inescapable rule in Illinois

1994In Lyons v. State, this Court stated that section 25 of the Court of Claims Act and section 790.60 of the Court of Claims Regulations, “quite clearly makes the exhaustion of remedies mandatory rather than optional.” (Lyons v. State, 34 Ill.

1990In Lyons v. State, this Court stated that section 25 of the Court of Claims Act and section 790.60 of the Court of Claims Regulations “quite clearly makes the exhaustion of remedies mandatory rather than optional.” (Lyons v. State (1980), 34 Ill.

1990Searle & Co. (1961), 367 U.S. 303, 307 , 6 L.Ed.2d 859, 863 , 81 S.Ct. 1579, 1582 .) The statute of repose provides that "no action for damages for injury or death against any physician * * * whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care" can be brought after the running of the repose period.

1979Ed. 2d 859, 869 , 81 S. Ct. 1579, 1582 , “The maxim noscitur a sociis, that a word is known by the company it keeps, while not an inescapable rule, is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.” Thus the words “abuse” and “harass” take color from the word “threaten” and acquire more restricted meanings.

1996(Burns v. State (1990), 43 Ill.

1981Ed. 2d 859 , ‘The maxim nosciur a sociis, that a word is known by the company it keeps, while not an inescapable rule, is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.’ Thus the words ‘abuse’ and ‘harass’ take color from the word ‘threaten’ and acquire more restricted meanings.” (People v. Parkins (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 253, 257-58 , 396 N.E.2d 22, 24 , appeal dismissed (1980), 446 U.S. 901 , 64 L.

1981Ed. 2d 254 , 100 S. Ct. 1825 .) Considering the more restricted meanings of the words in the present statute, we do not find the allegation of intent to annoy satisfactory for these proceedings.

1981Ed. 2d 859 , ‘The maxim nosciur a sociis, that a word is known by the company it keeps, while not an inescapable rule, is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.’ Thus the words ‘abuse’ and ‘harass’ take color from the word ‘threaten’ and acquire more restricted meanings.” (People v. Parkins (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 253, 257-58 , 396 N.E.2d 22, 24 , appeal dismissed (1980), 446 U.S. 901 , 64 L.

1981Ed. 2d 859 , ‘The maxim nosciur a sociis, that a word is known by the company it keeps, while not an inescapable rule, is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.’ Thus the words ‘abuse’ and ‘harass’ take color from the word ‘threaten’ and acquire more restricted meanings.” (People v. Parkins (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 253, 257-58 , 396 N.E.2d 22, 24 , appeal dismissed (1980), 446 U.S. 901 , 64 L.

1981Ed. 2d 859 , ‘The maxim nosciur a sociis, that a word is known by the company it keeps, while not an inescapable rule, is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.’ Thus the words ‘abuse’ and ‘harass’ take color from the word ‘threaten’ and acquire more restricted meanings.” (People v. Parkins (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 253, 257-58 , 396 N.E.2d 22, 24 , appeal dismissed (1980), 446 U.S. 901 , 64 L.

1979In People v. Raby (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 392 , the court considered the validity of section 26 — 1(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961, which in pertinent part provided: “A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly: (1) Does any act in such unreasonable manner as to alarm or disturb another and to provoke a breach of the peace ***.” (Ill.