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6 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Combs v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See also Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93, 95 (Fla.1983) (holding that, when considering common law certiorari, appellate courts reviewing orders of circuit courts acting in their appellate capacity should be primarily concerned with the seriousness of the error, not the mere existence of error, and should exercise cer-tiorari discretion only when there has been a violation of clearly established principles of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice). “[District courts should use this discretion cautiously so as to avert the possibility of common-law certiorari being used as a vehicle to obtain 2011See also Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93, 95 (Fla.1983) (holding that, when considering common law certiorari, appellate courts reviewing orders of circuit courts acting in their appellate capacity should be primarily concerned with the seriousness of the error, not the mere existence of error, and should exercise cer-tiorari discretion only when there has been a violation of clearly established principles of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice). “[District courts should use this discretion cautiously so as to avert the possibility of common-law certiorari being used as a vehicle to obtain | 4 | 4 |
Haines City Community Dev. v. Heggsgreen2 sentences2004In this context, “applied the correct law” is synonymous with “observing the essential requirements of law.” See Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 530 (Fla.1995). 2000See Heggs, 658 So.2d at 528 ; see also Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93, 95 (Fla.1983) (holding that in considering common law certiorari, district courts of appeal should be primarily concerned with the seriousness of the error, not the mere existence of error, and should exercise certiorari discretion only when there has been a violation of clearly established principles of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice); Martin County v. City of Stuart, 736 So.2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding that when a district court of appeal reviews by certiorari the decision of a three-judge panel of | 2 | 2 |
Martin County v. City of Stuartgreen2 sentences2004See Heggs, 658 So.2d at 528; see also Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93, 95 (Fla.1983)(holding that in considering common law certiorari, district courts of appeal should be primarily concerned with the seriousness of the error, not the mere existence of error, and should exercise certiorari discretion only when there has been a violation of clearly established principles of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice); Martin County v. City of Stuart, 736 So.2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(holding that when a district court of appeal reviews by certiorari the decision of a three-judge panel of the 2000See Heggs, 658 So.2d at 528 ; see also Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93, 95 (Fla.1983) (holding that in considering common law certiorari, district courts of appeal should be primarily concerned with the seriousness of the error, not the mere existence of error, and should exercise certiorari discretion only when there has been a violation of clearly established principles of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice); Martin County v. City of Stuart, 736 So.2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (holding that when a district court of appeal reviews by certiorari the decision of a three-judge panel of | 2 | 2 |
Ivey v. Allstate Ins. Co.green2 sentences2016See Ivey, 774 So. 2d at 682 (quoting Combs v. State, 436 So. 2d 93, 95 (Fla. 1983)). 2003Ivey, 774 So.2d at 682 . | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences2008Under the circumstances of this case, the failure in this regard does not comport with the definition of waiver, i.e., "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). *156 Additionally, we conclude that the mere existence of rule 3.190(j) does not provide defendants with a "prior opportunity" for cross-examination, as explained in Crawford . 2008Under the circumstances of this case, the failure in this regard does not comport with the definition of waiver, i.e., "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). *156 Additionally, we conclude that the mere existence of rule 3.190(j) does not provide defendants with a "prior opportunity" for cross-examination, as explained in Crawford . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Barber v. Page
green
2 sentences2008Under the circumstances of this case, the failure in this regard does not comport with the definition of waiver, i.e., "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). *156 Additionally, we conclude that the mere existence of rule 3.190(j) does not provide defendants with a "prior opportunity" for cross-examination, as explained in Crawford . 2008Under the circumstances of this case, the failure in this regard does not comport with the definition of waiver, i.e., "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 , 88 S.Ct. 1318 , 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). *156 Additionally, we conclude that the mere existence of rule 3.190(j) does not provide defendants with a "prior opportunity" for cross-examination, as explained in Crawford . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.