Addressing defendant in New York

2013Addressing defendant’s claims directed at the jury’s verdict, upon review of the evidence adduced at trial we conclude that it was supported by legally sufficient evidence and was not contrary to the weight of credible evidence (see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).

2013Addressing defendant’s claims directed at the jury’s verdict, upon review of the evidence adduced at trial we conclude that it was supported by legally sufficient evidence and was not contrary to the weight of credible evidence (see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).

2013Notably, we find that the narrow exception to the preservation rule is inapplicable, inasmuch as defendant did not make any statements during the plea colloquy that cast doubt upon his guilt or called into question the voluntariness of his plea (see People v Lopez, 71 NY2d 662, 666-667 [1988]; People v Ladieu, 105 AD3d at 1266; People v Leone, 105 AD3d at 1250; People v Revette, 102 AD3d at 1066 ).

2013Notably, we find that the narrow exception to the preservation rule is inapplicable, inasmuch as defendant did not make any statements during the plea colloquy that cast doubt upon his guilt or called into question the voluntariness of his plea (see People v Lopez, 71 NY2d 662, 666-667 [1988]; People v Ladieu, 105 AD3d at 1266; People v Leone, 105 AD3d at 1250; People v Revette, 102 AD3d at 1066 ).

2012In support of her motion, defendant contended that her indelible right to counsel attached on September 12, 2005, when the police contacted her attorney regarding the investigation of her second husband’s death, and thus that the police were prohibited from questioning her without counsel on September 7, 2007 (see People v Grice, 100 NY2d 318, 323 [2003]; People v Arthur, 22 NY2d 325, 329 [1968]).

2012In support of her motion, defendant contended that her indelible right to counsel attached on September 12, 2005, when the police contacted her attorney regarding the investigation of her second husband’s death, and thus that the police were prohibited from questioning her without counsel on September 7, 2007 (see People v Grice, 100 NY2d 318, 323 [2003]; People v Arthur, 22 NY2d 325, 329 [1968]).

2012In support of her motion, defendant contended that her indelible right to counsel attached on September 12, 2005, when the police contacted her attorney regarding the investigation of her second husband’s death, and thus that the police were prohibited from questioning her without counsel on September 7, 2007 (see People v Grice, 100 NY2d 318, 323 [2003]; People v Arthur, 22 NY2d 325, 329 [1968]).

2012In support of her motion, defendant contended that her indelible right to counsel attached on September 12, 2005, when the police contacted her attorney regarding the investigation of her second husband’s death, and thus that the police were prohibited from questioning her without counsel on September 7, 2007 (see People v Grice, 100 NY2d 318, 323 [2003]; People v Arthur, 22 NY2d 325, 329 [1968]).

2003“Where a single, substantial error by counsel so seriously compromises a defendant’s right to a fair trial, it will quality as ineffective representation” (People v Hobot, 84 NY2d 1021, 1022 [1995] [citations omitted]; see People v Flores, 84 NY2d 184, 188 [1994]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 146-147 [1981]).

1996Addressing defendant’s ineffective assistance argument based upon his counsel’s failure to include Heyden in the first alibi notice, we do not find such failure, or others noted by defendant, to rise to the level of ineffective assistance (see, People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137 ; see also, People v Flores, 84 NY2d 184 ; People v Parker, 220 AD2d 815 , lv denied 87 NY2d 1023 ) since such notice included numerous witnesses who were to testify similarly (cf., People v Rojas, 213 AD2d 56 , lv denied 87 NY2d 907 ) and no conduct of counsel precluded the presentation of an alibi defense (see, People v Bar

2015Plaintiff now appeals from both the order partially granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the judgment. 2 Addressing defendant’s motion for summary judgment first, whether an alleged tortfeasor owed a duty of care to a plaintiff is a threshold determination (see Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136, 138 [2002]; Sciscente v Lill Overhead Doors, Inc., 78 AD3d 1300, 1301 [2010]; Seymour v David W.

2015Plaintiff now appeals from both the order partially granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the judgment. 2 Addressing defendant’s motion for summary judgment first, whether an alleged tortfeasor owed a duty of care to a plaintiff is a threshold determination (see Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136, 138 [2002]; Sciscente v Lill Overhead Doors, Inc., 78 AD3d 1300, 1301 [2010]; Seymour v David W.

2015Plaintiff now appeals from both the order partially granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the judgment. 2 Addressing defendant’s motion for summary judgment first, whether an alleged tortfeasor owed a duty of care to a plaintiff is a threshold determination (see Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136, 138 [2002]; Sciscente v Lill Overhead Doors, Inc., 78 AD3d 1300, 1301 [2010]; Seymour v David W.

2015Plaintiff now appeals from both the order partially granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the judgment. 2 Addressing defendant’s motion for summary judgment first, whether an alleged tortfeasor owed a duty of care to a plaintiff is a threshold determination (see Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136, 138 [2002]; Sciscente v Lill Overhead Doors, Inc., 78 AD3d 1300, 1301 [2010]; Seymour v David W.

2015Mapes, Inc., 22 AD3d 1012, 1013 [2005]).

2015Mapes, Inc., 22 AD3d 1012, 1013 [2005]).

2014Defendant’s assertion that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated by the admission of an out-of-court statement made by the victims’ neighbor is unpreserved (see People v Kello, 96 NY2d 740, 744 [2001]; People v Snyder, 91 AD3d 1206, 1213 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 968 [2012], cert denied 568 US —, 133 S Ct 791 [2012]; People v Wright, 81 AD3d 1161, 1164-1165 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 803 [2011]).

2014Defendant’s assertion that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated by the admission of an out-of-court statement made by the victims’ neighbor is unpreserved (see People v Kello, 96 NY2d 740, 744 [2001]; People v Snyder, 91 AD3d 1206, 1213 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 968 [2012], cert denied 568 US —, 133 S Ct 791 [2012]; People v Wright, 81 AD3d 1161, 1164-1165 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 803 [2011]).

2014Defendant’s assertion that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated by the admission of an out-of-court statement made by the victims’ neighbor is unpreserved (see People v Kello, 96 NY2d 740, 744 [2001]; People v Snyder, 91 AD3d 1206, 1213 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 968 [2012], cert denied 568 US —, 133 S Ct 791 [2012]; People v Wright, 81 AD3d 1161, 1164-1165 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 803 [2011]).

2014Defendant’s assertion that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated by the admission of an out-of-court statement made by the victims’ neighbor is unpreserved (see People v Kello, 96 NY2d 740, 744 [2001]; People v Snyder, 91 AD3d 1206, 1213 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 968 [2012], cert denied 568 US —, 133 S Ct 791 [2012]; People v Wright, 81 AD3d 1161, 1164-1165 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 803 [2011]).

2014Defendant’s assertion that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated by the admission of an out-of-court statement made by the victims’ neighbor is unpreserved (see People v Kello, 96 NY2d 740, 744 [2001]; People v Snyder, 91 AD3d 1206, 1213 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 968 [2012], cert denied 568 US —, 133 S Ct 791 [2012]; People v Wright, 81 AD3d 1161, 1164-1165 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 803 [2011]).

2014Defendant’s assertion that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated by the admission of an out-of-court statement made by the victims’ neighbor is unpreserved (see People v Kello, 96 NY2d 740, 744 [2001]; People v Snyder, 91 AD3d 1206, 1213 [2012], lv denied 19 NY3d 968 [2012], cert denied 568 US —, 133 S Ct 791 [2012]; People v Wright, 81 AD3d 1161, 1164-1165 [2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 803 [2011]).

2014Addressing defendant’s evidentiary challenges, Supreme Court properly permitted the People to introduce the large quantity of coins that had been found on defendant at the time of his apprehension, as this evidence was relevant to the issue of defendant’s intent and its probative value outweighed any potential for prejudice (see People v Alfaro, 19 NY3d 1075, 1076 [2012]; People v Edwards, 43 AD3d 1175 , 1175 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 810 [2008]; People v Medina, 37 AD3d 240, 242 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 847 [2007]; see generally People v Scarola, 71 NY2d 769, 777 [1988]).

2014Addressing defendant’s evidentiary challenges, Supreme Court properly permitted the People to introduce the large quantity of coins that had been found on defendant at the time of his apprehension, as this evidence was relevant to the issue of defendant’s intent and its probative value outweighed any potential for prejudice (see People v Alfaro, 19 NY3d 1075, 1076 [2012]; People v Edwards, 43 AD3d 1175 , 1175 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 810 [2008]; People v Medina, 37 AD3d 240, 242 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 847 [2007]; see generally People v Scarola, 71 NY2d 769, 777 [1988]).

2014Addressing defendant’s evidentiary challenges, Supreme Court properly permitted the People to introduce the large quantity of coins that had been found on defendant at the time of his apprehension, as this evidence was relevant to the issue of defendant’s intent and its probative value outweighed any potential for prejudice (see People v Alfaro, 19 NY3d 1075, 1076 [2012]; People v Edwards, 43 AD3d 1175 , 1175 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 810 [2008]; People v Medina, 37 AD3d 240, 242 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 847 [2007]; see generally People v Scarola, 71 NY2d 769, 777 [1988]).

2014Addressing defendant’s evidentiary challenges, Supreme Court properly permitted the People to introduce the large quantity of coins that had been found on defendant at the time of his apprehension, as this evidence was relevant to the issue of defendant’s intent and its probative value outweighed any potential for prejudice (see People v Alfaro, 19 NY3d 1075, 1076 [2012]; People v Edwards, 43 AD3d 1175 , 1175 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 810 [2008]; People v Medina, 37 AD3d 240, 242 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 847 [2007]; see generally People v Scarola, 71 NY2d 769, 777 [1988]).

2014Addressing defendant’s evidentiary challenges, Supreme Court properly permitted the People to introduce the large quantity of coins that had been found on defendant at the time of his apprehension, as this evidence was relevant to the issue of defendant’s intent and its probative value outweighed any potential for prejudice (see People v Alfaro, 19 NY3d 1075, 1076 [2012]; People v Edwards, 43 AD3d 1175 , 1175 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 810 [2008]; People v Medina, 37 AD3d 240, 242 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 847 [2007]; see generally People v Scarola, 71 NY2d 769, 777 [1988]).

2014Addressing defendant’s evidentiary challenges, Supreme Court properly permitted the People to introduce the large quantity of coins that had been found on defendant at the time of his apprehension, as this evidence was relevant to the issue of defendant’s intent and its probative value outweighed any potential for prejudice (see People v Alfaro, 19 NY3d 1075, 1076 [2012]; People v Edwards, 43 AD3d 1175 , 1175 [2007], lv denied 10 NY3d 810 [2008]; People v Medina, 37 AD3d 240, 242 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 847 [2007]; see generally People v Scarola, 71 NY2d 769, 777 [1988]).

2013To establish defendant’s guilt of attempted murder in the second degree, the People were required to prove that defendant, acting with intent to cause the death of another, engaged in conduct which tended to effect the commission of that crime (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 125.25 [1]; People v Molina, 79 AD3d 1371, 1375 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 861 [2011]).

2013To establish defendant’s guilt of attempted murder in the second degree, the People were required to prove that defendant, acting with intent to cause the death of another, engaged in conduct which tended to effect the commission of that crime (see Penal Law §§ 110.00, 125.25 [1]; People v Molina, 79 AD3d 1371, 1375 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 861 [2011]).

2013Addressing defendant’s challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea, it is unpreserved because the record fails to indicate that he moved to withdraw his plea or vacate the judgment of conviction (see People v Ladieu, 105 AD3d at 1266 ; People v Leone, 105 AD3d 1249, 1250 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1017 [2013]; People v Revette, 102 AD3d 1065, 1065-1066 [2013]).

2013Addressing defendant’s challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea, it is unpreserved because the record fails to indicate that he moved to withdraw his plea or vacate the judgment of conviction (see People v Ladieu, 105 AD3d at 1266 ; People v Leone, 105 AD3d 1249, 1250 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1017 [2013]; People v Revette, 102 AD3d 1065, 1065-1066 [2013]).

2013Addressing defendant’s challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea, it is unpreserved because the record fails to indicate that he moved to withdraw his plea or vacate the judgment of conviction (see People v Ladieu, 105 AD3d at 1266 ; People v Leone, 105 AD3d 1249, 1250 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1017 [2013]; People v Revette, 102 AD3d 1065, 1065-1066 [2013]).

2013Addressing defendant’s challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea, it is unpreserved because the record fails to indicate that he moved to withdraw his plea or vacate the judgment of conviction (see People v Ladieu, 105 AD3d at 1266 ; People v Leone, 105 AD3d 1249, 1250 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1017 [2013]; People v Revette, 102 AD3d 1065, 1065-1066 [2013]).

2013Addressing defendant’s challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea, it is unpreserved because the record fails to indicate that he moved to withdraw his plea or vacate the judgment of conviction (see People v Ladieu, 105 AD3d at 1266 ; People v Leone, 105 AD3d 1249, 1250 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1017 [2013]; People v Revette, 102 AD3d 1065, 1065-1066 [2013]).

2013Addressing defendant’s challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea, it is unpreserved because the record fails to indicate that he moved to withdraw his plea or vacate the judgment of conviction (see People v Ladieu, 105 AD3d at 1266 ; People v Leone, 105 AD3d 1249, 1250 [2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1017 [2013]; People v Revette, 102 AD3d 1065, 1065-1066 [2013]).

2003“Where a single, substantial error by counsel so seriously compromises a defendant’s right to a fair trial, it will quality as ineffective representation” (People v Hobot, 84 NY2d 1021, 1022 [1995] [citations omitted]; see People v Flores, 84 NY2d 184, 188 [1994]; People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137, 146-147 [1981]).

1996Addressing defendant’s ineffective assistance argument based upon his counsel’s failure to include Heyden in the first alibi notice, we do not find such failure, or others noted by defendant, to rise to the level of ineffective assistance (see, People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137 ; see also, People v Flores, 84 NY2d 184 ; People v Parker, 220 AD2d 815 , lv denied 87 NY2d 1023 ) since such notice included numerous witnesses who were to testify similarly (cf., People v Rojas, 213 AD2d 56 , lv denied 87 NY2d 907 ) and no conduct of counsel precluded the presentation of an alibi defense (see, People v Bar

1995Addressing defendant’s contention that County Court erred by refusing to charge unlawful imprisonment in the first degree (see, Penal Law § 135.10) as a lesser included offense of the crime of kidnapping in the second degree, we find that defen dant failed to satisfy the second prong of the two-pronged test enunciated in People v Glover ( 57 NY2d 61, 63 ; see, People v Heide, 84 NY2d 943 ), i.e., that a reasonable view of the evidence supports defendant’s claim that he committed the lesser but not the greater offense.

1995Addressing defendant’s next contention that County Court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of criminal trespass in the second degree (Penal Law § 140.15), we note that such charge must only be given if the defendant can show both that the greater crime cannot be completed without the concomitant commission of the lesser included crime and that there is a reasonable view of the evidence which would support the commission of the lesser offense but not the greater (see, People v Heide, 84 NY2d 943, 944 ; People v Glover, 57 NY2d 61, 63 ).

2026Addressing defendant's preserved legal sufficiency arguments, we conclude that, when viewing the foregoing evidence in the light most favorable to the People, there is a "valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences" from which the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of the kidnapping and weapon possession charges ( People v James , 245 AD3d 1102 , 1104 [3d Dept 2026] [internal quotation marks, citations and brackets omitted], lv denied 45 NY3d 946 [2026]; see People v Bender , ___ NY3d ___, ___, 2026 NY Slip Op 01444, *1 [Mar. 17, 2026]).

2025Addressing defendant's contentions concerning the sufficiency of the trial evidence on the issue of causation, it is well established that, in cases involving exposure to asbestos or other toxins, " 'an opinion on causation should set forth a plaintiff's exposure to a toxin, that the toxin is capable of causing the particular illness (general causation) and that plaintiff was exposed to sufficient levels of the toxin to cause the illness (specific causation)' " ( Nemeth v Brenntag N. Am. , 38 NY3d 336 , 342-343 [2022], quoting Parker v Mobil Oil Corp. , 7 NY3d 434, 448 [2006], rearg denied 8 N

2025Addressing defendant's contentions concerning the sufficiency of the trial evidence on the issue of causation, it is well established that, in cases involving exposure to asbestos or other toxins, " 'an opinion on causation should set forth a plaintiff's exposure to a toxin, that the toxin is capable of causing the particular illness (general causation) and that plaintiff was exposed to sufficient levels of the toxin to cause the illness (specific causation)' " ( Nemeth v Brenntag N. Am. , 38 NY3d 336 , 342-343 [2022], quoting Parker v Mobil Oil Corp. , 7 NY3d 434, 448 [2006], rearg denied 8 N

2022Addressing defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence on the convictions for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, this Court must evaluate "whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, provides any valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences which could lead a rational person to the conclusion reached by the [factfinder] on the basis of the evidence at trial and as a matter of law satisfy the proof and burden requirements for every element of the crimes charged" ( People v Sanon , 179 AD3d 1151, 1152 [2020] [internal quotat

2019In addition, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury ( see People v Danielson , 9 NY3d 342, 349 [2007]), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence ( see generally People v Bleakley , 69 NY2d 490, 495 [1987]).

2019Addressing defendant's contentions in his main brief first, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction inasmuch as there is a "valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences that could lead a rational person to conclude that every element of the charged crime has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt" ( People v Delamota , 18 NY3d 107, 113 [2011]).