McNabb-Mallory rule in Florida

1973The impact of Miranda on the McNabb-Mallory doctrine was adumbrated in Pettyjohn v. United States, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 69 , 419 F.2d 651, 655 (1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 1058 , 90 S.Ct. 1383 , 25 L.Ed.2d 676 , in which the court stated: "Appellant's second contention is that after his arrest he was not promptly taken before a United States Commissioner in violation of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as construed by Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 , 77 S.Ct. 1356 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957).

1973The impact of Miranda on the McNabb-Mallory doctrine was adumbrated in Pettyjohn v. United States, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 69 , 419 F.2d 651, 655 (1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 1058 , 90 S.Ct. 1383 , 25 L.Ed.2d 676 , in which the court stated: "Appellant's second contention is that after his arrest he was not promptly taken before a United States Commissioner in violation of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as construed by Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 , 77 S.Ct. 1356 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957).

1970Although the Federal judiciary has failed to implement the caveat expressed in Milton v. Cochran, supra , on the basis the McNabb-Mallory rule is not of constitutional dimensions [see Van Ermen v. Burke, 398 F.2d 329 (7th Cir.1968), Cert. denied 393 U.S. 1004 , 89 S.Ct. 494 , 21 L.Ed.2d 468 ], I fail to envision any sufficient reason why law enforcement authorities should continue to disregard our prior admonishments.

1965See Young v. State, supra, 140 So.2d 97 ; Milton v. Cochran, Fla. 1962, 147 So.2d 137 ; Harris v. State, supra, 162 So.2d 262 ; and Romanello v. State, Fla.App. 1964, 160 So.2d 529 .

1973We recognize that Sections 901.06, 901.23 and 39.03(3) are the statutes invoked by appellee, but, as held by the trial court, they are analogous to and should therefore receive a similar interpretation as is accorded Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a) by the federal courts in Pettyjohn, supra, and O' Neal, supra. The above discussion of the impact of Miranda on the McNabb-Mallory rule and its correlative federal rule 5(a) is made necessary because the trial court rested its order of suppression thereon after holding that Oliver, supra, and Jacobs, supra, *266 adopted that federal principl

1973We recognize that Sections 901.06, 901.23 and 39.03(3) are the statutes invoked by appellee, but, as held by the trial court, they are analogous to and should therefore receive a similar interpretation as is accorded Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a) by the federal courts in Pettyjohn, supra, and O' Neal, supra. The above discussion of the impact of Miranda on the McNabb-Mallory rule and its correlative federal rule 5(a) is made necessary because the trial court rested its order of suppression thereon after holding that Oliver, supra, and Jacobs, supra, *266 adopted that federal principl

1973In support of the latter motion, the defendant asserted that this court in Jacobs v. State, 248 So.2d 515 , and later the Supreme Court in Oliver v. State, 250 So.2d 888 , [both Jacobs and Oliver were decided after the first denial of the motion to suppress], had finally adopted the McNabb-Mallory rule and therefore the confession now must be suppressed since it was made prior to taking the defendant to a committing magistrate, or in the case of this minor defendant, before the juvenile court pursuant to Section 39.03(3), Florida Statutes.

1973In support of the latter motion, the defendant asserted that this court in Jacobs v. State, 248 So.2d 515 , and later the Supreme Court in Oliver v. State, 250 So.2d 888 , [both Jacobs and Oliver were decided after the first denial of the motion to suppress], had finally adopted the McNabb-Mallory rule and therefore the confession now must be suppressed since it was made prior to taking the defendant to a committing magistrate, or in the case of this minor defendant, before the juvenile court pursuant to Section 39.03(3), Florida Statutes.

1973In support of the latter motion, the defendant asserted that this court in Jacobs v. State, 248 So.2d 515 , and later the Supreme Court in Oliver v. State, 250 So.2d 888 , [both Jacobs and Oliver were decided after the first denial of the motion to suppress], had finally adopted the McNabb-Mallory rule and therefore the confession now must be suppressed since it was made prior to taking the defendant to a committing magistrate, or in the case of this minor defendant, before the juvenile court pursuant to Section 39.03(3), Florida Statutes.

1973In support of the latter motion, the defendant asserted that this court in Jacobs v. State, 248 So.2d 515 , and later the Supreme Court in Oliver v. State, 250 So.2d 888 , [both Jacobs and Oliver were decided after the first denial of the motion to suppress], had finally adopted the McNabb-Mallory rule and therefore the confession now must be suppressed since it was made prior to taking the defendant to a committing magistrate, or in the case of this minor defendant, before the juvenile court pursuant to Section 39.03(3), Florida Statutes.

1973Carty v. Purdy, Fla., 240 So.2d 480 , indicated that it was on the verge of adopting the federal McNabb-Mallory rule as the prevailing law of this State.

1973In O'Neal v. United States, 411 F.2d 131 (C.A. 5th 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 827 , 90 S.Ct. 72 , 24 L.Ed.2d 77 , the court said: "Mallory was intended to insure that a suspect not be held for long hours of interrogation during which he had only his own personal stamina with which to resist an overbearing police barrage, and that if he were so intimidated the evidence thus gleaned could not be used at trial.

1973In O'Neal v. United States, 411 F.2d 131 (C.A. 5th 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 827 , 90 S.Ct. 72 , 24 L.Ed.2d 77 , the court said: "Mallory was intended to insure that a suspect not be held for long hours of interrogation during which he had only his own personal stamina with which to resist an overbearing police barrage, and that if he were so intimidated the evidence thus gleaned could not be used at trial.

1973In O'Neal v. United States, 411 F.2d 131 (C.A. 5th 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 827 , 90 S.Ct. 72 , 24 L.Ed.2d 77 , the court said: "Mallory was intended to insure that a suspect not be held for long hours of interrogation during which he had only his own personal stamina with which to resist an overbearing police barrage, and that if he were so intimidated the evidence thus gleaned could not be used at trial.

1973In O'Neal v. United States, 411 F.2d 131 (C.A. 5th 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 827 , 90 S.Ct. 72 , 24 L.Ed.2d 77 , the court said: "Mallory was intended to insure that a suspect not be held for long hours of interrogation during which he had only his own personal stamina with which to resist an overbearing police barrage, and that if he were so intimidated the evidence thus gleaned could not be used at trial.

1973The impact of Miranda on the McNabb-Mallory doctrine was adumbrated in Pettyjohn v. United States, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 69 , 419 F.2d 651, 655 (1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 1058 , 90 S.Ct. 1383 , 25 L.Ed.2d 676 , in which the court stated: "Appellant's second contention is that after his arrest he was not promptly taken before a United States Commissioner in violation of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as construed by Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 , 77 S.Ct. 1356 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957).

1973The impact of Miranda on the McNabb-Mallory doctrine was adumbrated in Pettyjohn v. United States, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 69 , 419 F.2d 651, 655 (1969), cert. denied 397 U.S. 1058 , 90 S.Ct. 1383 , 25 L.Ed.2d 676 , in which the court stated: "Appellant's second contention is that after his arrest he was not promptly taken before a United States Commissioner in violation of Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as construed by Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 , 77 S.Ct. 1356 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 (1957).

1973This conclusion seems to have been reached by the Third District Court of Appeal in the case of `In the Interest of A.J.A., a child, 248 So.2d 690 '." The prosecution contends that the interpretation given the McNabb-Mallory rule by the court below is erroneous.

1970Although the Federal judiciary has failed to implement the caveat expressed in Milton v. Cochran, supra , on the basis the McNabb-Mallory rule is not of constitutional dimensions [see Van Ermen v. Burke, 398 F.2d 329 (7th Cir.1968), Cert. denied 393 U.S. 1004 , 89 S.Ct. 494 , 21 L.Ed.2d 468 ], I fail to envision any sufficient reason why law enforcement authorities should continue to disregard our prior admonishments.

1970Although the Federal judiciary has failed to implement the caveat expressed in Milton v. Cochran, supra , on the basis the McNabb-Mallory rule is not of constitutional dimensions [see Van Ermen v. Burke, 398 F.2d 329 (7th Cir.1968), Cert. denied 393 U.S. 1004 , 89 S.Ct. 494 , 21 L.Ed.2d 468 ], I fail to envision any sufficient reason why law enforcement authorities should continue to disregard our prior admonishments.

1965See Young v. State, supra, 140 So.2d 97 ; Milton v. Cochran, Fla. 1962, 147 So.2d 137 ; Harris v. State, supra, 162 So.2d 262 ; and Romanello v. State, Fla.App. 1964, 160 So.2d 529 .

1965See Young v. State, supra, 140 So.2d 97 ; Milton v. Cochran, Fla. 1962, 147 So.2d 137 ; Harris v. State, supra, 162 So.2d 262 ; and Romanello v. State, Fla.App. 1964, 160 So.2d 529 .

1965The federal rule respecting the impact on the admissibility of an extra-judicial confession of an unreasonable delay in presenting one suspected of a crime to a committing magistrate — the so-called McNabb-Mallory rule, see McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 , 63 S.Ct. 608 , 87 L.Ed. 819 , and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 , 77 S.Ct. 1356 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 — was not intended to apply to state-court prosecutions as a "due process" requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 , 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 , and has not been adopted in this st

1965The federal rule respecting the impact on the admissibility of an extra-judicial confession of an unreasonable delay in presenting one suspected of a crime to a committing magistrate — the so-called McNabb-Mallory rule, see McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 , 63 S.Ct. 608 , 87 L.Ed. 819 , and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 , 77 S.Ct. 1356 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 — was not intended to apply to state-court prosecutions as a "due process" requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 , 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 , and has not been adopted in this st

1965The federal rule respecting the impact on the admissibility of an extra-judicial confession of an unreasonable delay in presenting one suspected of a crime to a committing magistrate — the so-called McNabb-Mallory rule, see McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 , 63 S.Ct. 608 , 87 L.Ed. 819 , and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 , 77 S.Ct. 1356 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 — was not intended to apply to state-court prosecutions as a "due process" requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 , 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 , and has not been adopted in this st

1965The federal rule respecting the impact on the admissibility of an extra-judicial confession of an unreasonable delay in presenting one suspected of a crime to a committing magistrate — the so-called McNabb-Mallory rule, see McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 , 63 S.Ct. 608 , 87 L.Ed. 819 , and Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 , 77 S.Ct. 1356 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1479 — was not intended to apply to state-court prosecutions as a "due process" requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 , 81 S.Ct. 1860 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 , and has not been adopted in this st

1965See Young v. State, supra, 140 So.2d 97 ; Milton v. Cochran, Fla. 1962, 147 So.2d 137 ; Harris v. State, supra, 162 So.2d 262 ; and Romanello v. State, Fla.App. 1964, 160 So.2d 529 .

1965See Young v. State, supra, 140 So.2d 97 ; Milton v. Cochran, Fla. 1962, 147 So.2d 137 ; Harris v. State, supra, 162 So.2d 262 ; and Romanello v. State, Fla.App. 1964, 160 So.2d 529 .

1962United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 , 64 S.Ct. 896 , 88 L.Ed. 1140 .

1962United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65 , 64 S.Ct. 896 , 88 L.Ed. 1140 .

1962We announced this position as recently as Leach and Smith v. State, Fla. 1961, 132 So.2d 329 .

1962We announced this position as recently as Leach and Smith v. State, Fla. 1961, 132 So.2d 329 .

1962Our research of the decisions subsequent to the cited annotation fails to reveal any state or federal court, with the exception of the Michigan Supreme Court, People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410 , 102 N.W.2d 738 , which has held the McNabb-Mallory requirement applicable to state extra-judicial confessions.

1962Our research of the decisions subsequent to the cited annotation fails to reveal any state or federal court, with the exception of the Michigan Supreme Court, People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410 , 102 N.W.2d 738 , which has held the McNabb-Mallory requirement applicable to state extra-judicial confessions.

1961Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, Sections 4.001 and 4.002; Crooker v. People of State of California, 357 U.S. 433 , 77 S.Ct. 1287 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1448 .

1961Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, Sections 4.001 and 4.002; Crooker v. People of State of California, 357 U.S. 433 , 77 S.Ct. 1287 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1448 .