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6 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1997People v. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d 170, 191 (1986), citing United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 , 65 L. 1997People v. Johnson , 114 Ill. 2d 170, 191 (1986), citing United States v. Salvucci , 448 U.S. 83, 91 , 65 L. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Charles Lochangreen1 sentence1986See United States v. Lochan (1st Cir.1982), 674 F.2d 960, 965 ; People v. Flowers (1982), 111 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Salvucci
green
2 sentences1986The fourth amendment protection against unreasonable government search and seizure extends only to individuals who have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched or property seized. ( Rakas v. Illinois (1978), 439 U.S. 128, 143 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 401 , 99 S.Ct. 421, 430 .) Property ownership, while not dispositive, is a factor to be considered in determining whether an individual has standing to test the constitutionality of a search and seizure. ( United States v. Salvucci (1980), 448 U.S. 83, 91 , 65 L.Ed.2d 619, 628 , 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2553 .) Other factors relevant in determin 1986The fourth amendment protection against unreasonable government search and seizure extends only to individuals who have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched or property seized. ( Rakas v. Illinois (1978), 439 U.S. 128, 143 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 401 , 99 S.Ct. 421, 430 .) Property ownership, while not dispositive, is a factor to be considered in determining whether an individual has standing to test the constitutionality of a search and seizure. ( United States v. Salvucci (1980), 448 U.S. 83, 91 , 65 L.Ed.2d 619, 628 , 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2553 .) Other factors relevant in determin | 3 | 1986–1997 |
People v. Mayberry
green
2 sentences1982An individual has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statutory provision if he is directly affected as one “within the class aggrieved by the alleged unconstitutionality.” (People v. Mayberry (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 1, 6 ; cert. denied (1976), 429 U.S. 828 , 50 L. 1982An individual has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statutory provision if he is directly affected as one "within the class aggrieved by the alleged unconstitutionality." ( People v. Mayberry (1976), 63 Ill.2d 1, 6 ; cert. denied (1976), 429 U.S. 828 , 50 L.Ed.2d 92 , 97 S.Ct. 87 .) Because the noncontrolled substance was represented to be heroin the prosecution contends that this should affect the defendant's standing to challenge the provision under which he was convicted. | 2 | 1982–1989 |
People v. Kidd
green
2 sentences2014The supreme court has held: -8- “Other factors relevant in determining the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy include whether the defendant was legitimately present in the area searched; whether the defendant had a possessory interest in the area or the property seized; whether the defendant had previously used the area searched or the area seized; whether the defendant had the ability to control the property or to exclude others from using it; and whether the defendant had a subjective expectation of privacy in the property. [Citation.] The question whether a defendant has a rea 2014But property ownership is merely “a factor to be considered in determining whether an individual has standing to test the constitutionality of a search and seizure”; it is “not dispositive.” Kidd, 178 Ill. 2d at 135 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Wagner
green
2 sentences1989(People v. Wagner (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 308, 311 , 433 N.E.2d 267, 269 ; People v. Mayberry (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 1, 6 , 345 N.E.2d 97, 100 .) It is evident defendant is not directly affected by any alleged constitutional problem with section 12 — 13 and, thus, has no standing to raise such. 1989(People v. Wagner (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 308, 311 , 433 N.E.2d 267, 269 ; People v. Mayberry (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 1, 6 , 345 N.E.2d 97, 100 .) It is evident defendant is not directly affected by any alleged constitutional problem with section 12 — 13 and, thus, has no standing to raise such. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
People v. Flowers
green
1 sentence1986See United States v. Lochan (1st Cir.1982), 674 F.2d 960, 965 ; People v. Flowers (1982), 111 Ill. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Rakas v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1986The fourth amendment protection against unreasonable government search and seizure extends only to individuals who have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched or property seized. ( Rakas v. Illinois (1978), 439 U.S. 128, 143 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 401 , 99 S.Ct. 421, 430 .) Property ownership, while not dispositive, is a factor to be considered in determining whether an individual has standing to test the constitutionality of a search and seizure. ( United States v. Salvucci (1980), 448 U.S. 83, 91 , 65 L.Ed.2d 619, 628 , 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2553 .) Other factors relevant in determin 1986Ed. 2d 387, 401 , 99 S. Ct. 421, 430 .) Property ownership, while not dispositive, is a factor to be considered in determining whether an individual has standing to test the constitutionality of a search and seizure. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Civic Awareness of America, Ltd. v. Mathews
green
2 sentences1982Ed. 2d 92 , 97 S. Ct. 87 .) Because the noncontrolled substance was represented to be heroin the prosecution contends that this should affect the defendant’s standing to challenge the provision under which he was convicted. 1982An individual has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statutory provision if he is directly affected as one "within the class aggrieved by the alleged unconstitutionality." ( People v. Mayberry (1976), 63 Ill.2d 1, 6 ; cert. denied (1976), 429 U.S. 828 , 50 L.Ed.2d 92 , 97 S.Ct. 87 .) Because the noncontrolled substance was represented to be heroin the prosecution contends that this should affect the defendant's standing to challenge the provision under which he was convicted. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Riebschlaeger v. United States
green
2 sentences1982An individual has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statutory provision if he is directly affected as one “within the class aggrieved by the alleged unconstitutionality.” (People v. Mayberry (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 1, 6 ; cert. denied (1976), 429 U.S. 828 , 50 L. 1982An individual has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statutory provision if he is directly affected as one "within the class aggrieved by the alleged unconstitutionality." ( People v. Mayberry (1976), 63 Ill.2d 1, 6 ; cert. denied (1976), 429 U.S. 828 , 50 L.Ed.2d 92 , 97 S.Ct. 87 .) Because the noncontrolled substance was represented to be heroin the prosecution contends that this should affect the defendant's standing to challenge the provision under which he was convicted. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.