Addressing defendant in California

2024Code, § 11377, subd. (a)), and multiple convictions of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). 3 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 . 4 sir, but it is rare that you see somebody with this many crimes committed in a single charging document.” The court struck the incarceration fees and the prison prior, and it reduced the upper-term sentences to middle-term sentences, which resulted in a reduced aggregate term of 37 years in state prison.

2024If it is easier to dispose of 13 an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be followed.” (Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 .) We find it more expeditious here to proceed directly to an analysis of prejudice.

2024Citing to People v. Robinson (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 363 (Robinson) defendant asserts the absence of a certificate of probable cause “does not bar” this court from addressing his claim as “[i]t has long been recognized that denial of a Faretta motion is not waived by a no contest plea.” The Attorney General agrees, also citing Robinson.

2013Addressing defendant’s due process claim first, we note in Moore, the court addressed the issue of whether “the defendant in an SVP proceeding has a due process right not to be tried or civilly committed while mentally incompetent” — an issue, the court noted, “which is likely to arise in countless other cases.” ( Moore, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 807-808.) The court 8 noted that “SVP proceedings are civil, not criminal in nature,” therefore the constitutional rights available to criminal defendants do not apply.

2007Defendant fell far short of "showing that the totality of the relevant facts [gave] rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 94 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; see also Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 168 , 125 S.Ct. 2410 ; People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 66, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 117 P.3d 622 .) The trial court correctly determined that he failed to make a prima facie showing of a Batson/Wheeler violation. b.

2007Defendant fell far short of "showing that the totality of the relevant facts [gave] rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 94 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 ; see also Johnson, supra, 545 U.S. at p. 168 , 125 S.Ct. 2410 ; People v. Cornwell, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 66, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 117 P.3d 622 .) The trial court correctly determined that he failed to make a prima facie showing of a Batson/Wheeler violation. b.

2002At the least, our decision in Oliver ‘indicated that in kidnapping cases the requirement of force may be relaxed where the victim is a minor who is “too young to give his legal consent to being taken” and the kidnapping was done for an improper purpose.’ (People v. Rios[, supra,] 177 Cal.App.3d 445, 451 ... , citing Oliver, supra, 55 Cal.2d at pp. 764-766.) Here, defendant snatched the baby as well as the mother.

2002We granted review to decide “whether sufficient evidence supported the carjacking and kidnapping convictions as to the infant victim.” (Id. at p. 856.) Addressing defendant’s claim that the Court of Appeal had misapplied Oliver because, he argued, Oliver did not eliminate section 207’s requirement of force or fear even as to a child, we said: “We need not, and do not, *610 decide whether, or to what extent, the Oliver decision eliminated the need to show as to a child force or fear in addition to an illegal purpose, or whether the illegal purpose itself establishes force or fear (see Parnell v

1991(Gardner v. Stroever (1891) 89 Cal. 26, 29 [ 26 P. 618 ].) Addressing defendant’s contention that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations, the Phillips court concluded, “Where a nuisance is of such character that it will presumably continue indefinitely it is considered permanent, and the limitations period runs from the time the nuisance is created. [Citations.] On the other hand, if the nuisance may be discontinued at any time it is considered continuing in character. [Citations.] Every repetition of a continuing nuisance is a separate wrong for which the person injured ma

1991(Gardner v. Stroever (1891) 89 Cal. 26, 29 [ 26 P. 618 ].) Addressing defendant’s contention that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations, the Phillips court concluded, “Where a nuisance is of such character that it will presumably continue indefinitely it is considered permanent, and the limitations period runs from the time the nuisance is created. [Citations.] On the other hand, if the nuisance may be discontinued at any time it is considered continuing in character. [Citations.] Every repetition of a continuing nuisance is a separate wrong for which the person injured ma