quiet title claim in Utah

2023See In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, ¶ 27 , 144 P.3d 1129 (“When a party asserts a quiet title claim in which that party merely requests that the court adjudicate the validity of an opponent’s adverse or hostile claim to property to which the party already holds title, no statute of limitations applies.”). 20210568-CA 7 2023 UT App 43 Fernwood Place v. Layton Partners Holdings on a liability created by state statute.

2023See In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, ¶ 27 , 144 P.3d 1129 (“When a party asserts a quiet title claim in which that party merely requests that the court adjudicate the validity of an opponent’s adverse or hostile claim to property to which the party already holds title, no statute of limitations applies.”). 20210568-CA 7 2023 UT App 43 Fernwood Place v. Layton Partners Holdings on a liability created by state statute.

2006Id. at 376-77 .

2006Id. ¶ 25 In American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757 (Utah 1992), we updated the framework for determining statute of limitations issues in Utah.

2024Consequently, a quiet title claim fails if the plaintiff cannot establish valid title or some other valid and existing property right.” WDIS, LLC v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass’n, 2019 UT 45, ¶ 42 , 449 P.3d 171 (quotation simplified).

2021See WDIS, LLC v. Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Ass’n, 2019 UT 45, ¶ 43 , 449 P.3d 171 (“[A] a quiet title claim analysis . . . requires the court to determine whether [one claimant’s] property interest is superior to the interests of the other named adverse claimants.”).5 III.

2019Co. v. Cannon, 184 P.2d 341, 342 (Utah 1947) (ruling that because the plaintiff failed to establish ownership, the defendant did not have to establish ownership to defeat plaintiff’s claim). 75 See Hoopiiaina, 2006 UT 53, ¶ 31 (determining that a grandfather’s will conveyance was void due to a lack of authority); see also Bangerter, 2009 UT 67, ¶¶ 6, 18 (upon remand the district court would be required to determine whether a sheriff’s deed was void). 21 WDIS v. HI-COUNTRY Opinion of the Court of “another claim”76—cannot be interpreted as requiring the success of the plaintiff’s quiet title cla

2019In that case we were asked to decide whether a statute of limitations applied to a quiet title claim where the plaintiff did not have record title to the property but had remained in continuous possession of it.113 The defendant argued that the statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiff’s challenge of the sheriff’s deed barred the quiet title action.114 According to the defendant, this was so, despite our holding in Hoopiiaina, because the plaintiff’s “claim [was] not a true quiet title action” under the test in Hoopiiaina.115 It claimed that it was not a true quiet title action, becau

2023See In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006 UT 53, ¶ 27 , 144 P.3d 1129 (“When a party asserts a quiet title claim in which that party merely requests that the court adjudicate the validity of an opponent’s adverse or hostile claim to property to which the party already holds title, no statute of limitations applies.”). 20210568-CA 7 2023 UT App 43 Fernwood Place v. Layton Partners Holdings on a liability created by state statute.

2019Canyon Land & Stock Co., 238 P. at 283 (“Possession of land is prima facie evidence of title, and is sufficient evidence of title as against all persons but one who can show either a prior possession or a better title.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bank of Vernal, 250 P.2d at 583 (explaining that “the right of possession . . . is the most important single incident of ownership”); Conder, 2000 UT App 105, ¶ 17 (citing our decisions in Rogers and Davidsen for the proposition that “those in actual possession of real estate are never barred by any statute of limitation from seekin

2019See id. ¶52 Accordingly, we hold that Pioneer’s Second Suit is not barred by claim preclusion, because acquiring the deed to the Disputed Strip from the Drive-In following the First Suit 20180159-CA 24 2019 UT App 213 Pioneer Home v. TaxHawk constituted a new, distinct transaction, and Pioneer therefore could not have asserted the quiet-title claim based on the deed during the First Suit.

2019See id. ¶52 Accordingly, we hold that Pioneer’s Second Suit is not barred by claim preclusion, because acquiring the deed to the Disputed Strip from the Drive-In following the First Suit 20180159-CA 24 2019 UT App 213 Pioneer Home v. TaxHawk constituted a new, distinct transaction, and Pioneer therefore could not have asserted the quiet-title claim based on the deed during the First Suit.

2019See Gillmor, 2012 UT 38, ¶ 23 ; 8.

2019Canyon Land & Stock Co., 238 P. at 283 (“Possession of land is prima facie evidence of title, and is sufficient evidence of title as against all persons but one who can show either a prior possession or a better title.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bank of Vernal, 250 P.2d at 583 (explaining that “the right of possession . . . is the most important single incident of ownership”); Conder, 2000 UT App 105, ¶ 17 (citing our decisions in Rogers and Davidsen for the proposition that “those in actual possession of real estate are never barred by any statute of limitation from seekin

2019Canyon Land & Stock Co., 238 P. at 283 (“Possession of land is prima facie evidence of title, and is sufficient evidence of title as against all persons but one who can show either a prior possession or a better title.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bank of Vernal, 250 P.2d at 583 (explaining that “the right of possession . . . is the most important single incident of ownership”); Conder, 2000 UT App 105, ¶ 17 (citing our decisions in Rogers and Davidsen for the proposition that “those in actual possession of real estate are never barred by any statute of limitation from seekin

2019We said that “[w]hen a party asserts a quiet title claim in which that party merely requests that the court adjudicate the validity of an opponent’s adverse or hostile claim to property to which the party already holds title,” the party is bringing a true quiet title claim. 59 So “if it is not necessary that the court grant other relief in favor of the 53 Tex. Co. v. Davis, 254 S.W. 304, 309 (Tex. 1923). 54 2006 UT 53 , ¶ 26 (citation omitted). 55 Id. 56 Id. 57 Id. (quoting State ex rel.

2019Canal Co., 238 P. 280, 283 (Utah 1925) (“Possession of land is prima facie evidence of title, and is sufficient (Continued) 20 Cite as: 2019 UT 45 Opinion of the Court ¶43 The second step of a quiet title claim analysis—after the plaintiff has established a prima facie quiet title case—requires the court to determine whether the plaintiff’s property interest is superior to the interests of the other named adverse claimants. 74 This second step almost always requires the court to make a legal determination regarding the validity of the adverse claimant’s interest, such as a determination that t

2019Canyon Land & Stock Co., 238 P. at 283 (“Possession of land is prima facie evidence of title, and is sufficient evidence of title as against all persons but one who can show either a prior possession or a better title.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bank of Vernal, 250 P.2d at 583 (explaining that “the right of possession . . . is the most important single incident of ownership”); Conder, 2000 UT App 105, ¶ 17 (citing our decisions in Rogers and Davidsen for the proposition that “those in actual possession of real estate are never barred by any statute of limitation from seekin

2019Co. v. Cannon, 184 P.2d 341, 342 (Utah 1947) (ruling that because the plaintiff failed to establish ownership, the defendant did not have to establish ownership to defeat plaintiff’s claim). 75 See Hoopiiaina, 2006 UT 53, ¶ 31 (determining that a grandfather’s will conveyance was void due to a lack of authority); see also Bangerter, 2009 UT 67, ¶¶ 6, 18 (upon remand the district court would be required to determine whether a sheriff’s deed was void). 21 WDIS v. HI-COUNTRY Opinion of the Court of “another claim”76—cannot be interpreted as requiring the success of the plaintiff’s quiet title cla

2019See id. ¶52 Accordingly, we hold that Pioneer’s Second Suit is not barred by claim preclusion, because acquiring the deed to the Disputed Strip from the Drive-In following the First Suit 20180159-CA 24 2019 UT App 213 Pioneer Home v. TaxHawk constituted a new, distinct transaction, and Pioneer therefore could not have asserted the quiet-title claim based on the deed during the First Suit.

2019See id. ¶52 Accordingly, we hold that Pioneer’s Second Suit is not barred by claim preclusion, because acquiring the deed to the Disputed Strip from the Drive-In following the First Suit 20180159-CA 24 2019 UT App 213 Pioneer Home v. TaxHawk constituted a new, distinct transaction, and Pioneer therefore could not have asserted the quiet-title claim based on the deed during the First Suit.

2016See Blum v. Dahl, 2012 UT App 198, ¶ 12 , 283 P.3d 963 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶62 As to the quiet title claim, the Bresees asserted in their complaint a right to possess an approximately nine-foot strip of land along the western border of their property.

2016See Blum v. Dahl, 2012 UT App 198, ¶ 12 , 283 P.3d 963 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶62 As to the quiet title claim, the Bresees asserted in their complaint a right to possess an approximately nine-foot strip of land along the western border of their property.

2014See Cusano v. Klein, 264 F.3d 936, 947 (9th Cir.2001) ("[Glenerally, a debtor has no duty to schedule a cause of action that did not accrue prior to bankruptcy.").

2011R.R., 932 P.2d 596, 597-98 (Utah 1997) (concluding that although different facts supported several theories for recovery, the facts all related to a single claim for ownership of the disputed land); American Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Gibson, 839 P.2d 797 (Utah 1992) (rejecting rule 54(b) certification of a judgment that determined liability on a loan guarantee but reserved the question of damages).