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6 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 2009–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re CLDgreen2 sentences2014The offending conduct must, however, “go beyond speech and mere passive resistance or avoidance, and cross the line into active confrontation, obstruction or other action directed against an officer’s performance in the line of duty.” In re C.L.D., 739 A.2d 353, 357 (D.C.1999) (no APO violation where juvenile ignored police command to stop, mouthed off, and walked away, but did not struggle with officer or physically impede him from carrying out his duties). 2014We are mindful that the statute “plainly seeks to deescalate the potential for violence which exists whenever a police officer encounters an individual in the line of duty.” In re C.L.D., 739 A.2d at 355 . | 2 | 3 |
Fogle v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014To establish the general intent necessary for an APO violation, the government need only show that appellant “intenfded] to commit the proscribed act.” Fogle v. United States, 336 A.2d 833, 835 (D.C. 1975) (citation omitted). 2014To establish the general intent necessary for an APO violation, the government need only show that appellant “intenfded] to commit the proscribed act.” Fogle v. United States, 336 A.2d 833, 835 (D.C. 1975) (citation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
In Re JSgreen2 sentences2015“The District’s APO statute does not criminalize every refusal to submit to a police officer or every prevention or hindrance of an officer in his duties.” Ruffin, supra, 76 A.3d at 850 (quoting In re J.S., 19 A.3d 328 , 331 (D.C. 2011)). 2015“The District’s APO statute does not criminalize every refusal to submit to a police officer or every prevention or hindrance of an officer in his duties.” Ruffin, supra, 76 A.3d at 850 (quoting In re J.S., 19 A.3d 328 , 331 (D.C. 2011)). | 1 | 2 |
Coghill v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2014For example, in Coghill v. United States, 982 A.2d 802, 806 (D.C.2009), we upheld an APO conviction where a motorist resisted officers’ attempts to remove him from his vehicle. | 1 | 1 |
Dickens v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014See Dickens v. United States, 19 A.3d 321, 323 (D.C.2011) (“The relevant language in D.C.Code § 22-405(b) authorizes imprisonment for someone who ‘assaults, resists, opposes, intimidates, or interferes with a law enforcement officer.’ ”), In this case, the trial court based its finding of an APO violation on the theory that Mr. Gayden both “resisted” and “intimidated” Officer Kimball. 2014See Dickens v. United States, 19 A.3d 321, 323 (D.C.2011) (“The relevant language in D.C.Code § 22-405(b) authorizes imprisonment for someone who ‘assaults, resists, opposes, intimidates, or interferes with a law enforcement officer.’ ”), In this case, the trial court based its finding of an APO violation on the theory that Mr. Gayden both “resisted” and “intimidated” Officer Kimball. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ruffin v. United States
green
2 sentences2015“The District’s APO statute does not criminalize every refusal to submit to a police officer or every prevention or hindrance of an officer in his duties.” Ruffin, supra, 76 A.3d at 850 (quoting In re J.S., 19 A.3d 328 , 331 (D.C. 2011)). 2015“The District’s APO statute does not criminalize every refusal to submit to a police officer or every prevention or hindrance of an officer in his duties.” Ruffin, supra, 76 A.3d at 850 (quoting In re J.S., 19 A.3d 328 , 331 (D.C. 2011)). | 2 | 2014–2015 |
Ransom v. United States
green
2 sentences2009Also, Marshall did not wield a gun as he ran, unlike the defendant in Ransom v. United States, 630 A.2d 170 , 174 n. 4 (D.C.1993), from which the fact finder could infer that the suspect not only avoided, but in the words of the statute, actively “intimidate[d]” the officers from pursuing him. 2009Also, Marshall did not wield a gun as he ran, unlike the defendant in Ransom v. United States, 630 A.2d 170 , 174 n. 4 (D.C.1993), from which the fact finder could infer that the suspect not only avoided, but in the words of the statute, actively “intimidate[d]” the officers from pursuing him. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.