elementary and fundamental requirement in Texas

50 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1965–2023 4 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (15)

Case	Followed	Cited
Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc.green scotus · 1988 · cited in 25 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1990–2023 2 sentences 2023“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their objections.” Peralta, 485 U.S. at 84 (quoting Mullane v. Cent. 2020Notice must be “reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their objections.” Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84 (1988), quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 ; see also Cunningham v. Parkdale Bank, 660 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. 1983) 5 (“procedural due process requires notice that is reasonably calculated to inform parties of proceedings which may directly and adversely affect their legally protected interests.”) (internal quotes omitted); Hamm v. Robinson, 314 S.W.3d 204,	11	25
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.green scotus · 1950 · cited in 24 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1965–2023 2 sentences 2023Nonetheless, “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Id. at 314. 2020Notice must be “reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their objections.” Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84 (1988), quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 ; see also Cunningham v. Parkdale Bank, 660 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. 1983) 5 (“procedural due process requires notice that is reasonably calculated to inform parties of proceedings which may directly and adversely affect their legally protected interests.”) (internal quotes omitted); Hamm v. Robinson, 314 S.W.3d 204,	5	24
Ex Parte Petersongreen tex · 1969 · cited in 3 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010 2 sentences 2010See Peralta , 485 U.S. at 84 ; Mullane , 339 U.S. at 313-14 ; Ex parte Peterson , 444 S.W.2d 286, 288-89 (Tex. 1969). 2010See Peralta, 485 U.S. at 84 , 108 S.Ct. 896 ; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-14 , 70 S.Ct. 652 ; Ex parte Peterson, 444 S.W.2d 286, 288-89 (Tex.1969).	3	3
Armstrong v. Manzogreen scotus · 1965 · cited in 9 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1972–2015 2 sentences 2015Furthermore, in Peralta v Heights Medical Center, which was a Texas case, duly litigated before the Supreme Court of the United States in which Peralta's due process right was violated, the highest court of the land ruled as follows, "Under our cases, a judgment entered without notice or service is constitutionally infirm.An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which isto be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties ofthe pendency of an action and afford them the opportunity to present their ob 2007“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 , 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1190 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965).	2	9
Cunningham v. Parkdale Bankgreen tex · 1983 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2020–2022 2 sentences 2022The parties have not identified any differences in text or application that are relevant to the issues raised here, so we treat the requirements of both Constitutions as identical for purposes of this opinion. 8 See also Cunningham v. Parkdale Bank, 660 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. 1983) (“[P]rocedural due process ‘requires notice that is reasonably calculated to inform parties of proceedings which may directly and adversely affect their legally protected interests.’” (quoting City of Waco v. Roddey, 613 S.W.2d 360, 365 (Tex. App.—Waco 1981, writ dism’d))); Hamm v. Robinson, 314 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Tex. 2020Notice must be “reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their objections.” Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84 (1988), quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 ; see also Cunningham v. Parkdale Bank, 660 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. 1983) 5 (“procedural due process requires notice that is reasonably calculated to inform parties of proceedings which may directly and adversely affect their legally protected interests.”) (internal quotes omitted); Hamm v. Robinson, 314 S.W.3d 204,	2	2
Hamm v. Robinsongreen texapp · 2010 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2020–2022 2 sentences 2022The parties have not identified any differences in text or application that are relevant to the issues raised here, so we treat the requirements of both Constitutions as identical for purposes of this opinion. 8 See also Cunningham v. Parkdale Bank, 660 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. 1983) (“[P]rocedural due process ‘requires notice that is reasonably calculated to inform parties of proceedings which may directly and adversely affect their legally protected interests.’” (quoting City of Waco v. Roddey, 613 S.W.2d 360, 365 (Tex. App.—Waco 1981, writ dism’d))); Hamm v. Robinson, 314 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Tex. 2022The parties have not identified any differences in text or application that are relevant to the issues raised here, so we treat the requirements of both Constitutions as identical for purposes of this opinion. 8 See also Cunningham v. Parkdale Bank, 660 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. 1983) (“[P]rocedural due process ‘requires notice that is reasonably calculated to inform parties of proceedings which may directly and adversely affect their legally protected interests.’” (quoting City of Waco v. Roddey, 613 S.W.2d 360, 365 (Tex. App.—Waco 1981, writ dism’d))); Hamm v. Robinson, 314 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Tex.	2	2
Bexar County Sheriff's Civil Service Commission v. Davisgreen tex · 1990 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009 2 sentences 2009Bd. v. Davis, 802 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. 1990). “‘An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their objections.’” Peralta v. Heights Med. 2009Bd. v. Davis , 802 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. 1990). "'An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their objections.'" Peralta v. Heights Med.	2	2
Mosser v. Plano Three Venturegreen texapp · 1994 · cited in 2 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2005–2016 2 sentences 2016Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84 , 108 S.Ct. 896 , 99 L.Ed.2d, 75 (1988)). “ ‘The failure to give adequate notice violates the most rudimentary demands of due process of law.’ ” Id. (quoting Mosser v. Plano Three Venture, 893 S.W.2d 8, 12 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, no writ)). ‘“For well' over a century, this court has required that strict compliance with the rules for service of citation affirmatively appear on the record in order for a default judgment to withstand direct attack.’ ” Deutsche Bank Trust Co. v. Hall, 400 S.W.3d 668, 670 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2013, pet. denied) (quoting Ins. 2005“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding that is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their objections thereto.” Mosser, 893 S.W.2d at 12 (citing Peralta v. Heights Medical Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84 , 108 S.Ct. 896, 898-99 , 99 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988)).	1	2
Campbell v. Stuckigreen texapp · 2007 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023 1 sentence 2023Campbell v. Stucki, 220 S.W.3d 562, 570 (Tex. App.– Tyler 2007, no pet.).	1	1
City of Waco v. Roddeygreen texapp · 1981 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022 1 sentence 2022The parties have not identified any differences in text or application that are relevant to the issues raised here, so we treat the requirements of both Constitutions as identical for purposes of this opinion. 8 See also Cunningham v. Parkdale Bank, 660 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. 1983) (“[P]rocedural due process ‘requires notice that is reasonably calculated to inform parties of proceedings which may directly and adversely affect their legally protected interests.’” (quoting City of Waco v. Roddey, 613 S.W.2d 360, 365 (Tex. App.—Waco 1981, writ dism’d))); Hamm v. Robinson, 314 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Tex.	1	1
Virgil Edward Kuykendall v. Jessica Beverlygreen texapp · 2014 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 1 sentence 2016The Default Judgment Cannot Stand “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding that is to be accordéd finality is notice reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their objections thereto.” Kuykendall v. Beverly, 436 S.W.3d 809, 813 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2014, no pet.) (citing Peralta v. Heights Med.	1	1
Deutsche Bank Trust Company, N. A. A/K/A Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Kenneth W. Hall and Roberta Hallgreen texapp · 2013 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 1 sentence 2016Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84 , 108 S.Ct. 896 , 99 L.Ed.2d, 75 (1988)). “ ‘The failure to give adequate notice violates the most rudimentary demands of due process of law.’ ” Id. (quoting Mosser v. Plano Three Venture, 893 S.W.2d 8, 12 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, no writ)). ‘“For well' over a century, this court has required that strict compliance with the rules for service of citation affirmatively appear on the record in order for a default judgment to withstand direct attack.’ ” Deutsche Bank Trust Co. v. Hall, 400 S.W.3d 668, 670 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2013, pet. denied) (quoting Ins.	1	1
Lopez v. Lopezgreen tex · 1988 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014 1 sentence 2014Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80 , 84–85 (1988) (“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their objections.”); Lopez v. Lopez, 757 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. 1988)); see also U.S. CONST. amend.	1	1
State v. Rumfologreen tex · 1976 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1995–1995 2 sentences 1995"An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process for any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." State v. Rumfolo, 545 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex.1976). 1995“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process for any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” State v. Rumfolo, 545 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex.1976).	1	1
Minnick v. State Bar of Texasgreen texapp · 1990 · cited in 1 Texas opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994 1 sentence 1994In point of error six, MacInnis contends that he was denied due process in the State Bar grievance committee proceedings because he was not allowed to testify before the committee. "`An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their objections.'" Minnick v. State Bar of Tex. , 790 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tex. App.--Austin 1990, writ denied) (quoting Peralta v. Heights Medical Ctr.,	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

Case	Cited	Years
Grannis v. Ordean green scotus · 1914 2 sentences 2015“A fundamental requirement of due process is the 'opportunity to be heard.” Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 . 2015“A fundamental requirement of due process is the 'opportunity to be heard.” Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 .	5	1965–2015
Milliken v. Meyer green scotus · 1941 2 sentences 1982Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 [ 61 S.Ct. 339 , 85 L.Ed. 278 ]; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 [ 34 S.Ct. 779 , 58 L.Ed. 1363 ]; Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U.S. 604 [ 34 S.Ct. 443 , 58 L.Ed. 751 ]; Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 [ 20 S.Ct. 410 , 44 L.Ed. 520 ] . . . . ” Id. [339 U.S.], at 314 [ 70 S.Ct., at 657 ], Mrs. Fuentes, a resident of Florida, complained that Firestone Tire and Rubber Company picked up her stereophonic phonograph on which there was about $200.00 still owing. 1982Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 [ 61 S.Ct. 339 , 85 L.Ed. 278 ]; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 [ 34 S.Ct. 779 , 58 L.Ed. 1363 ]; Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U.S. 604 [ 34 S.Ct. 443 , 58 L.Ed. 751 ]; Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 [ 20 S.Ct. 410 , 44 L.Ed. 520 ] . . . . ” Id. [339 U.S.], at 314 [ 70 S.Ct., at 657 ], Mrs. Fuentes, a resident of Florida, complained that Firestone Tire and Rubber Company picked up her stereophonic phonograph on which there was about $200.00 still owing.	4	1965–1982
Roller v. Holly green scotus · 1900 2 sentences 1982Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 [ 61 S.Ct. 339 , 85 L.Ed. 278 ]; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 [ 34 S.Ct. 779 , 58 L.Ed. 1363 ]; Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U.S. 604 [ 34 S.Ct. 443 , 58 L.Ed. 751 ]; Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 [ 20 S.Ct. 410 , 44 L.Ed. 520 ] . . . . ” Id. [339 U.S.], at 314 [ 70 S.Ct., at 657 ], Mrs. Fuentes, a resident of Florida, complained that Firestone Tire and Rubber Company picked up her stereophonic phonograph on which there was about $200.00 still owing. 1982Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 [ 61 S.Ct. 339 , 85 L.Ed. 278 ]; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 [ 34 S.Ct. 779 , 58 L.Ed. 1363 ]; Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U.S. 604 [ 34 S.Ct. 443 , 58 L.Ed. 751 ]; Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 [ 20 S.Ct. 410 , 44 L.Ed. 520 ] . . . . ” Id. [339 U.S.], at 314 [ 70 S.Ct., at 657 ], Mrs. Fuentes, a resident of Florida, complained that Firestone Tire and Rubber Company picked up her stereophonic phonograph on which there was about $200.00 still owing.	3	1965–1982
Priest v. Trustees of Town of Las Vegas green scotus · 1914 2 sentences 1982Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 [ 61 S.Ct. 339 , 85 L.Ed. 278 ]; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 [ 34 S.Ct. 779 , 58 L.Ed. 1363 ]; Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U.S. 604 [ 34 S.Ct. 443 , 58 L.Ed. 751 ]; Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 [ 20 S.Ct. 410 , 44 L.Ed. 520 ] . . . . ” Id. [339 U.S.], at 314 [ 70 S.Ct., at 657 ], Mrs. Fuentes, a resident of Florida, complained that Firestone Tire and Rubber Company picked up her stereophonic phonograph on which there was about $200.00 still owing. 1982Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 [ 61 S.Ct. 339 , 85 L.Ed. 278 ]; Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 [ 34 S.Ct. 779 , 58 L.Ed. 1363 ]; Priest v. Las Vegas, 232 U.S. 604 [ 34 S.Ct. 443 , 58 L.Ed. 751 ]; Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398 [ 20 S.Ct. 410 , 44 L.Ed. 520 ] . . . . ” Id. [339 U.S.], at 314 [ 70 S.Ct., at 657 ], Mrs. Fuentes, a resident of Florida, complained that Firestone Tire and Rubber Company picked up her stereophonic phonograph on which there was about $200.00 still owing.	3	1965–1982
Anderson v. Collum green tex · 1974 1 sentence 2022This Court echoed Mullane in Anderson v. Collum, a case concerning the validity of service by publication under Rule 117a. 514 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1974).	1	2022–2022
American Communications Assn. v. Douds green scotus · 1950 1 sentence 2015Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 .	1	2015–2015
Turner Entertainment Co. v. Degeto Film green ca11 · 1994 2 sentences 2014Thus, the Attorney General maintains that the notice Shlomo received is consistent with American notions of due process, citing Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512 , 1520 (11th Cir. 1994) (considering whether foreign legal system “follows procedures that ensure that litigants will receive treatment that satisfies American notions of due process”). 2014Thus, the Attorney General maintains that the notice Shlomo received is consistent with American notions of due process, citing Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512 , 1520 (11th Cir.1994) (considering whether foreign legal system “follows procedures that ensure that litigants will receive treatment that satisfies American notions of due process”).	1	2014–2014
In Re Adoption of Armstrong green texapp · 1963 1 sentence 1985Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 , (1965), reversing, In re Adoption of Armstrong, 371 S.W.2d 407 (Tex.Civ.	1	1985–1985
H---P. F v. B---D---P neutral texapp · 1971 1 sentence 1976Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545 , 85 S.Ct. 1187 , 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (and cases cited therein); H_P. F_ v. B_D_P_, 479 S.W.2d 124 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1971, writ ref’d n. r. e.).	1	1976–1976
State v. Garcia green njsuperctappdiv · 1971 2 sentences 1976In construing an Illinois forfeiture statute the U. S. Supreme Court in Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 , 93 S.Ct. 30 , 34 L.Ed.2d 47 (1972) held: “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process of any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." See also State v. Garcia, 114 N.J.Super. 444 , 276 A.2d 880 (1971); Sensenbrenner v. Crosby, 37 Ohio St.2d 43 , 306 N.E.2d 413 (1974). 1976In construing an Illinois forfeiture statute the U. S. Supreme Court in Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 , 93 S.Ct. 30 , 34 L.Ed.2d 47 (1972) held: “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process of any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." See also State v. Garcia, 114 N.J.Super. 444 , 276 A.2d 880 (1971); Sensenbrenner v. Crosby, 37 Ohio St.2d 43 , 306 N.E.2d 413 (1974).	1	1976–1976
Robinson v. Hanrahan green scotus · 1972 2 sentences 1976In construing an Illinois forfeiture statute the U. S. Supreme Court in Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 , 93 S.Ct. 30 , 34 L.Ed.2d 47 (1972) held: “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process of any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." See also State v. Garcia, 114 N.J.Super. 444 , 276 A.2d 880 (1971); Sensenbrenner v. Crosby, 37 Ohio St.2d 43 , 306 N.E.2d 413 (1974). 1976In construing an Illinois forfeiture statute the U. S. Supreme Court in Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 , 93 S.Ct. 30 , 34 L.Ed.2d 47 (1972) held: “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process of any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." See also State v. Garcia, 114 N.J.Super. 444 , 276 A.2d 880 (1971); Sensenbrenner v. Crosby, 37 Ohio St.2d 43 , 306 N.E.2d 413 (1974).	1	1976–1976
Sensenbrenner v. Crosby green ohio · 1974 2 sentences 1976In construing an Illinois forfeiture statute the U. S. Supreme Court in Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 , 93 S.Ct. 30 , 34 L.Ed.2d 47 (1972) held: “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process of any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." See also State v. Garcia, 114 N.J.Super. 444 , 276 A.2d 880 (1971); Sensenbrenner v. Crosby, 37 Ohio St.2d 43 , 306 N.E.2d 413 (1974). 1976In construing an Illinois forfeiture statute the U. S. Supreme Court in Robinson v. Hanrahan, 409 U.S. 38 , 93 S.Ct. 30 , 34 L.Ed.2d 47 (1972) held: “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process of any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." See also State v. Garcia, 114 N.J.Super. 444 , 276 A.2d 880 (1971); Sensenbrenner v. Crosby, 37 Ohio St.2d 43 , 306 N.E.2d 413 (1974).	1	1976–1976
City of Houston v. Fore green tex · 1967 1 sentence 1972Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 , 61 S.Ct. 339 , 85 L.Ed. 278 , . . . [citations omitted].’” ( 380 U.S. at p. 550 , 85 S.Ct. at p. 1190 .) In City of Houston v. Fore, 412 S.W.2d 35 (Tex.Sup.1967); 401 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco, 1966, reh. den.), the city brought action for street paving assessments and gave notice by three newspaper *383 advertisements.	1	1972–1972
City of Houston v. Fore neutral texapp · 1966 1 sentence 1972Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 , 61 S.Ct. 339 , 85 L.Ed. 278 , . . . [citations omitted].’” ( 380 U.S. at p. 550 , 85 S.Ct. at p. 1190 .) In City of Houston v. Fore, 412 S.W.2d 35 (Tex.Sup.1967); 401 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.Civ.App., Waco, 1966, reh. den.), the city brought action for street paving assessments and gave notice by three newspaper *383 advertisements.	1	1972–1972

Statutes the citing opinions construe

TX § Tex. Water Code § 5.122 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

OH 72 (1980–2025) TX 50 (1965–2023) CA 42 (1953–2026) IN 36 (1894–2023) NY 32 (1966–2026) LA 24 (1968–2024) IL 23 (1899–2025) MI 22 (1951–2026) PA 19 (1973–2023) MO 19 (1972–2024) MD 16 (1969–2024) OK 15 (1975–2011) CT 15 (1984–2023) NC 13 (1951–2024) NH 12 (1978–2023) NJ 12 (1971–2020) FL 12 (1981–2024) VA 11 (1978–2016) AZ 10 (1967–2021) GA 10 (1974–2003) AL 10 (1904–2025) MA 10 (1988–2026) WA 9 (1978–2018) KS 8 (1978–2005) CO 8 (1994–2011) OR 8 (1953–2020) SD 7 (1991–2015) NM 7 (1995–2020) WI 6 (1981–2020) VT 6 (1997–2020) HI 6 (1923–2022) UT 6 (1983–2020) DC 6 (1975–2003) MS 5 (1984–2016) TN 5 (1976–2015) MN 5 (1956–2018) AR 4 (2002–2018) RI 4 (1963–2011) IA 4 (1974–2016) WV 4 (1990–2019) MT 3 (1926–2007) ND 3 (1986–2014) KY 3 (1988–2021) NV 3 (1977–1998) AK 3 (1984–1994) ME 3 (1998–2007) ID 2 (1958–1986) NE 2 (1984–1988) SC 2 (2001–2005) DE 2 (2018–2019)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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