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8 California opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Souzagreen1 sentence2024(See Souza, supra, at p. 231 [a 11 detention is reasonable “when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity”].) Finally, after detaining Cain for a relatively short period of time to run a records check, Officer Garner discovered that Cain had a valid Fourth Amendment waiver and therefore decided to search the vehicle. | 1 | 1 |
Colvin v. City of Gardenagreen2 sentences1998(Colvin v. City of Gardena (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1275-1276 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 234 ].) Because the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is one of law based upon the papers presented, the appellate court makes an independent determination of their construction and effect. 1998(Colvin v. City of Gardena (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1275-1276 [ 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 234 ].) Because the trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is one of law based upon the papers presented, the appellate court makes an independent determination of their construction and effect. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Drewsgreen2 sentences1993(People v. Drews (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1325 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 846 ], citing Simmons v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 , 88 S.Ct. 967 ] and People v. Cornejo (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 637 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 238 ].) “However, if a defendant’s testimony at a pretrial suppression hearing is inconsistent with his testimony at trial, the People may use such pretrial testimony for impeachment. [Citation.]” (People v. Drews, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 1325 .) This rule does not force a defendant to choose between a valid Fourth Amendment claim and the Fifth Amendment right against se 1993(People v. Drews (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1325 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 846 ], citing Simmons v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 , 88 S.Ct. 967 ] and People v. Cornejo (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 637 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 238 ].) “However, if a defendant’s testimony at a pretrial suppression hearing is inconsistent with his testimony at trial, the People may use such pretrial testimony for impeachment. [Citation.]” (People v. Drews, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 1325 .) This rule does not force a defendant to choose between a valid Fourth Amendment claim and the Fifth Amendment right against se | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Simmons v. United States
green
2 sentences1993(People v. Drews (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1325 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 846 ], citing Simmons v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 , 88 S.Ct. 967 ] and People v. Cornejo (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 637 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 238 ].) “However, if a defendant’s testimony at a pretrial suppression hearing is inconsistent with his testimony at trial, the People may use such pretrial testimony for impeachment. [Citation.]” (People v. Drews, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 1325 .) This rule does not force a defendant to choose between a valid Fourth Amendment claim and the Fifth Amendment right against se 1993(People v. Drews (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1325 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 846 ], citing Simmons v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 , 88 S.Ct. 967 ] and People v. Cornejo (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 637 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 238 ].) “However, if a defendant’s testimony at a pretrial suppression hearing is inconsistent with his testimony at trial, the People may use such pretrial testimony for impeachment. [Citation.]” (People v. Drews, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 1325 .) This rule does not force a defendant to choose between a valid Fourth Amendment claim and the Fifth Amendment right against se | 2 | 1975–1993 |
People v. Coleman
green
2 sentences1989This rule does not oblige a defendant ‘either to give up what he believed, with advice of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or . . .to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.’ (Simmons v. United States, supra, [390 U.S.] p. 394; People v. Coleman, supra, [13 Cal.3d] p. 879 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 ].) He may testify truthfully at his suppression motion should he elect to do so. 1989This rule does not oblige a defendant ‘either to give up what he believed, with advice of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or . . .to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.’ (Simmons v. United States, supra, [390 U.S.] p. 394; People v. Coleman, supra, [13 Cal.3d] p. 879 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 533 P.2d 1024 ].) He may testify truthfully at his suppression motion should he elect to do so. | 2 | 1977–1989 |
In Re HM
green
1 sentence2020(See H.M., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at pp. 147-148 [concluding trial court did not err in denying 8 suppression motion where the suspicions of the officer “were aroused based on factors directly related to H.M., i.e., his suspicious behavior and his prior contacts with police.”].) Moreover, while the court in Medina questioned the officer’s reasons for having the defendant exit the vehicle in the first instance, here the vehicle at issue was subject to a valid Fourth Amendment waiver. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Medina
green
1 sentence2020(See Medina, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 176 .) The search at issue in Hester also occurred after a traffic stop. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Humiston
green
1 sentence2012Unlike the James situation, the defendant himself is the real witness.” (Id. at p. 49.) As in Johnson, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th 253 , the suppression testimony was used “in order to prevent [the defendant] from extrapolating a false argument from truthful testimony.” (Id. at p. 283.) A defendant “ ‘may testify truthfully at his suppression motion should he elect to do so,’ ” without being forced to choose between a valid Fourth Amendment claim and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. ( Humiston, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th 460, 474-475 , italics omitted.) Next, “ ‘in the event that he | 1 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2012Unlike the James situation, the defendant himself is the real witness.” (Id. at p. 49.) As in Johnson, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th 253 , the suppression testimony was used “in order to prevent [the defendant] from extrapolating a false argument from truthful testimony.” (Id. at p. 283.) A defendant “ ‘may testify truthfully at his suppression motion should he elect to do so,’ ” without being forced to choose between a valid Fourth Amendment claim and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. ( Humiston, supra, 20 Cal.App.4th 460, 474-475 , italics omitted.) Next, “ ‘in the event that he | 1 | 2012–2012 |
People v. Cornejo
green
2 sentences1993(People v. Drews (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1325 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 846 ], citing Simmons v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 , 88 S.Ct. 967 ] and People v. Cornejo (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 637 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 238 ].) “However, if a defendant’s testimony at a pretrial suppression hearing is inconsistent with his testimony at trial, the People may use such pretrial testimony for impeachment. [Citation.]” (People v. Drews, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 1325 .) This rule does not force a defendant to choose between a valid Fourth Amendment claim and the Fifth Amendment right against se 1993(People v. Drews (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1325 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 846 ], citing Simmons v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 , 88 S.Ct. 967 ] and People v. Cornejo (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 637 [ 155 Cal.Rptr. 238 ].) “However, if a defendant’s testimony at a pretrial suppression hearing is inconsistent with his testimony at trial, the People may use such pretrial testimony for impeachment. [Citation.]” (People v. Drews, supra, 208 Cal.App.3d at p. 1325 .) This rule does not force a defendant to choose between a valid Fourth Amendment claim and the Fifth Amendment right against se | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Beagle
green
1 sentence1977He has, however, no right to commit peijury and is not entitled to a “false aura of veracity.” (People v. Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 453 .) If his trial testimony is inconsistent with that previously given at the suppression hearing, he may be impeached therewith. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
McGautha v. California
green
2 sentences1975The court reasoned that, in effect, the defendant “was obliged either to give up what he believed, with advice of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or ... to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” Finding it “intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another” (id., at p. 394 [ 19 L.Ed.2d at p. 1259 ]), the court held that the government was constitutionally prohibited from offering at trial as evidence of guilt the testimony of the defendant in support of his motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment g 1975The court reasoned that, in effect, the defendant “was obliged either to give up what he believed, with advice of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or ... to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” Finding it “intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another” (id., at p. 394 [ 19 L.Ed.2d at p. 1259 ]), the court held that the government was constitutionally prohibited from offering at trial as evidence of guilt the testimony of the defendant in support of his motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment g | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.