quiet title claim in California

2026In Kachlon v. Markowitz (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 316, the Court of Appeal affirmed an attorneys’ fee award under Civil Code section 1717, finding causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief and to quiet title were “ ‘action[s] on a contract,’ ” even though “the remedy sought . . . was equitable.” (Id. at pp. 346-348.) The declaratory relief claim “sought a declaration that [an underlying] promissory note 13 must be cancelled because it had been paid in full, and that [a related] deed of trust must be reconveyed because the foreclosure violated the terms of the deed of trust.” (Id. at

2026In Kachlon v. Markowitz (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 316 , the Court of Appeal affirmed an attorneys’ fee award under Civil Code section 1717, finding causes of action for declaratory and injunctive relief and to quiet title were “ ‘action[s] on a contract,’ ” even though “the remedy sought . . . was equitable.” (Id. at pp. 346-348.) The declaratory relief claim “sought a declaration that [an underlying] promissory note 13 must be cancelled because it had been paid in full, and that [a related] deed of trust must be reconveyed because the foreclosure violated the terms of the deed of trust.” (Id. at

2025It is not aimed at a particular piece of evidence, but at the pretensions of an individual.’ ” (Water for Citizens of Weed California, supra, at p. 281, quoting Castro v. Barry (1889) 79 Cal. 443, 446 .) “The ultimate fact to be found is the ownership of the property.” (Water for Citizens of Weed California, at p. 281.) “To prevail on a quiet title claim, a plaintiff must establish title to the property in dispute.” (Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1193 ; see Code Civ.

2018The difficulty here is similar to the problem that can arise in determining whether to give collateral estoppel effect to a prior judicial decision. 15 Collateral estoppel applies only if an issue was "actually *511 litigated and *231 necessarily decided" in a prior case. ( DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813 , 825, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809 , 352 P.3d 378 .) If the record does not permit a conclusion that an issue was necessarily decided, the prior decision cannot be given preclusive effect. ( Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1180 , 1197-1198, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 501 [record from a

2026Inasmuch as the appellate record is unclear as to Sabahi, the trial court shall include the sellers’ quiet title claim as pleaded against Sabahi among the matters to be considered on remand. 26 The fourth amended complaint identified the Cardenas deeds of trust and the trustee deeds as the instruments that the plaintiffs desired the court to cancel. 28 To these elements, some opinions also “seem to” impose, as a further element, a requirement that “the aider and abettor had the specific intent to facilitate the wrongful conduct.” (Schulz v. Neovi Data Corp. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 86 , 95, citi

2026Inasmuch as the appellate record is unclear as to Sabahi, the trial court shall include the sellers’ quiet title claim as pleaded against Sabahi among the matters to be considered on remand. 25 The fourth amended complaint identified the Cardenas deeds of trust and the trustee deeds as the instruments that the plaintiffs desired the court to cancel. 28 To these elements, some opinions also “seem to” impose, as a further element, a requirement that “the aider and abettor had the specific intent to facilitate the wrongful conduct.” (Schulz v. Neovi Data Corp. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 86, 95 , citi

2026Inasmuch as the appellate record is unclear as to Sabahi, the trial court shall include the sellers’ quiet title claim as pleaded against Sabahi among the matters to be considered on remand. 26 The fourth amended complaint identified the Cardenas deeds of trust and the trustee deeds as the instruments that the plaintiffs desired the court to cancel. 28 To these elements, some opinions also “seem to” impose, as a further element, a requirement that “the aider and abettor had the specific intent to facilitate the wrongful conduct.” (Schulz v. Neovi Data Corp. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 86 , 95, citi

2026Inasmuch as the appellate record is unclear as to Sabahi, the trial court shall include the sellers’ quiet title claim as pleaded against Sabahi among the matters to be considered on remand. 25 The fourth amended complaint identified the Cardenas deeds of trust and the trustee deeds as the instruments that the plaintiffs desired the court to cancel. 28 To these elements, some opinions also “seem to” impose, as a further element, a requirement that “the aider and abettor had the specific intent to facilitate the wrongful conduct.” (Schulz v. Neovi Data Corp. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 86, 95 , citi

2026Inasmuch as the appellate record is unclear as to Sabahi, the trial court shall include the sellers’ quiet title claim as pleaded against Sabahi among the matters to be considered on remand. 26 The fourth amended complaint identified the Cardenas deeds of trust and the trustee deeds as the instruments that the plaintiffs desired the court to cancel. 28 To these elements, some opinions also “seem to” impose, as a further element, a requirement that “the aider and abettor had the specific intent to facilitate the wrongful conduct.” (Schulz v. Neovi Data Corp. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 86 , 95, citi

2026Inasmuch as the appellate record is unclear as to Sabahi, the trial court shall include the sellers’ quiet title claim as pleaded against Sabahi among the matters to be considered on remand. 25 The fourth amended complaint identified the Cardenas deeds of trust and the trustee deeds as the instruments that the plaintiffs desired the court to cancel. 28 To these elements, some opinions also “seem to” impose, as a further element, a requirement that “the aider and abettor had the specific intent to facilitate the wrongful conduct.” (Schulz v. Neovi Data Corp. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 86, 95 , citi

2018The difficulty here is similar to the problem that can arise in determining whether to give collateral estoppel effect to a prior judicial decision. 15 Collateral estoppel applies only if an issue was "actually *511 litigated and *231 necessarily decided" in a prior case. ( DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813 , 825, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809 , 352 P.3d 378 .) If the record does not permit a conclusion that an issue was necessarily decided, the prior decision cannot be given preclusive effect. ( Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1180 , 1197-1198, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 501 [record from a

2018The difficulty here is similar to the problem that can arise in determining whether to give collateral estoppel effect to a prior judicial decision. 15 Collateral estoppel applies only if an issue was "actually *511 litigated and *231 necessarily decided" in a prior case. ( DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813 , 825, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 809 , 352 P.3d 378 .) If the record does not permit a conclusion that an issue was necessarily decided, the prior decision cannot be given preclusive effect. ( Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1180 , 1197-1198, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 501 [record from a

2021(Id. at pp. 944-945) The court stated that after a default in a quiet title action, “the plaintiff is not automatically entitled to judgment in its favor but must prove its case [against the defaulting defendant] in an evidentiary hearing with live witnesses and any other admissible evidence.” (Id. at p. 947.) Both Harbour Vista and Nickell disagreed with dicta in an earlier case, Yeung v. Soos (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 576 (Yeung) (a case relied upon by Paterra), that section 764.010 does not prohibit default judgments in quiet 30 title actions, but merely requires a higher standard of evidence

2021(Id. at pp. 944-945) The court stated that after a default in a quiet title action, “the plaintiff is not automatically entitled to judgment in its favor but must prove its case [against the defaulting defendant] in an evidentiary hearing with live witnesses and any other admissible evidence.” (Id. at p. 947.) Both Harbour Vista and Nickell disagreed with dicta in an earlier case, Yeung v. Soos (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 576 (Yeung) (a case relied upon by Paterra), that section 764.010 does not prohibit default judgments in quiet 30 title actions, but merely requires a higher standard of evidence

2021(See Harbour Vista, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1504-1509; Nickell v. Matlock (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 934, 941-947 (Nickell).) Under section 580, in a non-quiet-title action where a defendant was served by publication or in a noncontract case, after an entry of default and 28 before a default judgment, the plaintiff must present evidence at a hearing (with witnesses or by documents) to prove up the claimed damages or other relief requested, and the defendant cannot participate in this hearing. (§ 580; see Sass, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 871, 880, 882; Harbour Vista, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p

2021(See Harbour Vista, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1504-1509; Nickell v. Matlock (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 934, 941-947 (Nickell).) Under section 580, in a non-quiet-title action where a defendant was served by publication or in a noncontract case, after an entry of default and 28 before a default judgment, the plaintiff must present evidence at a hearing (with witnesses or by documents) to prove up the claimed damages or other relief requested, and the defendant cannot participate in this hearing. (§ 580; see Sass, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 871, 880, 882; Harbour Vista, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p

2016"Allowing plaintiffs to recoup the property without full tender would give them an inequitable windfall, allowing them to evade their lawful debt." (Stebley v. Litton Loan Servicing, 26 LLP (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 522, 526 ; see Gavina v. Smith (1944) 25 Cal.2d 501, 506 .) However, the courts have recognized an exception in the case of a postsale foreclosure alleged to be a void sale.

2015Additionally, a borrower may not “quiet title against a secured lender without first paying the outstanding debt on which the mortgage or deed of trust is based.” (Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 49, 86 (Lueras).) “Allowing plaintiffs to recoup the property without full tender would give them an inequitable windfall, allowing them to evade their lawful debt.” (Stebley v. Litton Loan Servicing, LLP (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 522, 526 ; see also Gavina v. Smith (1944) 25 Cal.2d 501, 506 [“One who violates his contract cannot have recourse to equity to support that very

2014To state a quiet title claim, a plaintiff must plead: (1) a description 5 The Ninth Circuit has only addressed Glaski in one case: In re Davies (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2014) 565 Fed.Appx. 630 .

2014To state a quiet title claim, a plaintiff must plead: (1) a description 5 The Ninth Circuit has only addressed Glaski in one case: In re Davies (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2014) 565 Fed.Appx. 630 .

2026(See Maynard, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at pp. 990–992.) So Hakim-Baba’s success, or lack thereof, in obtaining the litigation objectives reflected by his pursuit of tort claims is, in this case, a proper factor that the trial court considered in deciding that he was not the prevailing party for the purpose of his request for contractual attorney fees. 2.

2026(See Turner v. Seterus, Inc. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 516 , 531–532.)” The court concluded that no statute of limitations had begun to run on the Heredias’ quiet title claim because they were in undisputed possession of the property.

2025(See City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 80 .) And because the Rodriguezes fail to identify any proposed amendments that would cure the complaint’s defects, they are not entitled to leave to amend.

2025Under section 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure, “[n]o action for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof, can be maintained, unless it appear that the plaintiff . . . was seized or possessed of the property in question, within five years before the commencement of the action.” “‘An action to quiet title to real property is an action for the recovery thereof within the meaning of section 318.’” (Safwenberg v. Marquez (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 301, 311 .) Consequently, the Ghosals had to have possession of the property sometime after December 2017—five years bef

2025It is not aimed at a particular piece of evidence, but at the pretensions of an individual.’ ” (Water for Citizens of Weed California, supra, at p. 281, quoting Castro v. Barry (1889) 79 Cal. 443, 446 .) “The ultimate fact to be found is the ownership of the property.” (Water for Citizens of Weed California, at p. 281.) “To prevail on a quiet title claim, a plaintiff must establish title to the property in dispute.” (Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1193 ; see Code Civ.

2024While this reason was erroneous—as the Ghosals in fact alleged this, and such an allegation was not required anyway (see Glaski v. Bank of America (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1100 [allegation of tender not required when plaintiff alleges defendant’s lack of authority rendered foreclosure sale void])—it is nonetheless conclusive for purposes of claim preclusion (Murphy v. Murphy (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 376, 407 ).

2024Claim preclusion “arises if a second suit involves: (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same parties (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824 .) Whether the lawsuits involve the same cause of action is determined under “the ‘primary rights’ theory, under which the invasion of one primary right gives rise to a single cause of action.” (Slater v. Blackwood (1975) 15 Cal.3d 791, 795 .) In this context, “the ‘cause of action’ is based upon the harm suffered, as opposed to the particular theory asserted by the liti

2024Claim preclusion “arises if a second suit involves: (1) the same cause of action (2) between the same parties (3) after a final judgment on the merits in the first suit.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 824 .) Whether the lawsuits involve the same cause of action is determined under “the ‘primary rights’ theory, under which the invasion of one primary right gives rise to a single cause of action.” (Slater v. Blackwood (1975) 15 Cal.3d 791, 795 .) In this context, “the ‘cause of action’ is based upon the harm suffered, as opposed to the particular theory asserted by the liti