Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
50 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ivory v. Stategreen2 sentences2011However, the Florida Supreme Court has “established a per se reversible error rule where a trial court responds to a jury’s question without giving counsel notice and ‘the opportunity to participate in the discussion of the action to be taken on the jury’s request.’ ” Mills v. State, 620 So.2d 1006, 1007 (Fla.1993) (quoting Ivory v. State, 351 So.2d 26, 28 (Fla.1977)). 2011In adopting a per se reversible error rule, the court recognized that “communication with the jury is ‘so fraught with potential prejudice that it cannot be considered harmless.’ ” Id. (quoting Ivory, 351 So.2d at 28 ). | 6 | 10 |
Thomas v. Stategreen2 sentences2026This right to participate includes the right to place objections on record as well as the right to make full argument as to the reasons the jury's request should or should not be honored.”) and Thomas v. State, 730 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 1998) (“The per se reversible error rule announced in Ivory is prophylactic in nature and must be invoked by contemporaneous objection at trial.”). 2 2015However, as we stated in Thomas v. State, 730 So. 2d 667, 668 (Fla. 1998), “The per se reversible error rule announced in Ivory is prophylactic in nature and must be invoked by contemporaneous objection at trial. | 6 | 7 |
State v. DiGuiliogreen2 sentences2022As explained in the cases above, the Court has consistently applied a per se reversible standard consistent with the first category of the test set forth in State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986). 2019Here, the issue of liability was vigorously disputed.4 Rierson was rendered comatose and unable to communicate immediately following the accident, thus 3 See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (1986), for a discussion comparing the per se reversible rule and the harmless error rule. 4 We reject the argument that Rierson opened the door to Deveau’s improper closing argument statements. | 4 | 8 |
State v. Franklingreen2 sentences1998As we stated in State v. Franklin, 618 So.2d 171, 173 (Fla.1993): The per se reversible error rule ... exists for two distinct reasons. 1998P. 3.410 (emphasis added). [2] See also State v. Franklin, 618 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1993); Colbert v. State, 569 So.2d 433 (Fla.1990); Williams v. State, 488 So.2d 62 (Fla.1986); Curtis v. State, 480 So.2d 1277 (Fla.1985). [3] Colbert, 569 So.2d at 435 ("This per se reversible error rule evolved as a prophylactic procedure to ensure that a trial judge's response to a jury request for additional instructions or to have testimony read is made in the presence of counsel."); cf. Pope v. State, 569 So.2d 1241, 1244 (Fla.1990)("[T]his per se [reversible error] rule is merely prophylactic in nature and mu | 4 | 4 |
Mills v. Stategreen2 sentences2011However, the Florida Supreme Court has “established a per se reversible error rule where a trial court responds to a jury’s question without giving counsel notice and ‘the opportunity to participate in the discussion of the action to be taken on the jury’s request.’ ” Mills v. State, 620 So.2d 1006, 1007 (Fla.1993) (quoting Ivory v. State, 351 So.2d 26, 28 (Fla.1977)). 1998We reaffirmed the per se reversible error standard in Mills v. State, 620 So.2d 1006 (Fla.1993), [2] explaining that "[t]he particular evil rule 3.410 and the per se error standard of Ivory were designed to prevent is the lack of notice to counsel, coupled with the lost opportunity for counsel to argue and to place objections on the record. " Id. at 1008 (quoting Colbert, 569 So.2d at 435). | 3 | 6 |
Galindez v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Id. (quoting Galindez v. State, 955 So.2d 517, 522 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999))); cf. Jenkins v. Hutton, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 1769, 1772 ,' 198 L.Ed.2d 415 (2017) (recognizing that :the proper, focus in an instructional error case is on whether , a properly instructed, reasonable jury cpuld have recommended death).- In practice, however, the majority has replaced the proper harmless error analysis with the same per se reversible error rule that Hurst rejected, finding Hurst error' harmful in every case in which the jury di 2017State v. Estevez, 753 So.2d 1, 4-5 (Fla. 1999), superseded by Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 , 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006); see Galindez v. State, 955 So.2d 517 (Fla. 2007). | 3 | 3 |
Walker v. Stategreen2 sentences1994“A trial court’s failure to hold a complete inquiry is a per se reversible error.” Walker v. State, 573 So.2d 1075, 1075 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (emphasis added). 1991Accord Walker v. State, 573 So.2d 1075 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (“A trial court’s failure to hold a complete inquiry is a per se reversible error to which there is no harmless error exception.”). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Merricksgreen2 sentences2022Finally, when a bailiff engages in unsupervised conversations with a jury, harmless error analysis is inappropriate because it “would ‘unnecessarily embroil trial counsel, trial judges and appellate courts in a search for evanescent “harm,” real or fancied.’ ” Merricks, 831 So. 2d at 161 (quoting Ivory v. State, 351 So. 2d 26, 28 (Fla. 1977) (England, J., concurring)). 2011See State v. Merricks, 831 So.2d 156, 161 (Fla.2002) ("To apply a harmless error analysis to such improper communications as the State proposes would `unnecessarily embroil trial counsel, trial judges and appellate courts in a search for evanescent harm, real or fancied.'") (quoting Ivory, 351 So.2d at 28 (England, J., concurring)). | 2 | 4 |
Bradley v. Stategreen2 sentences2022Bradley v. State, 513 So. 2d 112, 113-14 (Fla. 1987) (citing Curtis v. State, 480 So. 2d 1277, 1279 (Fla. 1985)); see also Colbert v. State, 569 So. 2d 433, 435 (Fla. 1990) (listing cases and examining the history of the per se reversible error rule in the rule 3.410 context). 2011These circumstances include when a trial *1008 judge "respond[s] to a request from the jury without the prosecuting attorney, the defendant, and defendant's counsel being present and having the opportunity to participate in the discussion of the action to be taken on the jury's request." Ivory v. State, 351 So.2d 26, 28 (Fla.1977); see also Bradley v. State, 513 So.2d 112, 113-14 (Fla.1987) ("[B]oth the state and the defendant must have the opportunity to participate, regardless of the subject matter of the jury's inquiry. | 2 | 4 |
Colbert v. Stategreen2 sentences2022Bradley v. State, 513 So. 2d 112, 113-14 (Fla. 1987) (citing Curtis v. State, 480 So. 2d 1277, 1279 (Fla. 1985)); see also Colbert v. State, 569 So. 2d 433, 435 (Fla. 1990) (listing cases and examining the history of the per se reversible error rule in the rule 3.410 context). 1998P. 3.410 (emphasis added). [2] See also State v. Franklin, 618 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1993); Colbert v. State, 569 So.2d 433 (Fla.1990); Williams v. State, 488 So.2d 62 (Fla.1986); Curtis v. State, 480 So.2d 1277 (Fla.1985). [3] Colbert, 569 So.2d at 435 ("This per se reversible error rule evolved as a prophylactic procedure to ensure that a trial judge's response to a jury request for additional instructions or to have testimony read is made in the presence of counsel."); cf. Pope v. State, 569 So.2d 1241, 1244 (Fla.1990)("[T]his per se [reversible error] rule is merely prophylactic in nature and mu | 2 | 3 |
State v. Schoppgreen2 sentences2011In State v. Schopp, 653 So.2d 1016 (Fla.1995), this Court receded from a similar per se reversible error ruling based upon presumed harm from the possibility of uncertainty. 2011In State v. Schopp, 653 So.2d 1016 (Fla.1995), this Court receded from a similar per se reversible error ruling based upon presumed harm from the possibility of uncertainty. | 2 | 2 |
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences2003See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 2003See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). | 2 | 2 |
Curtis v. Stategreen2 sentences2022Bradley v. State, 513 So. 2d 112, 113-14 (Fla. 1987) (citing Curtis v. State, 480 So. 2d 1277, 1279 (Fla. 1985)); see also Colbert v. State, 569 So. 2d 433, 435 (Fla. 1990) (listing cases and examining the history of the per se reversible error rule in the rule 3.410 context). 1998P. 3.410 (emphasis added). [2] See also State v. Franklin, 618 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1993); Colbert v. State, 569 So.2d 433 (Fla.1990); Williams v. State, 488 So.2d 62 (Fla.1986); Curtis v. State, 480 So.2d 1277 (Fla.1985). [3] Colbert, 569 So.2d at 435 ("This per se reversible error rule evolved as a prophylactic procedure to ensure that a trial judge's response to a jury request for additional instructions or to have testimony read is made in the presence of counsel."); cf. Pope v. State, 569 So.2d 1241, 1244 (Fla.1990)("[T]his per se [reversible error] rule is merely prophylactic in nature and mu | 1 | 4 |
Riley v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See Lindsay v. State, 1 So.3d 270 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Riley v. State, 25 So.3d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). 2016In Riley v. State, 25 So.3d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), rev. dismissed, 26 So.3d 1288 (Fla.2009), the court reversed for a new trial when it granted a petition for IAAC on the grounds that appellate counsel had failed to argue a per se reversible error of failing to instruct on a lesser-included offense. | 1 | 2 |
Soto v. McCulley Marine Services, Inc.green1 sentence2019See, e.g., Soto, 181 So. 3d at 1226 (“Arguing that a 7 Trooper Sanchez was the sole witness at the scene upon whom she could rely to advance her theory of the case. | 1 | 1 |
Frank Special v. West Boca Medical Centergreen1 sentence2019Ctr., 160 So. 3d 1251, 1256 (Fla. 2014) (emphasis supplied). 3 See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129, 1135 (1986), for a discussion comparing the per se reversible rule and the harmless error rule. 7 Here, the issue of liability was vigorously disputed.4 Rierson was rendered comatose and unable to communicate immediately following the accident, thus Trooper Sanchez was the sole witness at the scene upon whom she could rely to advance her theory of the case. | 1 | 1 |
& SC15-767 Lancelot Uriley Armstrong v. State of Florida & Lancelot Uriley Armstrong v. Julie L. Jones, etc.green2 sentences2018See, e.g., Kopsho v. State, 209 So. 3d 568, 570 (Fla. 2017) (holding Hurst error was not harmless after explaining that all that can be determined from the jury’s 10-2 death recommendation is “that the jury did not unanimously recommend a sentence of death”). 2018See, e.g., Kopsho v. State, 209 So.3d 568, 570 (Fla. 2017) (holding Hurst error was not harmless after explaining that all that can be determined from the jury’s 10-2 death recommendation is “that the-jury did not unanimously recommend a sentence of death”). | 1 | 1 |
Lindsay v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See Lindsay v. State, 1 So.3d 270 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009); Riley v. State, 25 So.3d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). | 1 | 1 |
| Wilcott v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
State v. Estevezgreen1 sentence2017State v. Estevez, 753 So.2d 1, 4-5 (Fla. 1999), superseded by Washington v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212 , 126 S.Ct. 2546 , 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006); see Galindez v. State, 955 So.2d 517 (Fla. 2007). | 1 | 1 |
| Russell v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anderson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hayes v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ventura v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Goodwin v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Williams v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cunningham v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Rhodengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Clark v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lucasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pope v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Plummer v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Rousseaugreen | 1 | 1 |
| Albritton v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences2000In Williams v. State, 488 So.2d 62 (Fla.1986), the court clarified that the per-se reversible-error rule applies only to communications expressly encompassed by rule 3.410; other communications between the judge and the jury are subject to a harmless-error analysis. 1998P. 3.410 (emphasis added). [2] See also State v. Franklin, 618 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1993); Colbert v. State, 569 So.2d 433 (Fla.1990); Williams v. State, 488 So.2d 62 (Fla.1986); Curtis v. State, 480 So.2d 1277 (Fla.1985). [3] Colbert, 569 So.2d at 435 ("This per se reversible error rule evolved as a prophylactic procedure to ensure that a trial judge's response to a jury request for additional instructions or to have testimony read is made in the presence of counsel."); cf. Pope v. State, 569 So.2d 1241, 1244 (Fla.1990)("[T]his per se [reversible error] rule is merely prophylactic in nature and mu | 6 | 1987–2002 |
Smith v. State
green
2 sentences2011Specifically, in Schopp, this Court receded from its holding in Smith v. State, 500 So.2d 125 (Fla. 1986), wherein this Court held that the failure to conduct a Richardson [8] hearing was per se reversible error, assuming that "a reviewing court is in no position to determine from a cold record whether a discovery violation is harmless." Schopp, 653 So.2d at 1019 (describing Smith, 500 So.2d 125 ). 2011Specifically, in Schopp, this Court receded from its holding in Smith v. State, 500 So.2d 125 (Fla. 1986), wherein this Court held that the failure to conduct a Richardson [8] hearing was per se reversible error, assuming that "a reviewing court is in no position to determine from a cold record whether a discovery violation is harmless." Schopp, 653 So.2d at 1019 (describing Smith, 500 So.2d 125 ). | 4 | 1991–2011 |
Johnson v. State
green
2 sentences2022Second, “[t]his Court has also applied the per se reversible error rule to those cases where the appellate court is unable to conduct a harmless error analysis because it would have to engage in pure speculation in order to attempt to determine the potential effect of the error on the jury.” Johnson, 53 So. 3d at 1007 . 2017While purporting to apply our traditional fundamental error test, the majority effectively applies a “structural” error standard—akin to the per se reversible error analysis applied by this Court’s majority in Johnson v. State, 53 So. 3d 1003 (Fla. 2010). | 3 | 2010–2022 |
State v. Wimberly
green
2 sentences2017See Wilcott v. State, 509 So.2d 261, 262 (Fla. 1987) (reversing conviction for unlawfully introduc ing or possessing contraband upon grounds of a correctional center because trial court refused to provide a jury instruction on simple possession of less than twenty grams of cannabis, even though the only evidence established that the possession did, in fact, occur in the prison and the defendant was an inmate); Wimberly, 498 So.2d 929 (reversing conviction for battery of a law enforcement officer even though uncontroverted evidence at trial established that the defendant was incarcerated at the 1997State v. Wimberly, 498 So.2d 929 (Fla.1986); Nelson v. State, 665 So.2d 382 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Crapps v. State, 566 So.2d 62 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). | 2 | 1997–2017 |
Jenkins v. Hutton
green
2 sentences2018Id. (quoting Galindez v. State, 955 So.2d 517, 522 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999))); cf. Jenkins v. Hutton, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 1769, 1772 ,' 198 L.Ed.2d 415 (2017) (recognizing that :the proper, focus in an instructional error case is on whether , a properly instructed, reasonable jury cpuld have recommended death).- In practice, however, the majority has replaced the proper harmless error analysis with the same per se reversible error rule that Hurst rejected, finding Hurst error' harmful in every case in which the jury di 2018Id. (quoting Galindez v. State, 955 So.2d 517, 522 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999))); cf. Jenkins v. Hutton, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 1769, 1772 ,' 198 L.Ed.2d 415 (2017) (recognizing that :the proper, focus in an instructional error case is on whether , a properly instructed, reasonable jury cpuld have recommended death).- In practice, however, the majority has replaced the proper harmless error analysis with the same per se reversible error rule that Hurst rejected, finding Hurst error' harmful in every case in which the jury di | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Neder v. United States
green
2 sentences2018Id. (quoting Galindez v. State, 955 So.2d 517, 522 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999))); cf. Jenkins v. Hutton, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 1769, 1772 ,' 198 L.Ed.2d 415 (2017) (recognizing that :the proper, focus in an instructional error case is on whether , a properly instructed, reasonable jury cpuld have recommended death).- In practice, however, the majority has replaced the proper harmless error analysis with the same per se reversible error rule that Hurst rejected, finding Hurst error' harmful in every case in which the jury di 2018Id. (quoting Galindez v. State, 955 So.2d 517, 522 (Fla. 2007) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999))); cf. Jenkins v. Hutton, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 1769, 1772 ,' 198 L.Ed.2d 415 (2017) (recognizing that :the proper, focus in an instructional error case is on whether , a properly instructed, reasonable jury cpuld have recommended death).- In practice, however, the majority has replaced the proper harmless error analysis with the same per se reversible error rule that Hurst rejected, finding Hurst error' harmful in every case in which the jury di | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Washington v. Recuenco green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Dillard v. State
neutral
1 sentence2017See, e.g., Riley v. State, 25 So.3d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (granting a new trial after conviction of capital sexual battery due to failure of trial judge to provide a jury instruction on simple battery even though no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty of simple battery); King v. State, 911 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (granting a new trial for defendant after jury conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer where the trial judge denied request for simple battery instruction after defendant admitted he knew the victim was a law enforcement officer); Brown v. State, 60 | 1 | 2017–2017 |
King v. State
green
1 sentence2017See, e.g., Riley v. State, 25 So.3d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (granting a new trial after conviction of capital sexual battery due to failure of trial judge to provide a jury instruction on simple battery even though no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty of simple battery); King v. State, 911 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (granting a new trial for defendant after jury conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer where the trial judge denied request for simple battery instruction after defendant admitted he knew the victim was a law enforcement officer); Brown v. State, 60 | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Brown v. State
green
1 sentence2017See, e.g., Riley v. State, 25 So.3d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (granting a new trial after conviction of capital sexual battery due to failure of trial judge to provide a jury instruction on simple battery even though no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty of simple battery); King v. State, 911 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (granting a new trial for defendant after jury conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer where the trial judge denied request for simple battery instruction after defendant admitted he knew the victim was a law enforcement officer); Brown v. State, 60 | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Hayes v. State
green
1 sentence2017See, e.g., Riley v. State, 25 So.3d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (granting a new trial after conviction of capital sexual battery due to failure of trial judge to provide a jury instruction on simple battery even though no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty of simple battery); King v. State, 911 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (granting a new trial for defendant after jury conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer where the trial judge denied request for simple battery instruction after defendant admitted he knew the victim was a law enforcement officer); Brown v. State, 60 | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Hopper v. Evans green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Jess v. State
green
1 sentence2017See, e.g., Riley v. State, 25 So.3d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (granting a new trial after conviction of capital sexual battery due to failure of trial judge to provide a jury instruction on simple battery even though no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty of simple battery); King v. State, 911 So.2d 857 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (granting a new trial for defendant after jury conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer where the trial judge denied request for simple battery instruction after defendant admitted he knew the victim was a law enforcement officer); Brown v. State, 60 | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Cooper v. State green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Riley green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Jenkins v. State green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| McKinney v. State green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Crapps v. State neutral | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Nelson v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Brush v. Palm Beach County green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Abreau green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Richardson v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| James v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Long v. State green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Meek v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Francis v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Wilson v. State green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Carroll v. State neutral | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.