will follow rule in Colorado

2014We will depart from our precedent, however, 'where sound reasons exist for doing so.'" (citing Blehm, 983 P.2d at 788 )). 117 The issue on post-conviction review, whether the defendant's waiver of the right to testify was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, is a question of law subject to de novo review.

2013People v. Blehm, 983 P.2d 779, 788 (Colo.1999) (collecting cases).

2026While "[t]he principles of stare decisis provide that this Court will follow the rule of law it has established in earlier cases[,]" Bedor v. Johnson , 2013 CO 4, ¶ 23, 292 P.3d 924, 929, 21 "[we] are not without power to depart from a prior ruling, or to overrule it, where sound reasons exist[,]" Creacy v. Indus.

2026While "[t]he principles of stare decisis provide that this Court will follow the rule of law it has established in earlier cases[,]" Bedor v. Johnson , 2013 CO 4, ¶ 23, 292 P.3d 924, 929, 21 "[we] are not without power to depart from a prior ruling, or to overrule it, where sound reasons exist[,]" Creacy v. Indus.

2026Comm'n , 366 P.2d 384, 386 (Colo. 1961); see also People v. Porter , 2015 CO 34, ¶ 23, 348 P.3d 922, 927 ("[Stare decisis] is not so rigid as to prevent us from reevaluating our precedent."). ¶42 However, "[w]e will depart from our existing law only if we are clearly convinced that (1) the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions[,] and (2) more good than harm will come from departing from precedent." Love v. Klosky , 2018 CO 20, ¶ 15, 413 P.3d 1267, 1270. ¶43 With these principles in mind, we turn to the issue before us to determine whether it is appr

2026Comm'n , 366 P.2d 384, 386 (Colo. 1961); see also People v. Porter , 2015 CO 34, ¶ 23, 348 P.3d 922, 927 ("[Stare decisis] is not so rigid as to prevent us from reevaluating our precedent."). ¶42 However, "[w]e will depart from our existing law only if we are clearly convinced that (1) the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions[,] and (2) more good than harm will come from departing from precedent." Love v. Klosky , 2018 CO 20, ¶ 15, 413 P.3d 1267, 1270. ¶43 With these principles in mind, we turn to the issue before us to determine whether it is appr

2026Comm'n , 366 P.2d 384 , 386 ( Colo. 1961 ) ; see also People v. Porter , 2015 CO 34 , ¶ 23 , 348 P.3d 922, 927 ( " [Stare decisis] is not so rigid as to prevent us from reevaluating our precedent." ) . ¶42 However, " [w] e will depart from our existing law only if we are clearly convinced that (1) the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions [,] and (2) more good than harm will come from departing from precedent." Love v. Klosky , 2018 CO 20 , ¶ 15 , 413 P.3d 1267 , 1270 . ¶43 With these principles in mind, we turn to the issue before us to determine w

2026Comm'n , 366 P.2d 384, 386 (Colo. 1961); see also People v. Porter , 2015 CO 34, ¶ 23, 348 P.3d 922, 927 ("[Stare decisis] is not so rigid as to prevent us from reevaluating our precedent."). ¶42 However, "[w]e will depart from our existing law only if we are clearly convinced that (1) the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions[,] and (2) more good than harm will come from departing from precedent." Love v. Klosky , 2018 CO 20, ¶ 15, 413 P.3d 1267, 1270. ¶43 With these principles in mind, we turn to the issue before us to determine whether it is appr

2026Comm'n , 366 P.2d 384, 386 (Colo. 1961); see also People v. Porter , 2015 CO 34, ¶ 23, 348 P.3d 922, 927 ("[Stare decisis] is not so rigid as to prevent us from reevaluating our precedent."). ¶42 However, "[w]e will depart from our existing law only if we are clearly convinced that (1) the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions[,] and (2) more good than harm will come from departing from precedent." Love v. Klosky , 2018 CO 20, ¶ 15, 413 P.3d 1267, 1270. ¶43 With these principles in mind, we turn to the issue before us to determine whether it is appr

2026Comm'n , 366 P.2d 384, 386 (Colo. 1961); see also People v. Porter , 2015 CO 34, ¶ 23, 348 P.3d 922, 927 ("[Stare decisis] is not so rigid as to prevent us from reevaluating our precedent."). ¶42 However, "[w]e will depart from our existing law only if we are clearly convinced that (1) the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions[,] and (2) more good than harm will come from departing from precedent." Love v. Klosky , 2018 CO 20, ¶ 15, 413 P.3d 1267, 1270. ¶43 With these principles in mind, we turn to the issue before us to determine whether it is appr

2025Further, " [u] nder an established rule of statutory construction, the legislature is presumed, by virtue of its action in amending a previously construed statute without changing the portion that was construed, to have accepted and ratified the prior judicial construction." People v. Swain , 959 P.2d 426, 430-31 ( Colo. 1998 ) . ¶15 The doctrine of stare decisis means that this court will follow the rule of law established in earlier cases .

2025Further, "[u]nder an established rule of statutory construction, the legislature is presumed, by virtue of its action in amending a previously construed statute without changing the portion that was 10 construed, to have accepted and ratified the prior judicial construction." People v. Swain , 959 P.2d 426, 430-31 (Colo. 1998). ¶15 The doctrine of stare decisis means that this court will follow the rule of law established in earlier cases.

2012See Bd. of County Commis. v. Vail Assocs., Inc., 19 P.3d 1263, 1274 (Colo.2001) ("The doctrine of stare decisis provides that a court will follow the rule of law it has established in earlier cases, unless clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions. ..."). iv.