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16 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2020A-2050-17T1 7 Addressing defendant's claims about trial counsel in his first petition for PCR, the judge explained that under the two-prong set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), "there was no viable [IAC] claim[] on" the grounds asserted by defendant in his second petition. 2014In support of his PCR petition, defendant certified that during the lunch recess his attorney requested the prosecutor to agree "to a postponement, of at least one day, to allow me to have additional time to adequately review and consider [the community supervision for life] conditions, as well as the implications attendant to them." According to defendant, his counsel said the prosecutor "rebuffed this request and stated that his office would immediately withdraw the 5-year flat5 5 The term "flat," in the context of a custodial state prison term, is a colloquialism used by lawyers for a term | 1 | 2 |
State v. Nashgreen1 sentence2025The court additionally recognized as of the time of defendant's plea, "[n]o other published or unpublished case had held the child erotica amendment unconstitutional, and . . . the Supreme Court promptly stayed the Higginbotham decision until the State's A-0024-23 11 petition for certification [could] be decided." Recognizing the presumption that plea counsel exercised "'reasonable professional judgment' and 'sound trial strategy,'" as well as the "distorting effects of hindsight," the PCR court found "defendant's plea counsel [could not] be faulted for not anticipating that the statute would | 1 | 1 |
State v. Duquene Pierre(072859)green1 sentence2025The court additionally recognized as of the time of defendant's plea, "[n]o other published or unpublished case had held the child erotica amendment unconstitutional, and . . . the Supreme Court promptly stayed the Higginbotham decision until the State's A-0024-23 11 petition for certification [could] be decided." Recognizing the presumption that plea counsel exercised "'reasonable professional judgment' and 'sound trial strategy,'" as well as the "distorting effects of hindsight," the PCR court found "defendant's plea counsel [could not] be faulted for not anticipating that the statute would | 1 | 1 |
Jadlowski v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.green1 sentence2021Jadlowski v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 283 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cummingsgreen1 sentence2020Relying on defendant's colloquy at the plea hearing, Judge Blaney noted defendant "stated under oath that he had 'more than enough time' to meet with [his attorney] before he entered the plea agreement, that [his attorney] explained 'in detail' the nature of both charges [defendant] ple[]d to, and that [his attorney] answered all of [defendant's] questions to his satisfaction." Defendant also confirmed these representations on "each page of the plea form[.]" Additionally, defendant "stated on the record that he was 'more than satisfied' with [his attorney's] representation of him." Likewise, " | 1 | 1 |
Lepis v. Lepisgreen1 sentence2019Addressing defendant's arguments about his remaining alimony obligation under the DSA being limited to the date he turned sixty-seven, the judge found them to be "pure speculation" as the DSA provided for permanent alimony and any termination would be "fact sensitive under the alimony statute[,] N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(c)." Because the judge was satisfied that the mediation agreement should be enforced, he did not address whether defendant established a prima facie showing of changed circumstances under Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cortezgreen1 sentence2019Citing to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673 (1988), the court stated that "[p]olice officers may only stop an individual to conduct an investigatory stop if they have an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that the individual stopped was or is involved in criminal activity." Once stopped, under Terry, "the seizure of any weapons taken from the suspect [may] be introduced as evidence." Citing to United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) and State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 502 (1986), the trial court observed that whether police have the requis | 1 | 1 |
State v. Scott M. Cain(074124)green2 sentences2018See State v. Cain , 224 N.J. 410 , 427-28, 133 A.3d 619 (2016) ; State v. Simms , 224 N.J. 393 , 396-97, 133 A.3d 609 (2016). 2018See State v. Cain , 224 N.J. 410 , 427-28, 133 A.3d 619 (2016) ; State v. Simms , 224 N.J. 393 , 396-97, 133 A.3d 609 (2016). | 1 | 1 |
Connally v. General Construction Co.green2 sentences1996Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926)). 1996Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 , 46 S.Ct. 126, 127 , 70 L.Ed. 322, 328 (1926)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Comparato v. Schait
neutral
2 sentences2015And so I’m not going to let you conduct a fishing expedition ...[.] At the conclusion of the argument, the trial judge asked defense counsel to address the Supreme Court’s holding in Comparato v. Schait, 180 N.J. 90 , 848 A.2d 770 (2004): THE JUDGE: [Addressing defense counsel] let me ask you this and you know we could be here all day and tomorrow listening to the facts of this case. 2015And so I’m not going to let you conduct a fishing expedition ...[.] At the conclusion of the argument, the trial judge asked defense counsel to address the Supreme Court’s holding in Comparato v. Schait, 180 N.J. 90 , 848 A.2d 770 (2004): THE JUDGE: [Addressing defense counsel] let me ask you this and you know we could be here all day and tomorrow listening to the facts of this case. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Crowe v. De Gioia
green
1 sentence2021Addressing defendant's request to stay the orders, the judge applied the Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126 (1982) standard, and found that defendant had not shown irreparable harm or a probability of success on the merits because the A-3629-19 14 orders were entered to enforce the judgment of divorce and he had not provided any persuasive reason justifying his non-compliance. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
1 sentence2019Citing to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673 (1988), the court stated that "[p]olice officers may only stop an individual to conduct an investigatory stop if they have an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that the individual stopped was or is involved in criminal activity." Once stopped, under Terry, "the seizure of any weapons taken from the suspect [may] be introduced as evidence." Citing to United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) and State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 502 (1986), the trial court observed that whether police have the requis | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Davis
green
1 sentence2019Citing to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673 (1988), the court stated that "[p]olice officers may only stop an individual to conduct an investigatory stop if they have an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that the individual stopped was or is involved in criminal activity." Once stopped, under Terry, "the seizure of any weapons taken from the suspect [may] be introduced as evidence." Citing to United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) and State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 502 (1986), the trial court observed that whether police have the requis | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Thomas
green
1 sentence2019Citing to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673 (1988), the court stated that "[p]olice officers may only stop an individual to conduct an investigatory stop if they have an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that the individual stopped was or is involved in criminal activity." Once stopped, under Terry, "the seizure of any weapons taken from the suspect [may] be introduced as evidence." Citing to United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) and State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 502 (1986), the trial court observed that whether police have the requis | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Yasin Simms(074209)
green
2 sentences2018See State v. Cain , 224 N.J. 410 , 427-28, 133 A.3d 619 (2016) ; State v. Simms , 224 N.J. 393 , 396-97, 133 A.3d 609 (2016). 2018See State v. Cain , 224 N.J. 410 , 427-28, 133 A.3d 619 (2016) ; State v. Simms , 224 N.J. 393 , 396-97, 133 A.3d 609 (2016). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Galloway
green
2 sentences2015Addressing defendant's contention he lost his ability to make "an intelligent evaluation of the situation and [form] a voluntarily intention to make a statement without the assistance of counsel" after being told he was charged with murder, we are not persuaded. "[T]he fact that [a] defendant was distressed and emotional is not by itself sufficient to render his [or her] confession involuntary." Galloway, supra, 133 N.J. at 657 . 2015Addressing defendant's contention he lost his ability to make "an intelligent evaluation of the situation and [form] a voluntarily intention to make a statement without the assistance of counsel" after being told he was charged with murder, we are not persuaded. "[T]he fact that [a] defendant was distressed and emotional is not by itself sufficient to render his [or her] confession involuntary." Galloway, supra, 133 N.J. at 657 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Allan
green
2 sentences2014Addressing defendant’s argument that the municipal court violated his right to procedural due process by deciding the merits of the case based on the suppression motion record, the Law Division cited defendant’s “multiple failed attempts at two field sobriety tests,” his admission that he had been drinking that evening, and his “hostile behavior and demeanor during the arrest.” The Law Division distinguished State v. Allan, 283 N.J.Super. 622, 630 , 662 A.2d 1038 (Law Div.1995), which holds that a municipal court should not incorporate suppression hearing evidence into the trial on the merits 2014Addressing defendant’s argument that the municipal court violated his right to procedural due process by deciding the merits of the case based on the suppression motion record, the Law Division cited defendant’s “multiple failed attempts at two field sobriety tests,” his admission that he had been drinking that evening, and his “hostile behavior and demeanor during the arrest.” The Law Division distinguished State v. Allan, 283 N.J.Super. 622, 630 , 662 A.2d 1038 (Law Div.1995), which holds that a municipal court should not incorporate suppression hearing evidence into the trial on the merits | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Hampton
green
2 sentences1997Id. at 263 , 294 A. 2d 23 . 1997Id. at 263 , 294 A. 2d 23 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman
green
2 sentences1996Addressing defendant's facial challenge, we conclude the statute is not "so vague that persons `of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.'" Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 94 N.J. 85, 118 , 462 A. 2d 573 (1983) (quoting Connally v. General Constr. 1996Addressing defendant's facial challenge, we conclude the statute is not "so vague that persons `of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.'" Town Tobacconist v. Kimmelman, 94 N.J. 85, 118 , 462 A. 2d 573 (1983) (quoting Connally v. General Constr. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
United States v. Ash
green
2 sentences1982The court, after a lengthy examination and discussion concerning the guarantees afforded by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, explained ( 413 U.S. at 309 , 93 S.Ct. at 2573 , 37 L.Ed.2d at 626 ) that the “core purpose of the counsel guarantee was to assure assistance at trial, when the accused was confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor.” Addressing defendant’s contention the court further held: A substantia] departure from the historical test would be necessary if the Sixth Amendment were interpreted to give Ash a right to 1982The court, after a lengthy examination and discussion concerning the guarantees afforded by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, explained ( 413 U.S. at 309 , 93 S.Ct. at 2573 , 37 L.Ed.2d at 626 ) that the “core purpose of the counsel guarantee was to assure assistance at trial, when the accused was confronted with both the intricacies of the law and the advocacy of the public prosecutor.” Addressing defendant’s contention the court further held: A substantia] departure from the historical test would be necessary if the Sixth Amendment were interpreted to give Ash a right to | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.