valid Fourth Amendment waiver in Georgia

2022See Wiggins v. State, 323 Ga. App. 754, 756 (2) ( 748 SE2d 120 ) (2013) (noting that failure to object to trial court’s imposition of Fourth Amendment waiver following jury trial was tantamount to consent). 13 295) (2016); see also Hood v. State, 343 Ga. App. 230, 234 (1) ( 807 SE2d 10 ) (2017).

2022See Wiggins v. State, 323 Ga. App. 754, 756 (2) ( 748 SE2d 120 ) (2013) (noting that failure to object to trial court’s imposition of Fourth Amendment waiver following jury trial was tantamount to consent). 13 295) (2016); see also Hood v. State, 343 Ga. App. 230, 234 (1) ( 807 SE2d 10 ) (2017).

2022See Wiggins v. State, 323 Ga. App. 754, 756 (2) ( 748 SE2d 120 ) (2013) (noting that failure to object to trial court’s imposition of Fourth Amendment waiver following jury trial was tantamount to consent). 13 295) (2016); see also Hood v. State, 343 Ga. App. 230, 234 (1) ( 807 SE2d 10 ) (2017).

2022See Wiggins v. State, 323 Ga. App. 754, 756 (2) ( 748 SE2d 120 ) (2013) (noting that failure to object to trial court’s imposition of Fourth Amendment waiver following jury trial was tantamount to consent). 13 295) (2016); see also Hood v. State, 343 Ga. App. 230, 234 (1) ( 807 SE2d 10 ) (2017).

2022(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Jackson v. State, 338 Ga. App. 509, 509-510 ( 790 SE2d 7 See OCGA §§ 17-8-58 (b) (plain error review of jury instructions), 24-1-103 (d) (plain error review of evidentiary rulings). 8 Contrary to Gainey’s argument, a Fourth Amendment waiver obtained as part of an express agreement in a negotiated guilty plea is not the only manner in which a valid Fourth Amendment waiver may arise.

2016Niles, 325 Ga. App. at 624 (citation omitted); see also Prince, 299 Ga. App. at 170 (3) (b) (officers pursuing an anonymous tip were lawfully present at the side door of the residence of a probationer who had executed a valid Fourth Amendment waiver, from which position officers saw the contraband at issue in plain view).

2016Niles, 325 Ga. App. at 624 (citation omitted); see also Prince, 299 Ga. App. at 170 (3) (b) (officers pursuing an anonymous tip were lawfully present at the side door of the residence of a probationer who had executed a valid Fourth Amendment waiver, from which position officers saw the contraband at issue in plain view).

2016In sum, “[although we owe substantial deference to the way in which the trial court resolved disputed questions of material fact, we owe no deference at all to the trial court with respect to questions of law, and instead, we must apply the law ourselves to the material facts.” Hughes, 296 Ga. at 750 (2) (citation omitted).

2015In Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 106-107 (2) ( 657 SE2d 213 ) (2008), where an officer relied on a warrant that later was found to be unsupported by probable cause and a valid warrant was required to search the defendant’s desk, the evidence seized from the desk had to be suppressed because Georgia has no good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

2015In Harper v. State, 283 Ga. 102, 106-107 (2) ( 657 SE2d 213 ) (2008), where an officer relied on a warrant that later was found to be unsupported by probable cause and a valid warrant was required to search the defendant’s desk, the evidence seized from the desk had to be suppressed because Georgia has no good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

2015Citing Ford, supra at 286-287 (3), 4 the Warner court posits in conditional language, that “[a] warrantless search based on unauthorized consent could nonetheless be upheld if the law enforcement *145 officer conducting the search reasonably (albeit erroneously) believed the consent given was valid.” (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied and in original).

2011See Culpepper v. State, 132 Ga. App. 733 ( 209 SE2d 18 ) (1974) (a defendant’s testimony at a motion to suppress could not be used against him in the State’s case at trial because that would force him to forfeit a valid Fourth Amendment claim or waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).

2011See Culpepper v. State, 132 Ga. App. 733 ( 209 SE2d 18 ) (1974) (a defendant’s testimony at a motion to suppress could not be used against him in the State’s case at trial because that would force him to forfeit a valid Fourth Amendment claim or waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).

2009In Rocco, supra, we held that a search pursuant to a valid Fourth Amendment waiver “was triggered by a good-faith suspicion which arose in the course of routine investigative work, and was not conducted merely to harass Rocco.” Id. at 904 (2).

2009In Rocco, supra, we held that a search pursuant to a valid Fourth Amendment waiver “was triggered by a good-faith suspicion which arose in the course of routine investigative work, and was not conducted merely to harass Rocco.” Id. at 904 (2).

2009See, e.g., Boldin v. State, 282 Ga. App. 492, 495 (3) ( 639 SE2d 522 ) (2006). 8 This court recently issued an opinion involving a valid Fourth Amendment waiver and an anonymous tip without discussing whether police acted in bad faith or in an arbitrary or capricious manner.

2009See, e.g., Boldin v. State, 282 Ga. App. 492, 495 (3) ( 639 SE2d 522 ) (2006). 8 This court recently issued an opinion involving a valid Fourth Amendment waiver and an anonymous tip without discussing whether police acted in bad faith or in an arbitrary or capricious manner.

1974These circumstances fall squarely within the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377, 394 (88 SC 967, 19 LE2d 1247): ". . . in this case Garrett was obliged either to give up what he believed... to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal effect, to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.