Addressing defendant in Illinois

2015People v. Guzman, 2011 IL App (3d) 090464 .

2015People v. Guzman, 2011 IL App (3d) 090464 .

2011Defendant acknowledged that his sixth amendment claim had not been raised in the trial court but asked the appellate court to review the claim for plain error. ¶ 160 Addressing defendant's claim for plain error, the appellate court held, as a matter of "first impression in Illinois" ( 395 Ill.App.3d 797, 810 , 334 Ill.Dec. 943 , 917 N.E.2d 1018 ), that once adversarial criminal proceedings have commenced, a general policy of prohibiting defense attorneys from observing the moment of identification at a lineup violates the accused's sixth amendment right to counsel.

2011Defendant acknowledged that his sixth amendment claim had not been raised in the trial court but asked the appellate court to review the claim for plain error. ¶ 160 Addressing defendant's claim for plain error, the appellate court held, as a matter of "first impression in Illinois" ( 395 Ill.App.3d 797, 810 , 334 Ill.Dec. 943 , 917 N.E.2d 1018 ), that once adversarial criminal proceedings have commenced, a general policy of prohibiting defense attorneys from observing the moment of identification at a lineup violates the accused's sixth amendment right to counsel.

2007Addressing defendant’s constitutional challenge to the definition of a sex offense as applied in this case, the appellate court first determined that the aggravated kidnapping of the granddaughter was “not sexually motivated and had no sexual purpose.” 363 Ill.

2007Addressing defendant's constitutional challenge to the definition of a sex offense as applied in this case, the appellate court first determined that the aggravated kidnapping of the granddaughter was "not sexually motivated and had no sexual purpose." 363 Ill.App.3d 356, 363 , 300 Ill.Dec. 176 , 843 N.E.2d 434 .

1997Defendant argues through counsel and in his pro se brief that the trial court violated his absolute constitutional right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 45 L.

1997Defendant argues through counsel and in his pro se brief that the trial court violated his absolute constitutional right to self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 45 L.

2026“Testimony may be found insufficient under the Jackson standard, but only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). “[T]he weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses is strictly within the competence of the fact finder.” People v. Ellis, 74 Ill. 2d 489, 496 (1978) (citing People v. Orlando, 380 Ill. 107, 119 (1942); People v. Novotny, 41 Ill. 2d 401, 412 (1968); People v. Yarbrough, 67 Ill. 2d 222, 227 (1977)). ¶ 20 Addressing defendant’s argument, we find th

2026“Testimony may be found insufficient under the Jackson standard, but only where the record evidence compels the conclusion that no reasonable person could accept it beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). “[T]he weight of the evidence and credibility of witnesses is strictly within the competence of the fact finder.” People v. Ellis, 74 Ill. 2d 489, 496 (1978) (citing People v. Orlando, 380 Ill. 107, 119 (1942); People v. Novotny, 41 Ill. 2d 401, 412 (1968); People v. Yarbrough, 67 Ill. 2d 222, 227 (1977)). ¶ 20 Addressing defendant’s argument, we find th

2025Did your attorney explain to you what a jury trial is?” and “Did he explain to you that by signing this document, you give up your right to a jury trial in this case?” Finally, the trial court asked, “Is that your signature on the bottom?” After Buschauer answered each question in the affirmative, the trial court finished: “And you do not wish to have a jury trial; is that correct?” Only after this exchange did the trial court accept Buschauer’s jury waiver. ¶ 32 Caselaw is consistent that no set of specific admonishments exists that the trial court must provide before accepting a waiver. “[E]

2024Evans, 174 Ill. 2d at 326 .

2023Addressing defendant’s proportionate penalties claim, the court, citing People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010 , 183 N.E.3d 715 , noted “the State accurately points out that [p]roportionate [p]enalt[ies] claims existed well before -5- Miller and that the timing of the Miller decision does not serve as ‘cause’ for failure to raise such claims in an initial Petition.” The court also held defendant could not establish the requisite cause in relation to his eighth amendment challenge, as “he had the youth studies at his disposal at resentencing and on appeal” and “could have raised those claims in his i

2023Addressing defendant’s proportionate penalties claim, the court, citing People v. Dorsey, 2021 IL 123010 , 183 N.E.3d 715 , noted “the State accurately points out that [p]roportionate [p]enalt[ies] claims existed well before -5- Miller and that the timing of the Miller decision does not serve as ‘cause’ for failure to raise such claims in an initial Petition.” The court also held defendant could not establish the requisite cause in relation to his eighth amendment challenge, as “he had the youth studies at his disposal at resentencing and on appeal” and “could have raised those claims in his i

2023Id. (citing Brown, 2017 IL 121681, ¶¶ 35-36 ). ¶ 33 Addressing defendant’s argument on appeal, we first note counsel misrepresented the law to defendant.

2023Id. (citing Brown, 2017 IL 121681, ¶¶ 35-36 ). ¶ 33 Addressing defendant’s argument on appeal, we first note counsel misrepresented the law to defendant.

2022In accepting the plea, the trial court asserted that “the fines and costs that follows [sic] all reduced to judgment.” Addressing defendant, the court listed the fines and costs, reiterated “that is all reduced to judgment,” and said, “[S]o you are all clear.” The court’s written order and 2022 IL App (2d) 210079 other documents in the record indicate that $1308 in costs and fines were imposed.

2017Addressing defendants' as-applied challenge under the first amendment, the court applied intermediate scrutiny, traditionally applicable to content-neutral regulations, and determined that defendants' first amendment rights were not violated. 2015 IL App (1st) 122858-B , ¶¶ 28-48, 399 Ill.Dec. 707 , 46 N.E.3d 1207 . ¶ 22 Turning to defendants' claims under the Illinois Constitution, the appellate court explained that its "review of the 1970 Illinois Constitution debates and convention supports the conclusion that the framers intended for article I, section 5 to extend a broader right of assemb

2015Addressing defendant’s arguments, the trial court reviewed the language of counts VII and XIV and concluded that they were “basically of the same physical act.” It then said that, when it rendered its original ruling on counts VII and XIV, it - 20 - 2015 IL App (2d) 130521 “didn’t think through that at the time,” referring to the fact that the convictions were based on the same physical act.

2005Addressing defendant's claim that she did not expect Jessica to open the envelope, the majority recites several facts of the case and then states: "As the trial court aptly concluded, under these circumstances, defendant `[ran] the risk * * * that [Jessica] may open it.' * * * Thus, any claim by defendant that she only intended Richard to see the photographs rings hollow." 215 Ill.2d at 331 , 294 Ill.Dec. at 152 , 830 N.E.2d at 564 .

2005Addressing defendant's claim that she did not expect Jessica to open the envelope, the majority recites several facts of the case and then states: "As the trial court aptly concluded, under these circumstances, defendant `[ran] the risk * * * that [Jessica] may open it.' * * * Thus, any claim by defendant that she only intended Richard to see the photographs rings hollow." 215 Ill.2d at 331 , 294 Ill.Dec. at 152 , 830 N.E.2d at 564 .

2000Addressing defendant’s motion, the trial court stated that “there could be some prejudice to the defendant because *** some of the defendants [Rodriguez] are already out.” In denying the motion, the court, however, followed the reasoning in Matthews v. Donnelly, 265 Ill.

2000App. 3d 1016, 1020-21 , 639 N.E.2d 193 (1994), which held that the trial court erred in considering the plaintiffs diligence, or lack thereof, in serving the defendant with the summons and complaint prior to the running of the applicable statute of limitations when deciding whether to dismiss the complaint with prejudice.

1990Addressing defendant’s former contention, the Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Reddick (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 184 , 526 N.E.2d 141 , found the IPI instructions on murder and voluntary manslaughter incorrectly set forth the State’s burden of proof regarding the mental states necessary to reduce a murder charge to manslaughter.

1990Addressing defendant’s former contention, the Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Reddick (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 184 , 526 N.E.2d 141 , found the IPI instructions on murder and voluntary manslaughter incorrectly set forth the State’s burden of proof regarding the mental states necessary to reduce a murder charge to manslaughter.

1989App. 3d 825, 830 , 331 N.E.2d 311, 314-15 ; People v. Vasquez (1972), 8 Ill.

1989App.3d 825, 830 , 331 N.E.2d 311, 314-15 ; People v. Vasquez (1972), 8 Ill.

1989Addressing defendants’ claim that the prosecutor improperly tried to align himself with the jurors, it is true that although a prosecutor is given great latitude in his closing argument, he may not invade the province of the jury or act as a “thirteenth juror.” (See People v. Martin (1975), 29 Ill.

1989Addressing defendants' claim that the prosecutor improperly tried to align himself with the jurors, it is true that although a prosecutor is given great latitude in his closing argument, he may not invade the province of the jury or act as a "thirteenth juror." (See People v. Martin (1975), 29 Ill.

1989App. 3d 333 , 398 N.E.2d 837 .) Addressing defendant’s contentions as to these elements, we commence with plaintiff’s proof as to his reasonable expectancy of entering into a valid business relationship.

1986(People v. Tyson (1985), 137 Ill.