defendant makes claim in Florida

2010See also Berghuis v. Thompkins, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 2250 , — L.Ed.2d —, n. 7 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("See, e.g., United States v. Plugh, 576 F.3d 135, 143 (C.A.2 2009) (“Davis only provides guidance ... [when] a defendant makes a claim that he subsequently invoked previously waived Fifth Amendment rights”); United States v. Rodriguez, 518 F.3d 1072, 1074 (C.A.9 2008) (Davis' " 'clear statement' " rule "applies only after the police have already obtained an unambiguous and unequivocal waiver of Miranda rights”); State v. Tuttle, 2002 SD 94, ¶ 14 , 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 ; State v. Hollow

2010See also Berghuis v. Thompkins, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 2250 , — L.Ed.2d —, n. 7 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("See, e.g., United States v. Plugh, 576 F.3d 135, 143 (C.A.2 2009) (“Davis only provides guidance ... [when] a defendant makes a claim that he subsequently invoked previously waived Fifth Amendment rights”); United States v. Rodriguez, 518 F.3d 1072, 1074 (C.A.9 2008) (Davis' " 'clear statement' " rule "applies only after the police have already obtained an unambiguous and unequivocal waiver of Miranda rights”); State v. Tuttle, 2002 SD 94, ¶ 14 , 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 ; State v. Hollow

2010See also Berghuis v. Thompkins, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 2250 , — L.Ed.2d —, n. 7 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("See, e.g., United States v. Plugh, 576 F.3d 135, 143 (C.A.2 2009) (“Davis only provides guidance ... [when] a defendant makes a claim that he subsequently invoked previously waived Fifth Amendment rights”); United States v. Rodriguez, 518 F.3d 1072, 1074 (C.A.9 2008) (Davis' " 'clear statement' " rule "applies only after the police have already obtained an unambiguous and unequivocal waiver of Miranda rights”); State v. Tuttle, 2002 SD 94, ¶ 14 , 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 ; State v. Hollow

2010See also Berghuis v. Thompkins, — U.S. —, 130 S.Ct. 2250 , — L.Ed.2d —, n. 7 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("See, e.g., United States v. Plugh, 576 F.3d 135, 143 (C.A.2 2009) (“Davis only provides guidance ... [when] a defendant makes a claim that he subsequently invoked previously waived Fifth Amendment rights”); United States v. Rodriguez, 518 F.3d 1072, 1074 (C.A.9 2008) (Davis' " 'clear statement' " rule "applies only after the police have already obtained an unambiguous and unequivocal waiver of Miranda rights”); State v. Tuttle, 2002 SD 94, ¶ 14 , 650 N.W.2d 20, 28 ; State v. Hollow

2010P. 3.800(b)(1) (evidentiary hearings are permissible as part of 3.800(b) proceedings); cf. Kablitz v. State, 979 So.2d 969 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (holding that trial court should resolve jail credit claim raised in 3.800(b) motion on remand); Ocasio v. State, 962 So.2d 1025 *638 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (holding that when a defendant makes a claim that he has been improperly denied credit for time served, the trial court must “review the appropriate records and make a determination whether the defendant has received proper credit”).

1985Under these circumstances, we apply the general rule that counsel will be "accorded a wide latitude in making arguments to the jury, and unless their remarks are highly prejudicial and inflammatory, counsel's statements made to the jury will not serve as a basis for reversing a judgment." Metropolitan Dade County v. Dillon, 305 So.2d 36 (Fla.3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 317 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1975).

1985Under these circumstances, we apply the general rule that counsel will be "accorded a wide latitude in making arguments to the jury, and unless their remarks are highly prejudicial and inflammatory, counsel's statements made to the jury will not serve as a basis for reversing a judgment." Metropolitan Dade County v. Dillon, 305 So.2d 36 (Fla.3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 317 So.2d 442 (Fla. 1975).

1983State v. Dodd, 396 So.2d 1205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 419 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1982).

1983State v. Dodd, 396 So.2d 1205 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), aff'd on other grounds, 419 So.2d 333 (Fla. 1982).

1983Such was the situation in Enrique v. State, 408 So.2d 635 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), rev. denied, 418 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 1982), which held, on direct appeal, that waiver of jury trial was not shown to have been knowingly and intelligently made despite the existence of a written waiver.