment) provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." (See Kedroff v. St. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Presbytery of Riverside v. Community Church of Palm Springs
green
1 sentence2007Here is the key passage: "The conclusion to be drawn from Jones is that a state court may resolve disputes over church property through use of neutral principles of law, focusing on sources such as deeds to church property, articles of incorporation, bylaws, state statutory law and the constitution and rules of the general church; but if a civil court is required to resolve a religious controversy, it must then defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body." (Korean United, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 498 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 396 .) The Korean United also c | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Civil Service Assn. v. Redevelopment Agency green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Korean United Presbyterian Church v. Presbytery of the Pacific
green
2 sentences2007Here is the key passage: "The conclusion to be drawn from Jones is that a state court may resolve disputes over church property through use of neutral principles of law, focusing on sources such as deeds to church property, articles of incorporation, bylaws, state statutory law and the constitution and rules of the general church; but if a civil court is required to resolve a religious controversy, it must then defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body." (Korean United, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 498 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 396 .) The Korean United also c 2007Here is the key passage: "The conclusion to be drawn from Jones is that a state court may resolve disputes over church property through use of neutral principles of law, focusing on sources such as deeds to church property, articles of incorporation, bylaws, state statutory law and the constitution and rules of the general church; but if a civil court is required to resolve a religious controversy, it must then defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body." (Korean United, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 498 , 281 Cal.Rptr. 396 .) The Korean United also c | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Presbyterian Church in US v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Metropolitan Baptist Church of Richmond, Inc. v. Younger
green
1 sentence2007This concept has been described as the application of `neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied' without establishing `religion....'" (Metropolitan Baptist, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at pp. 858-859, 121 Cal. Rptr. 899 , quoting Hull Church, supra, 393 U.S. at p. 449 , 89 S.Ct. 601 .)) The court did not address how the cy pres doctrine to be sure, a traditional and neutral principle of trust law in non-religion cases interacted with the need of courts to stay away from religious disputes, or differed from Lord Eldon's discredited implied trust d | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| People v. Gonzales green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| People v. Winson green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Guerrero green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| People v. Felix green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| In Re Prewitt green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Rhode Island v. Innis green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Pannell v. Jones green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| People v. Lookadoo green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| People v. Hill green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| People v. Pike green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Cotter v. California red | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| People v. Charles green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Chapman v. California red | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| People v. Lewis green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.