defendant makes challenge in Illinois

2026We address each argument in turn. ¶ 12 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence ¶ 13 When a defendant makes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985).

2026When a defendant makes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985).

2025He further argues that the circuit court erred in ordering him to pay $450 in restitution, as there was no evidentiary support for that amount. ¶ 28 Sufficiency of the Evidence ¶ 29 When a defendant makes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)

2025ANALYSIS ¶ 19 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence ¶ 20 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of predatory criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, and child pornography. ¶ 21 When a defendant makes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins, 106

2025The State responds that defendant is legally accountable for the hijacking of Threat’s vehicle since he seized her and dragged her away from her SUV and into the van. -8- 1-23-0943 ¶ 27 When a defendant makes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1

2025ANALYSIS ¶ 19 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence ¶ 20 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of predatory criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, and child pornography. ¶ 21 When a defendant makes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “ ‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins, 106

2025App. 3d 325, 329 (1979) (failure to raise the issue that there was insufficient evidence to support the judgment did not preclude review on appeal); People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470 (2005) (“when a defendant makes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, his or her claim is not subject to the waiver rule and may be raised for the first time on direct appeal.”).

2024Here, the issue is the sufficiency of the State’s evidence. “[W]hen a defendant makes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, his or her claim is not subject to the waiver rule and may be raised for the first time on direct appeal.” People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470 (2005) (citing People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 190 (1988)).

2026People v. Saxon, 374 Ill.

2026People v. Saxon, 374 Ill.

2025“Rather, when a defendant makes such a claim, the court should first examine the factual basis of the defendant’s claim.” Id. (citing Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 77-78 ).

2025“Rather, when a defendant makes such a claim, the court should first examine the factual basis of the defendant’s claim.” Id. (citing Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 77-78 ).

2024Accordingly, the issue is not forfeited. 13 ¶ 37 Typically, when considering the sufficiency of the evidence, “the reviewing court must view the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the prosecution.’ ” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

2023“Under this standard, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues of the weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses.” People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431 , (2000). “[T]he reviewing court must allow all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution.” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004).

2020Our supreme court has held that “[w]here *** the death penalty is not involved and the defendant makes no claim of actual innocence, Illinois law prohibits the defendant from raising an issue in a successive postconviction petition unless the defendant can establish a legally cognizable cause for his or her failure to raise that issue in an earlier proceeding and actual prejudice would result if defendant were denied consideration of the claimed error.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Brown, 225 Ill. 2d 188, 206 , 866 N.E.2d 1163, 1173 (2007).

2020Our supreme court has held that “[w]here *** the death penalty is not involved and the defendant makes no claim of actual innocence, Illinois law prohibits the defendant from raising an issue in a successive postconviction petition unless the defendant can establish a legally cognizable cause for his or her failure to raise that issue in an earlier proceeding and actual prejudice would result if defendant were denied consideration of the claimed error.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Brown, 225 Ill. 2d 188, 206 , 866 N.E.2d 1163, 1173 (2007).

2001People v. Johnson , 122 Ill.

2001People v. Johnson, 122 Ill.

2023However, “ ‘we should not make random speculations in favor of the [State].’ ” People v. Petty, 2020 IL App (3d) 180011, ¶ 21 (quoting People v. Dye, 2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 12 ).

2021“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court ‘should draw only reasonable inferences in favor of the [State]; we should not make random speculations in favor of the prosecution.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Petty, 2020 IL App (3d) 180011, ¶ 21 (quoting People v. Dye, 2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 12 ).

2013See Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 330 (“where a defendant sets forth a claim of actual innocence in a successive postconviction petition, the defendant is excused from showing cause -23- and prejudice”).

2013See Ortiz, 235 Ill. 2d at 330 (“where a defendant sets forth a claim of actual innocence in a successive postconviction petition, the defendant is excused from showing cause and prejudice”).

2026App. 3d 322, 325 (2002). ¶ 31 Where a defendant makes a claim of actual innocence, our supreme court has explained a substantial showing of a constitutional violation as follows: “Substantively, in order to succeed on a claim of actual innocence, the defendant must present new, material, noncumulative evidence that is so conclusive it would probably change the result on retrial. [Citation.] New means the evidence was discovered after trial and could not have been discovered earlier through the exercise of due diligence. [Citation.] Material means the evidence is relevant and probative of the p

2024When applying the test, this court was clear that “the fundamental fairness exception applies to claims, not to petitions, and the cause-and-prejudice test must be applied to individual claims, not to the petition as a whole.” Id. at 462 . ¶ 67 Earlier in Washington, 171 Ill. 2d at 489 , in recognizing that there was “footing in the Illinois Constitution for asserting freestanding innocence claims based upon newly discovered evidence under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act,” we stated that “such claims should be resolved as any other brought under the Act.” Therefore, in Coleman, 2013 IL 113307,

2024Here, the issue is the sufficiency of the State’s evidence. “[W]hen a defendant makes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, his or her claim is not subject to the waiver rule and may be raised for the first time on direct appeal.” People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470 (2005) (citing People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 190 (1988)).

2005Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d at 190 .

2018After considering the rationale behind Krankel , we find that a Krankel -like *171 procedure should apply to situations where a defendant makes a claim of unreasonable assistance of postconviction counsel at the third stage of the proceedings. ¶ 26 People v. Krankel , 102 Ill. 2d 181 , 187, 80 Ill.Dec. 62 , 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984), prescribes the following procedure to address a defendant's pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

2018After considering the rationale behind Krankel , we find that a Krankel -like *171 procedure should apply to situations where a defendant makes a claim of unreasonable assistance of postconviction counsel at the third stage of the proceedings. ¶ 26 People v. Krankel , 102 Ill. 2d 181 , 187, 80 Ill.Dec. 62 , 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984), prescribes the following procedure to address a defendant's pro se posttrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

2024To sustain 22 convictions on all four counts, the State must “prove that defendant was 17 years of age or older and committed ‘an act of contact, however slight, between the sex organ or anus of one person and the part of the body of another for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused’ and that the victim was under 13 years of age.” People v. Sauls, 2022 IL 127732, ¶ 53 (quoting 720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2018)). ¶ 40 When a defendant makes a claim that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction, this court reviews the evidence presented a

2023Therefore, we review defendant’s claim on the merits without addressing the plain-error doctrine. ¶ 48 “When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the required elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Sauls, 2022 IL 127732, ¶ 52 .

2023“Under this standard, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues of the weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses.” People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431 , (2000). “[T]he reviewing court must allow all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution.” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004).

2023“Under this standard, a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues of the weight of evidence or the credibility of witnesses.” People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431 (2000).

2018People v. Davis , 233 Ill. 2d 244 , 263, 330 Ill.Dec. 744 , 909 N.E.2d 766 (2009) ("A defendant can (1) intend to kill or do great bodily harm to the victim (intentional murder), (2) know that his acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the victim (knowing murder, also known as strong probability murder), or (3) attempt or commit a forcible felony other than second degree murder (felony murder)." Id. (citing 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 2004) ). ¶ 40 Under the felony murder statute, " '[a] person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree mur

2018People v. Davis , 233 Ill. 2d 244 , 263, 330 Ill.Dec. 744 , 909 N.E.2d 766 (2009) ("A defendant can (1) intend to kill or do great bodily harm to the victim (intentional murder), (2) know that his acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the victim (knowing murder, also known as strong probability murder), or (3) attempt or commit a forcible felony other than second degree murder (felony murder)." Id. (citing 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 2004) ). ¶ 40 Under the felony murder statute, " '[a] person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree mur

2018People v. Davis , 233 Ill. 2d 244 , 263, 330 Ill.Dec. 744 , 909 N.E.2d 766 (2009) ("A defendant can (1) intend to kill or do great bodily harm to the victim (intentional murder), (2) know that his acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the victim (knowing murder, also known as strong probability murder), or (3) attempt or commit a forcible felony other than second degree murder (felony murder)." Id. (citing 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 2004) ). ¶ 40 Under the felony murder statute, " '[a] person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree mur

2018People v. Davis , 233 Ill. 2d 244 , 263, 330 Ill.Dec. 744 , 909 N.E.2d 766 (2009) ("A defendant can (1) intend to kill or do great bodily harm to the victim (intentional murder), (2) know that his acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the victim (knowing murder, also known as strong probability murder), or (3) attempt or commit a forcible felony other than second degree murder (felony murder)." Id. (citing 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 2004) ). ¶ 40 Under the felony murder statute, " '[a] person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree mur

2018In re Dionte J. , 2013 IL App (1st) 110700 , ¶¶ 78-79, 373 Ill.Dec. 350 , 993 N.E.2d 909 (where " 'a defendant makes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, his or her claim is not subject to the waiver rule and may be raised for the first time on direct appeal' " (quoting People v. Woods , 214 Ill. 2d 455 , 470, 293 Ill.Dec. 277 , 828 N.E.2d 247 (2005) ) ). ¶ 38 In this case, defendant was charged with felony murder based on the theory that, in performing the acts which caused Mr. Barrow's death, he was committing aggravated battery with a firearm. ¶ 39 The first degree murder statute

2018In re Dionte J. , 2013 IL App (1st) 110700 , ¶¶ 78-79, 373 Ill.Dec. 350 , 993 N.E.2d 909 (where " 'a defendant makes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, his or her claim is not subject to the waiver rule and may be raised for the first time on direct appeal' " (quoting People v. Woods , 214 Ill. 2d 455 , 470, 293 Ill.Dec. 277 , 828 N.E.2d 247 (2005) ) ). ¶ 38 In this case, defendant was charged with felony murder based on the theory that, in performing the acts which caused Mr. Barrow's death, he was committing aggravated battery with a firearm. ¶ 39 The first degree murder statute

2017People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48 ; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1979).

2017People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48 (discussing U.S. Const., amend.