50 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2025 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gallas v. Car Biz, Inc.green2 sentences2009See Gallas v. Car Biz, Inc., 914 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied). 2009See Gallas v. Car Biz, Inc., 914 S.W.2d 592, 593 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied). | 5 | 5 |
Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hospitalgreen2 sentences2007The Morrells rely on Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hospital, 747 S.W.2d 361, 364-65 (Tex.1987), arguing that the supreme court in that case recognized a parent’s entitlement to mental anguish resulting from serious permanent injury to a child by letting stand the jury’s award of that element of damages. 2007The Morrells rely on Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hospital, 747 S.W.2d 361, 364-65 (Tex.1987), arguing that the supreme court in that case recognized a parent's entitlement to mental anguish resulting from serious permanent injury to a child by letting stand the jury's award of that element of damages. | 4 | 4 |
Cecil v. Smithgreen2 sentences2015Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509 , 510–11 (Tex. 1991); Daniels v. Empty Eye, Inc., 368 S.W.3d 743, 749 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). 2015Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509, 510-11 (Tex.1991); Daniels v. Empty Eye, Inc., 368 S.W.3d 743, 749 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). | 3 | 3 |
Holman Street Baptist Church v. Jeffersongreen2 sentences2014Baptist Church v. Jefferson, 317 S.W.3d 540, 547 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). 2014Baptist Church v. Jefferson, 317 S.W.3d 540, 547 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). | 3 | 3 |
Elloway v. Pategreen2 sentences2022Elloway v. Pate, 238 S.W.3d 882, 889 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). 2022Elloway v. Pate, 238 S.W.3d 882, 889 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Jiles Daniels v. Empty Eye, Inc., Empty Eye & Associates, L.P. and Judith Danielsgreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., Daniels v. Empty Eye, Inc., 368 S.W.3d 743, 748-49 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied) (explaining that, in a case tried to a jury, a motion to disregard preserves legal sufficiency challenge and a motion for new trial preserves a factual sufficiency challenge). 6 ARTICLE 5. 2015Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509 , 510–11 (Tex. 1991); Daniels v. Empty Eye, Inc., 368 S.W.3d 743, 749 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied). | 2 | 2 |
Mocega v. BRADFORD URQUHART, MDgreen2 sentences2018See Knutson v. Friess, No. 09-08-00181-CV, 2009 WL 1331100 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 14, 2009, no pet.) (citing Mocega v. Bradford Urquhart M.D., 79 S.W.3d 61 , 64–65 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (reversing dismissal of medical malpractice action because trial court did not give notice of hearing on motion to dismiss); Green v. McAdams, 857 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (holding trial court erred by rendering post-answer default judgment after party failed to appear at trial because trial court gave defaulting party no notice of trial 2018See Knutson v. Friess, No. 09-08-00181-CV, 2009 WL 1331100 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 14, 2009, no pet.) (citing Mocega v. Bradford Urquhart M.D., 79 S.W.3d 61 , 64–65 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (reversing dismissal of medical malpractice action because trial court did not give notice of hearing on motion to dismiss); Green v. McAdams, 857 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (holding trial court erred by rendering post-answer default judgment after party failed to appear at trial because trial court gave defaulting party no notice of trial | 2 | 2 |
Palmer v. Cantrellgreen2 sentences2018See Knutson v. Friess, No. 09-08-00181-CV, 2009 WL 1331100 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 14, 2009, no pet.) (citing Mocega v. Bradford Urquhart M.D., 79 S.W.3d 61 , 64–65 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (reversing dismissal of medical malpractice action because trial court did not give notice of hearing on motion to dismiss); Green v. McAdams, 857 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (holding trial court erred by rendering post-answer default judgment after party failed to appear at trial because trial court gave defaulting party no notice of trial 2018See Knutson v. Friess, No. 09-08-00181-CV, 2009 WL 1331100 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 14, 2009, no pet.) (citing Mocega v. Bradford Urquhart M.D., 79 S.W.3d 61 , 64–65 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (reversing dismissal of medical malpractice action because trial court did not give notice of hearing on motion to dismiss); Green v. McAdams, 857 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (holding trial court erred by rendering post-answer default judgment after party failed to appear at trial because trial court gave defaulting party no notice of trial | 2 | 2 |
Green v. McAdamsgreen2 sentences2018See Knutson v. Friess, No. 09-08-00181-CV, 2009 WL 1331100 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 14, 2009, no pet.) (citing Mocega v. Bradford Urquhart M.D., 79 S.W.3d 61 , 64–65 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (reversing dismissal of medical malpractice action because trial court did not give notice of hearing on motion to dismiss); Green v. McAdams, 857 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (holding trial court erred by rendering post-answer default judgment after party failed to appear at trial because trial court gave defaulting party no notice of trial 2018See Knutson v. Friess, No. 09-08-00181-CV, 2009 WL 1331100 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 14, 2009, no pet.) (citing Mocega v. Bradford Urquhart M.D., 79 S.W.3d 61 , 64–65 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (reversing dismissal of medical malpractice action because trial court did not give notice of hearing on motion to dismiss); Green v. McAdams, 857 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (holding trial court erred by rendering post-answer default judgment after party failed to appear at trial because trial court gave defaulting party no notice of trial | 2 | 2 |
Hatfield v. Solomongreen2 sentences2014A. Jury-Charge Error “The trial court enjoys wide latitude in framing a jury charge and is given broad latitude to determine the propriety of explanatory instructions and definitions.” Hatfield v. Solomon, 316 S.W.3d 50, 62 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (citing H.E. 2014A. Jury-Charge Error “The trial court enjoys wide latitude in framing a jury charge and is given broad latitude to determine the propriety of explanatory instructions and definitions.” Hatfield v. Solomon, 316 S.W.3d 50, 62 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (citing H.E. | 2 | 2 |
Werner v. Colwellgreen2 sentences2012See Werner, 909 S.W.2d at 870, n. 1 ; Horrocks, 852 S.W.2d at 499 ; Razey, 426 S.W.2d at 540-41 . 2012See Werner, 909 S.W.2d at 870, n. 1 ; Horrocks, 852 S.W.2d at 499 ; Razey, 426 S.W.2d at 540-41 . | 2 | 2 |
J. Weingarten, Inc. v. Razeygreen2 sentences2012See id. 2012See Werner, 909 S.W.2d at 870, n. 1 ; Horrocks, 852 S.W.2d at 499 ; Razey, 426 S.W.2d at 540-41 . | 2 | 2 |
cluster 573914green2 sentences2010See , e.g. , Tex. Pig Stands, Inc. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l, Inc. , 951 F.2d 684 , 697 (5th Cir. 1992) (reviewing under JNOV standard trial court’s decision to overturn recovery based on jury’s § 1117(a) finding). 2010See, e.g., Tex. Pig Stands, Inc. v. Hard Rock Cafe Int’l, Inc., 951 F.2d 684 , 697 (5th Cir. 1992) (reviewing under JNOV standard trial court’s decision to overturn recovery based on jury’s § 1117(a) finding). | 2 | 2 |
Kratz v. Exxon Corp.green2 sentences2008Cecil v. Smith , 804 S.W.2d 509, 510-11 (Tex. 1991); Kratz v. Exxon Corp ., 890 S.W.2d 899, 901 (Tex. App.-El Paso, 1994, no writ). 2008Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509, 510-11 (Tex. 1991); Kratz v. Exxon Corp., 890 S.W.2d 899, 901 (Tex. App.–El Paso, 1994, no writ). | 2 | 2 |
Lenz v. Lenzgreen2 sentences2007Co. v. First Bank & Trust of Groves, Tex., 753 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ) (holding that appellant *431 failed to preserve challenge to rendition of unpleaded interest rate when it failed to except to opposing party’s motion for entry of judgment requesting unpleaded interest rate or to move to limit judgment to pleaded rate); cf. Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 13 (Tex.2002) (holding that appellant preserved complaint raised in pre-judgment JNOV because trial court implicitly ruled on JNOV motion by virtue of substance of its judgment that was later rendered); Second Injury 2007P. 33.1(a)(2)(A); Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 13 (Tex.2002) (holding that appellant preserved complaint raised in pre-judgment JNOV because trial court implicitly ruled on JNOV motion by virtue of substance of its judgment that was later rendered); First Nat’l Indem. | 2 | 2 |
First National Indemnity Co. v. First Bank & Trust of Grovesgreen2 sentences2007Co. v. First Bank & Trust of Groves, Tex. , 753 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1988, no writ) (holding that appellant failed to preserve challenge to rendition of unpleaded interest rate when it failed to except to opposing party's motion for entry of judgment requesting unpleaded interest rate or to move to limit judgment to pleaded rate); cf. Lenz v. Lenz , 79 S.W.3d 10, 13 (Tex. 2002) (holding that appellant preserved complaint raised in pre-judgment JNOV because trial court implicitly ruled on JNOV motion by virtue of substance of its judgment that was later rendered); Second Injury 2007Co. v. First Bank & Trust of Groves, Tex., 753 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ) (holding that appellant *431 failed to preserve challenge to rendition of unpleaded interest rate when it failed to except to opposing party’s motion for entry of judgment requesting unpleaded interest rate or to move to limit judgment to pleaded rate); cf. Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 13 (Tex.2002) (holding that appellant preserved complaint raised in pre-judgment JNOV because trial court implicitly ruled on JNOV motion by virtue of substance of its judgment that was later rendered); Second Injury | 2 | 2 |
Second Injury Fund v. Tomongreen2 sentences2007Co. v. First Bank & Trust of Groves, Tex. , 753 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1988, no writ) (holding that appellant failed to preserve challenge to rendition of unpleaded interest rate when it failed to except to opposing party's motion for entry of judgment requesting unpleaded interest rate or to move to limit judgment to pleaded rate); cf. Lenz v. Lenz , 79 S.W.3d 10, 13 (Tex. 2002) (holding that appellant preserved complaint raised in pre-judgment JNOV because trial court implicitly ruled on JNOV motion by virtue of substance of its judgment that was later rendered); Second Injury 2007Co. v. First Bank & Trust of Groves, Tex., 753 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1988, no writ) (holding that appellant *431 failed to preserve challenge to rendition of unpleaded interest rate when it failed to except to opposing party’s motion for entry of judgment requesting unpleaded interest rate or to move to limit judgment to pleaded rate); cf. Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 13 (Tex.2002) (holding that appellant preserved complaint raised in pre-judgment JNOV because trial court implicitly ruled on JNOV motion by virtue of substance of its judgment that was later rendered); Second Injury | 2 | 2 |
Fort Bend County Drainage District v. Sbruschgreen2 sentences2005See Fort Bend County Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex.1991) (stating that a court may render a JNOV if a directed verdict would have been proper); see also Prudential Ins. 2005See Fort Bend County Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex.1991) (stating that a court may render a JNOV if a directed verdict would have been proper); see also Prudential Ins. | 2 | 2 |
Tanner v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co.green2 sentences2024Tanner, 289 S.W.3d at 830 . 2019Discussion Unsurprisingly, because we review a trial court’s ruling on a JNOV motion under a legal-sufficiency standard of review, see Tanner, 289 S.W.3d at 830 , our analysis with respect to the trial court’s ruling on Musallam’s JNOV motion, as well as the evidence we referenced in that analysis, is equally applicable here. | 1 | 3 |
City of Keller v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2023See Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 533 (Tex. 2010) (“Lay testimony may be used as evidence of causation in certain circumstances, but ‘[w]hen expert testimony is required, lay evidence supporting liability is legally insufficient.’” (quoting City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 812 )). 2020Id. at 827 . | 1 | 3 |
Mancorp, Inc. v. CULPEPPEERgreen2 sentences2024Brown v. Zimmerman, 160 S.W.3d 695, 702 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex.1990). 2017Specifically, Walker assert that “Many of these terms were never testified to at all, or were contradicted by Plaintiff’s own 4 Id. (citing Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995) (citation omitted)). 5 Id. (citing Mancorp, 802 S.W.2d at 227 ). 6 Id. 7 Id. (citing Garcia v. Ins. | 1 | 2 |
Usaa Texas Lloyds Company v. Gail Menchacagreen1 sentence2025See USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 505 (Tex. 2018); Spencer v. Eagle Star Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Zimmermangreen1 sentence2024Brown v. Zimmerman, 160 S.W.3d 695, 702 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.); Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex.1990). | 1 | 1 |
Jelinek v. Casasgreen1 sentence2023See Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 533 (Tex. 2010) (“Lay testimony may be used as evidence of causation in certain circumstances, but ‘[w]hen expert testimony is required, lay evidence supporting liability is legally insufficient.’” (quoting City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 812 )). | 1 | 1 |
Allen Chadwick Burbage v. W. Kirk Burbage and Burbage Funeral Homegreen1 sentence2022But because the Defendants did not object to the charge in the trial court, they have failed to preserve this issue for our review and thus cannot now complain about the charge. 18 See Burbage, 447 S.W.3d at 256 (“[I]n situations where a party does not raise a Casteel-type objection, that party surely cannot raise a Casteel issue when it failed to preserve a claim of an invalid theory of liability 18 Citing United Scaffolding, Inc. v. Levine, 537 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. 2017), the Defendants contend that they weren’t required to object to the charge and preserved their complaint by raising it in thei | 1 | 1 |
In Re MSgreen1 sentence2021Moreover, none of the Yammines argued to the trial court—or to us— that the evidence was legally or factually insufficient to support the jury’s finding of an agreement that the 701 Property legal description could be added after closing.11 See In 11 Wally and Wahid filed a JNOV motion combined with a motion to disregard jury findings in which they argued that Question 1 “{i} is not supported by Plaintiff’s pleadings and {ii} constitutes a legal conclusion and an improper statement of the law.” They contended that if the trial court relied on the jury’s answer to Question 1 26 re M.S., 115 S.W | 1 | 1 |
| Damian v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Cryegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Haase v. Glaznergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Baylor University v. Sonnichsengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Perry v. Cohengreen | 1 | 1 |
| First City Mortgage Co. v. Gillisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Exxon Corp. v. Breezevale Ltd.green | 1 | 1 |
| Kissman v. Bendix Home Systems, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gomez v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Divisiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Osterberg v. Pecagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Tubb v. Bartlettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Seckers v. Ocean Chemicals, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018See Knutson v. Friess, No. 09-08-00181-CV, 2009 WL 1331100 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 14, 2009, no pet.) (citing Mocega v. Bradford Urquhart M.D., 79 S.W.3d 61 , 64–65 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (reversing dismissal of medical malpractice action because trial court did not give notice of hearing on motion to dismiss); Green v. McAdams, 857 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (holding trial court erred by rendering post-answer default judgment after party failed to appear at trial because trial court gave defaulting party no notice of trial 2018See Knutson v. Friess, No. 09-08-00181-CV, 2009 WL 1331100 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May 14, 2009, no pet.) (citing Mocega v. Bradford Urquhart M.D., 79 S.W.3d 61 , 64–65 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (reversing dismissal of medical malpractice action because trial court did not give notice of hearing on motion to dismiss); Green v. McAdams, 857 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (holding trial court erred by rendering post-answer default judgment after party failed to appear at trial because trial court gave defaulting party no notice of trial | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Horrocks v. Texas Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2012See Werner, 909 S.W.2d at 870, n. 1 ; Horrocks, 852 S.W.2d at 499 ; Razey, 426 S.W.2d at 540-41 . 2012See Werner, 909 S.W.2d at 870, n. 1 ; Horrocks, 852 S.W.2d at 499 ; Razey, 426 S.W.2d at 540-41 . | 2 | 2012–2012 |
United Scaffolding, Inc. v. James Levine
green
2 sentences2022In Levine, the supreme court determined that when “the wrong theory of recovery was submitted and the correct theory of recovery was omitted entirely, the defendant has no obligation to object.” Id. at 481 . 2022But because the Defendants did not object to the charge in the trial court, they have failed to preserve this issue for our review and thus cannot now complain about the charge. 18 See Burbage, 447 S.W.3d at 256 (“[I]n situations where a party does not raise a Casteel-type objection, that party surely cannot raise a Casteel issue when it failed to preserve a claim of an invalid theory of liability 18 Citing United Scaffolding, Inc. v. Levine, 537 S.W.3d 463 (Tex. 2017), the Defendants contend that they weren’t required to object to the charge and preserved their complaint by raising it in thei | 1 | 2022–2022 |
T.O. Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso
green
1 sentence2021Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218 , 220–21 (Tex. 1992) (explaining that a no-evidence issue must be preserved by moving for an instructed verdict, moving for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, objecting to submitting the question to the jury, moving to disregard the jury’s answer to a vital fact question, or moving for a new trial). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Bennett v. Cochran green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| D. Patrick Smitherman v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Schwab v. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Kia Motors Corp. v. Ruiz green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Ryland Enterprise, Inc. v. Weatherspoon green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Verburgt v. Dorner green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Bradford v. Vento green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Alan Gordon, Lauren Gordon, and IBL Construction & Design, LLC v. Dennis Leasman D/B/A Leasman Contracting green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Apache Corp. v. DYNEGY MIDSTREAM SERVICES green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Halim v. Ramchandani green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.